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Dakota Territory in 1870 was a raw frontier country, 
inhabited by roaming bands of Indians and dotted with sparse 
settlements of whites. Into this land one April day came a 
young man whose rugged spirit and vitality matched that of the 
land he now claimed as his own. His name was Richard F. 
Pettigrew. He was a pioneer.
The youth was well suited to the tasks which awaited 
him. Full six feet tall, his shoulders were broad and his 
back straight. But equally important, his physical prowess 
was matched with a keen intellect, an engaging personality and 
boundless energy. Moreover, Pettigrew had supreme confidence 
in himself. He was aware from the outset of the limitless 
opportunities offered by Dakota, and he determined at once to 
exploit them for all of their worth.^ As he gazed across
X ■Doane Robinson, History of Dakota Territory and
South Dakota (New York; American Historical Society, 1930),
II, 640.
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the prairies of eastern Dakota that day, Pettigrew must have 
envisioned in his mind’s eye the wealth which was there for 
the taking. Penniless, with no alternative but success, there 
could be no turning back for him. He must push on,
Richard Pettigrew was born in 1848 in the village of 
Ludlow, Vermont, Through his mother he could trace his 
lineage back to the Puritan band which followed John Winthrop 
to Watertown, Both of his grandfathers fought in the Revolution 
and later settled permanently in Vermont; and there his 
parents spent their early years, were married and began their 
family, Richard’s life might well have run its course in 
Vermont had events not forced his father to flee New England 
and seek a new home further west,
Andrew Pettigrew was a devoted admirer of the 
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, He circulated the 
Liberator and other unpopular literature, and his store in 
Ludlow served as a way station for the "underground railroad,"
By 1850, unfortunately, his fervor began to cost him friends 
and customers, and soon he was faced with financial ruin. In 
1854, his savings gone and his very life in danger, he made 
the final decision to leave. Drawn by glowing reports of the 
West which he read in railroad advertising, Andrew gathered 
his family and set out for Wisconsin,^
2R,0, Parkinson, "The Early Career of Richard 
Franklin Pettigrew," (lowa City, Iowa; State University of 
Iowa, unpublished Master’s thesis, 1938), 1-2,
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The Pettigrews settled on a farm in Rock County near 
the hamlet of Union.^ Here the family worked and played, and 
the children continued their education at a country school.
By 1860, however, the desire to give his brood the best 
schooling available prompted Andrew to move once more. This 
time he settled near Evansville, the location of a respectable 
academy. Richard graduated from Evansville Academy in 1864 
and that fall enrolled at Beloit College.^ Since the family 
had no money for college expenses, he took a job as a janitor. 
This provided enough for room, board and tuition, and he was 
able to complete two full years of study before fate inter­
vened to cut short his college career.
Soon after the beginning of the term in 1866 Andrew 
Pettigrew became seriously ill. Richard hurried home from 
school to help manage the farm and when his father died in 
December, he decided to.stay on as long as he might be needed. 
It was not until the late summer of 1867 that he felt free to
leave. He had heard of a job in a dry goods store in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, which sounded attractive, and he decided to 
go there. When he arrived, however, the job had been taken 
and he was forced to pick corn in order to earn enough money
to eat. A few days later he learned of a position as a
^Dumas Malone (ed.). Dictionary of American Biography, 
"Richard Franklin Pettigrew" (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1946),XIV, 516-517.
4Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"
3-5.
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teacher in a country school near Marion Junction. He applied, 
passed the required examination, and was hired.
Teaching did not appeal to young Pettigrew. Neverthe­
less, he threw himself into his work with his characteristic 
vigor. Shortly, however, he decided to return to college and 
thus spent most of his leisure time reading law in preparation. 
When the year of teaching was completed, he went directly to 
Madison and enrolled in the Law School of the University of 
Wisconsin. There he met and studied under William F. Vilas 
and John C. Spooner, who were later to be his colleagues in 
the United States Senate.
At the end of the school year 1869, Pettigrew, 
penniless once again, joined a surveying party which was headed 
for Dakota Territory.^ The group arrived in eastern Dakota 
in June and worked through the summer and fall. Pettigrew 
was impressed with the immensity of the land and the 
opportunities which awaited the enterprising pioneer. Before 
he started home in November, he staked a claim to 160 acres 
near the village of Sioux Falls on the Big Sioux River. Then 
he returned to Madison to read law under the direction of 
Spooner. Little time elapsed, however, before Pettigrew again 
became restless. He feared that he might lose his claim to
5R.F. Pettigrew, "Autobiographical Manuscript," 
Pettigrew Papers, Loose File, Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota, 1.
5
a squatter, so in April 1870, he again set out for Dakota, 
and this time he stayed.&
The "village" of Sioux Falls which Pettigrew viewed 
across the Big Sioux River that spring,day in 1870 consisted 
of three log buildings, barracks, officers quarters, and a 
hospital. These buildings were constructed by the army in 
1863 after an Indian uprising had frightened most of the 
original settlers away. In 1869 the soldiers departed, but 
the buildings were left standing.? Since the land was now a 
military reservation and in theory not open to settlement, 
only a few people had returned. The buildings were inhabited 
by three traders, and a feV farmers lived along the wooded 
banks of the Big Sioux River, The day he arrived, Pettigrew 
met Dr. Nyrum Phillips, a trader and one of the original 
settlers who had remained. The young man moved into the 
vermin-infested barracks with the doctor and this became his 
home during his first year in Dakota.®
Since he knew something of the business because of his 
experience in 1869, Pettigrew decided to support himself by 
surveying the public domain. Shortly after his arrival 
in Dakota, he called upon the Surveyor General, William H. H.
^R.F. Pettigrew, "The Scroll of Time" (Unpublished 




Beadle, and was granted a contract for the survey of a portion 
of Lincoln County south of Sioux Falls.^
Meanwhile, young Pettigrew continued to broaden his 
acquaintanceship in the Big Sioux Valley, and he soon came to 
know most of the white settlers and Indians who inhabited the 
area. Pettigrew was a man who made friends quickly and
impressed others with his attitude assurance and self
‘10confidence, and he undertook to promise everyone living on 
the Sioux Falls Military Reservation that they would be allowed 
to prove up on their claims without interference as soon as 
the lands were surveyed. But a problem soon developed. 
Pettigrew and Phillips discovered that a syndicate had been 
formed in the East to buy the Sioux Falls Reservation from 
the government. This was customary procedure in those days, 
but since it would prevent Pettigrew and many of his new 
friends from making valid claims under the Homestead law, 
they decided to enter a protest. A petition was prepared to 
send to Congress, but when it was completed there were only 
twelve names attached. Pettigrew did not believe this would 
be sufficient so he and Phillips added the names of several 
more persons they thought might "show up pretty soon."
^Beadle to J.S. Wilson, Commissioner of the General 
Land Office, July 8, 1870, Records of the General Land 
Office, Record Groüp'60, Dakota Territory, Miscellaneous 
Letters received. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^*^Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"11- 12 .
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Satisfied with this, they sent their petition to Pettigrew’s 
friend, Senator Matthew Carpenter of Wisconsin and he used 
his influence to protect their rights.
In the summer of 1870 the army sent a few soldiers ove: 
from Fort Randall to auction off the buildings. Since they 
rested on the quarter section claimed by Phillips, the other 
settlers did not bid against him. He purchased the structures 
for a small price and allowed everyone to stay on free of rent, 
Pettigrew planned to live with Phillips that winter and 
build his own quarters the next spring. He hoped to practice 
law if he could drum up enough business, but meanwhile he 
kept busy with his surveying.
Surveyor General Beadle was pleased with Pettigrew’s
work in Lincoln County. Therefore, in August 1870, he
granted the young man a new contract for the survey of a
portion of Minnehaha County along the river north of Sioux
Falls. Pettigrew was paid $1800 for his services and
13granted the title, Deputy Surveyor. Shortly after the 
contract was signed, however. Beadle requested the General
^^R.F. Pettigrew, "Remarks Before the Minnehaha 
History Club of Sioux Falls," Pettigrew Papers, Loose File, 
Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 4.
12Ibid.. 5-6.
13Contract and Bond No. 48, Richard Pettigrew and 
W.H.H. Beadle, Contract Book III, 15, Records of the General 
Land Office, Record Group 49, Dakota Territory, Miscellaneous 
Letters Received, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
8
Land Office that it be suspended so that he might investigate 
a complaint which had been lodged against Pettigrew.
Three weeks later, having satisfied himself as to Pettigrew’s 
integrity, Beadle wrote Commissioner Joseph S. Wilson that 
the complaint had originated with only one person and was 
prompted by a "misunderstanding." The complaint was that 
Pettigrew had been granted a $5,000 surveying contract while 
a friend of the complainant had no work at all. When the 
size of the contract was disclosed to be only $1800, the 
complaint was withdrawn and the complainant joined in 
commending Pettigrew. Moreover, declared Beadle, Pettigrew 
was "warmly commended by distinguished gentlemen in 
Wisconsin." So the surveying contract was granted.
This episode and the petition incident constituted 
Pettigrew’s introduction to territorial politics. As he 
examined political conditions further, he discovered that 
the key factors in territorial political relationships were 
factionalism and jealousy between federally appointed officers 
and their local allies; and the local politicians making their 
own bids for leadership. The federal faction, he discovered, 
usually revolved around the Governor, while the most important 
elective office, was that of Delegate to Congress. The man
14Beadle to Wilson, August 14, 1870, Records of the 
General Land Office, Record Group 60, Dakota Territory, 
Miscellaneous Letters Received, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.
^^Beadle to Wilson, September 16, 1870, in ibid.
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who held this position was head of his party, or at least 
his faction, and his ability to distribute patronage 
adequately among his followers was the measure of his success. 
His most dangerous enemies in this business were the appointive 
federal officials.
Pettigrew found that in 1861, after the passage of 
the Organic Act for Dakota Territory, President Lincoln had 
appointed the first federal officials from among the various 
groups which made up the young Republican p a r t y . T h e  
Republicans thus dominated territorial politics from the 
outset and only relinquished their control on a few occasions. 
When this happened it was usually caused by fights within the
party which gave the Democrats an opportunity to elect a
D e l e g a t e . A t  the very time that Pettigrew arrived in the 
Territory such a split was developing and he wasted no time 
in entering the fray. With the help of his new friends in 
Sioux Falls he became a member of the Minnehaha County 
delegation to the Republican Territorial Convention of 1870,“ 
a gathering which portrayed admirably the bitter hostility 
that existed between the factions of the party. Since 1866
1^Howard R. Lamar, Dakota Territory (New Haven,
Connecticut; Yale University Press, 1956), 67-71.
17Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 93-108.
18George W. Kingsbury, History of Dakota Territory 
(Chicago: J.S. Clarke Publishing Co., 1915), I, 546.
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a breach had been widening between the pro- and anti-Johnson 
Republicans. The former, under the leadership of Dr. Walter A, 
Burleigh, controlled the Territory until 1868. After that 
the faction led by Solomon L. Spink was in power. Now, in 
1870, the two factions were again battling for control of 
delegates to yie territorial convention which would enable 
one of them to elect its leader to Congress. Neither side, 
however, felt secure after the county conventions had met, 
so separate conventions were held and both men were 
nominated.
Pettigrew was a delegate to the Burleigh faction 
conventions which met in Vermillion on September 6, 1870.
Along with his fellows he voted to nominate the doctor for 
Delegate. He also voted to encourage railroads to enter the 
Territory and to seek a more lenient government policy in
on ■
dealing with pre-emptors on public lands. He was 
disappointed, however, in the election. The split in the
party cost both candidates their chances, and the Democrat,
21Moses K. Armstrong, was elected.
When the political maneuvering was over, Pettigrew 
returned to Sioux Falls. Since he had not yet fulfilled his
19Lamar, Dakota Territory. 100-126.
90Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. I, 542-547.
21Ibid.. 551.
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surveying contract, he soon moved out once again and spent the 
remaining warm months working for the government.^2 He finished
his survey before the December 1, deadline and Beadle submitted
23his account to the General Land Office for payment.
Returning to Sioux Falls in November, Pettigrew lived in the
barracks until the completion of his office in the spring.
During cold weather he spent most of his time indoors
practicing law or playing poker, but when summer came in 1871
24he went surveying once more. Again he worked north along 
the Sioux River in what is now Brookings County. His 
contract was the same size as before, amounting to about 
$1800.25
As he travelled the length and breadth of the Big 
Sioux Valley, Pettigrew was impressed with the possibilities 
which existed for the man who owned strategic lots in newly 
organized counties. Whoever was in possession of land where 
county seats might be established would be likely to make a 
fortune. The thought intrigued him and he decided to make
22Pettigrew, "The Scroll of Time," 6.
23
Beadle to Wilson, November 21, 1870, Records of the 
General Land Office, Record Group 60, Dakota Territory 
Miscellaneous Letters Received, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.
24Pettigrew, "The Scroll of Time," 7.
25Beadle to Willis Drummond, July 8, 1871, Records of 
the General Land Office, Record Group 60, Dakota Territory, 
Miscellaneous Letters Received, National Archives,
Washington, D.C. ,
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certain that his land would be within the county seat of
Minnehaha County. He already owned a tract of land in Sioux
Falls, but he wanted to strengthen his position. To accomplish
this he gave money to two homesteaders to help them prove up
their claims in exchange for their promises to sell the land to
him as soon as title was clear. While he was out surveying,
however, both of these individuals sold their options to
other speculators and Pettigrew was left with nothing.
Thereafter, he decided to proceed by means of direct political
action. He became a candidate for the Territorial Legislature
of 1872.^^ Once elected, his plan was to have the vast
Minnehaha County divided into three smaller counties. He
called upon his brother, Fred, and his sister, Hannah, to
file claims on the land where the seats of the new counties
were likely to be placed; and having attended to this,
27turned his attention to the campaign.
The district which Pettigrew was to represent 
stretched for two hundred miles along the eastern edge of 
Dakota from Elk Point on the south to Big Stone Lake on- the 
north. There were very few people in the area and not all of 
them were eligible voters. There were some railroad surveyors 
in the area however, and Pettigrew solicited their votes. 
Although the railroad men were not legal residents of Dakota,
26Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew," 25.
27Pettigrew, "Remarks Before the Minnehaha History 
Club,'.' 9. : .
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they promised to give Pettigrew their support in the election. 
Their ballots were counted and with the majority the 
railroad vote gave him, Pettigrew was declared the winner. 
Shortly afterward, he set out for Yankton, the territorial
capital, where he soon became involved in a factional
98dispute which cost him his chair in the legislature.
Like most of its predecessors, this dispute was
precipitated during the campaign when two prominent Republicans
both claimed the office of Delegate. Judge W.W. Brookings
had the support of Governor Burbank and most of the federal
officials, while the other candidate. Col. Gideon C. Moody
of Yankton, led what formerly had been the Burleigh faction.
As a result of this split in the party both men failed and
Delegate Armstrong was re-elected. Furthermore, while there
were far more Republicans than Democrats elected to the
legislature, their effectiveness was deterred by the fact
that the breach had not healed by January, but seemed wider 
ogthan ever.
The fight in which Pettigrew soon became involved 
centered around the question of public printing. With the 
aid of the Democrats, Moody and his group passed a bill 
granting the contract for territorial printing to the
28Pettigrew, "Autobiographical Manuscript," 1-2.
og^Schell, South Dakota. 190-191.
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Yankton Dakotan. Trouble arose when Moody discovered that 
Territorial Secretary Edward S. McCook had already granted 
a printing contract to the other Yankton newspaper, the Press. 
McCook declared that since the federal government paid the 
bills, its representatives had the right to choose the 
printer. Col. Moody countered that this right belonged 
solely to the representatives of the people. Pettigrew joined 
with Moody in denouncing the federal faction by declaring in 
his maiden speech that Governor Burbank's opening address was 
so bad, and such a disgrace to the Territory, that it should 
not be printed by anyone. Unfortunately for the young 
politico, McCook won the fight and immediately afterward 
Pettigrew’s election was contested. Even so, he might have 
remained in the legislature if Moody had not suddenly decided 
to contest the election of Delegate Armstrong. When the 
Democrats heard of this, they immediately defected and 
without them the Moody faction was a minority in the assembly. 
Thus, Pettigrew lost his seat in the assembly.
From his experience in the legislature of 1872 
Pettigrew developed a hatred for federal control of 
territorial affairs which he never lost. He also gained the 
personal enmity of McCook which soon erupted into violence.
The incident occurred one night shortly after the beginning 
of the session. Pettigrew had already made his speech on the
on
Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. I, 674-675. The Press 
and Dakotan were combined late in 1872..
15
printing bill, but had not yet been unseated. That evening 
the members of the legislature were to be entertained by a 
troup of Swiss bell ringers. Pettigrew attended with Silas 
Roar of Union County, another member of the Moody faction.
When they arrived at the legislative hall, where the show was 
to be held, they found that all the desks had been pushed back 
to make room for the entertainers, and since the hall was 
already crowded, they climbed up on the pile of desks to 
watch. At the end of the bell ringing, McCook made his way 
toward them and ordered them off the desks with the words, 
"Sons-of-bitches like you cannot sit on government prdperty."
Roar and Pettigrew walked away, but when McCdok 
continued to badger them, Pettigrew turned and climbed back 
up on the pile of desks. With that the Secretary exploded 
with rage and pulled him down. Pettigrew swung and the 
fight was on. It was not an even match. Even though 
McCook was an extremely large and powerful man, he was so 
clumsy that the agile Pettigrew had no trouble avoiding his 
blows. While the Secretary continued to swing and miss, 
Pettigrew got in enough punches to knock him down. Then he 
jumped on the big man and began to flail away, determined to 
do as much damage as possible. At this point some friends of 
the Secretary pulled Pettigrew to his feet and pinned his 
arms behind him. He struggled frantically to escape as 
McCook lunged toward him, and at the last moment wrenched one 
arm free and whirled around pulling the man who held him
16
between himself and McCook. His captor caught the full force 
of a tremendous blow flush on the jaw and collapsed in a
heap, Pettigrew then turned on McCook again, but at this
31point the town marshall arrived and the bout was ended.
In later years Pettigrew delighted in telling this 
story, and also the story of McCook*s untimely death. This 
occurred on the night of September 11, 1873, in Yankton where 
a large, number of politicos had gathered to discuss the 
solvency of the Dakota Southern Railroad. Peter P. Wintermute, 
an anti-administration banker, moved a vote of no confidence 
in the company, after which he left the meeting hall to 
have a drink in a nearby saloon. There he was accosted by 
McCook and a fight broke out between them. Wintermute was 
a tiny man and the Secretary easily beat him and then pushed 
his face into the contents of a spitoon. While the banker 
sat on the floor, blood and rotten spittle dripping from his 
face, he screamed hysterically that he would kill McCook when 
next they met. Unabashed, the Secretary left to address the 
railroad meeting.
A few moments later while McCook was speaking, Winter­
mute walked quietly into the room and before he was noticed, 
emptied a pistol into the Secretary's chest at point blank 
range. McCook, who was not killed outright, lunged toward 
his assailant, knocked him to the floor, and was about to
31Pettigrew, "Autobiographical Manuscript," 3-4. 
Although there is no available substantiary evidence to prove 
it, relatives and friends testified to R.O. Parkinson that 
Pettigrew was known for his prowess at fisticuffs.
17
throw him out the window before he was finally restrained. 
Unfortunately, McCook’s wounds were fatal and he died the 
next day. Wintermute was indicted for manslaughter and 
found guilty, but the Territorial Supreme Court later
Op
reversed the decision and he went free.
The hatreds engendered by this episode had a telling 
effect on the Republican party. For the next two years the 
Democrats continued to control the office of Delegate and 
had more than their usual power in the legislature. Although 
Pettigrew continued to be interested in politics during this 
period, he was not again elected to public office until 1877. 
Thus he spent most of his time in Sioux Falls attending to 
his growing business interests, selling real estate and 
surveying.
In early July, 1872, two County Commissioners of 
Brookings County complained to the Surveyor General that 
Pettigrew’s work in 1871 had been inaccurate. Beadle demanded 
that evidence be submitted and he discovered that the 
commissioners had confused Pettigrew’s work with that of 
another surveyor who was clearly incompetent. It was further 
discovered that those who complained against Pettigrew had 
a personal grudge against him since they were unsuccessful
32Schell, South Dakota. 191; Kingsbury, Dakota 
Territory. I, 720-740; Pettigrew, ’Autobiographical Manuscript,"
4-5. Also see Lamar, Dakota Territory. 141-142.
33Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"
27.
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applicants for surveying contracts. Convinced of Pettigrew’s
integrity, Beadle ignored the complaints and cade a new
contract with the young surveyor and his partner, Ole 
34Iverson. The new contract was a larger one than before, 
amounting to $4,096.07. The work was completed successfully 
and Beadle transmitted Pettigrew's account to the General 
Land Office in December.Subsequently, Pettigrew fulfilled 
two more large surveying contracts in eastern Dakota, during 
the summers of 1873 and 1875. The first of these netted 
$4,886.52,^^ and the second brought $3,053.92?^ The records 
indicate that Pettigrew's work continued to be entirely 
satisfactory with the government. ' "
Meanwhile, the population of Dajcota continued to grow.
When Pettigrew arrived in 1870, the population of the entire
38Territory was only about 14,000. It increased rapidly 
after that, however, and the need for more adequate 
transportation facilities soon became apparent. Pettigrew
34Beadle to Willis Drummond, August 17, 18/2, Records 
of the General Land Office, Record Group 49, Dakota 
Territory, Miscellaneous Letters Received, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C.
35Beadle to Drummond, December 13, 1872, in ibid.
36William P. Dewey, Surveyor General of Efekota 
Territory, to Drummond, December 27, 1873, in ibid.
^^Dewey to S.S. Burnett, October 9, 1875, in ibid.
38Ninth Census of the United States. Population. 1870 
(Washington; Government Printing Office, 1872), I, 3.
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was very much interested in attracting railroads to south­
eastern Dakota. During the * seventies he made more than a 
dozen trips to New York and Chicago attempting to promote 
Dakota among eastern capitalists. He wanted to bring more 
railroads to the Territory and at the same time make Sioux 
Falls a city which would be the hub of the territorial system. 
His dream was to bring all the lines in the southern section 
of Dakota through Sioux Falls and then connect the city with 
two international shipping centers, Chicago and a port on 
the West C o a s t . H e  also wanted direct rail service for the 
farmers of southeastern Dakota so that they could compete 
more adequately with Sioux City shippers in the narkets of 
Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth.
In 1875 a citizens committee for the promotion of 
railroads in Dakota was formed. Pettigrew became a member 
and was soon recognized by everyone as the "ramrod."^* He 
had the unique capacity of the salesman in that he could 
stimulate interest where none existed. Moreover, he was 
tireless in his activities in behalf of Sioux Fails, pursuing 
his objectives with an almost demonic zeal, and as a result
An
of his work the railroads came. The first line into the
39Pettigrew, "Remarks Before the Minnehaha History
Club," 17.
40Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.-. Pettigrew," 65.
■ ...41D.R."Bailey, History of Minnehaha County (Sioux 
Falls: Brown and Saenger, 1899), 146.
42Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.r. Pettigrew," 89.
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village was the Saint Paul-Sioux City, which began 
construction of a spur from Worthington, Minnesota, in 1876. 
Pettigrew made himself personally responsible for its rapid 
completion. He assisted in the selection of the roadbed and 
aided in surveying and construction activities. When the 
first engine chugged into town on August 1, 1878, Pettigrew
was there beaming with pride. His dream was beginning to
. 43come true.
At the same time, Pettigrew attempted to strengthen 
his political position. He ran for the Territorial Council 
in 1874, but was d e f e a t e d . T w o  years later he served once 
again as a representative of his county at the Republican 
Territorial Convention. Eighteen-seventy-six was a 
presidential election year and the Republicans held two 
sessions. The first met in Yankton'in May. Pettigrew attended 
along with seven others from Minnehaha County, and helped 
select delegates to the national convention. He also 
appeared at the second session which met in Vermillion in 
August. Pettigrew was the only returning member of the 
Minnehaha County delegation and was elevated to a seat on the 
resolutions committee. The report of that committee which was 
adopted by the convention reflected admirably his own position:
43Sioux Falls Argus Leader. July 23, 1926.
44■ Yankton Press and Dakotan. January 14, 1875.
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We renew our allegiance to the principles of the 
Republican party. . . .
We cordially endorse the selection of Hayes.
We acknowledge with pride the valuable services of our 
Delegate to Congress, J.P. Kidder. . . .
The interests of the people of Dakota demand the 
creation of a separate territorial government for the 
northern portion. . . .
We believe the Black Hills should be opened to 
settlement. . . .
When the convention ended Pettigrew went home to begin his
campaign for the legislature. This time he won and took
45his seat in Yankton on January 27, 1877.
During his term on the Territorial Council Pettigrew 
adhered strictly to the party line. The legislators were 
primarily concerned with the organization of the Black Hills, 
in which a population increase had occurred since the 
discovery of gold two years before. The federal government 
had not yet ratified a treaty with the Indians, and thus 
refused to take jurisdiction in the area. But the residents 
had established provisional governments which were operating 
de facto. and in anticipation of the ratification of an Indian 
treaty the legislature established a mining code which was 
incorporated into the laws of the Territory. The lawmakers 
also created three new counties in the Black Kills, Custer,
Lawrence and Pennington, and made these a separate judicial district,
45Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1011.
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Party factionalism was in the background during this 
period, but was kept alive by severe criticism which was 
levelled at the administration by the Dsaocrats. Governor 
John L. Pennington appointed a number of officials to 
administer, the newly organized counties. Of course all of 
them were Republicans and most came from outside the Hills.
The result was inevitable. The majority of the ceople in the 
Black Hills were Democrats and a great outcry of partisanship 
arose. Moreover, when the county seats were created, those 
who were disappointed charged that the Governor and his 
•'friends" had formed a "ring" for the promotion of new 
townsites.
The unrest continued after the adjournment of the 
legislature as agitation for special elections to rid the 
Hills of the Pennington appointees began in earnest. The 
county clerks, however, refused to act and nothing was done 
until fall. Then, the clerks were overruled by the new judge 
of the district, Granville G. Bennett, and the elections were 
called. On November 15, 1877, the voters elected their own 
officials and new county seats, and the "Yankton Ring" was 
beaten.
Meanwhile, Pettigrew was in Sioux Falls attending to 
his business affairs. The community was growing along with 
the entire territory, and he was even more certain than before
46Schell, South Dakota. 194-195.
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that he sat on a potential gold mine. Pettigrew believed 
there was virtually no limit to the heights he could reach 
if he maintained his popularity among the people and expanded 
his role in the Republican party. To accomplish these 
objectives simultaneously he hit upon a formula which was 
ready-made for him and which was almost certain of success.
He would continue to work for the economic development of the 
Territory, level his political attacks primarily against the 
federal officials and their allies, and take up the growing 
cry for division of the Territory and statehood for South 
Dakota.
His drive for supremacy began in 1878. Once again he 
served on the delegation which represented Minnehaha County 
at the Territorial Republican convention. As usual, the 
most important bit of business was the selection of a 
candidate for the office of Delegate. Since the time was not 
yet ripe for him to push his own candidacy, Pettigrew played 
safe by supporting the incumbent, Jefferson P. Kidder. This 
man was partially responsible for the extinguishment of 
Indian title to the Black Hills, and as a result was 
extremely popular in the western section of the Territory.
He had considerable support among party leaders also, 
except for two determined groups which backed Gideon C. Moody
47
The Black Hills Treaty was signed in 1876 and 
ratified in 1877. Kidder sponsored the land district bill. 
See: Congressional Record. 44 Cong., 2 Sess., January 17,
1877, V, 693.
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and Granville G. Bennett. Bennett, too, was popular in the 
Black Hills because of his opposition to the "Yankton Ring," 
while Moody, now chairman of the central committee, had 
numerous partisans throughout Dakota, Nevertheless, neither 
of these men had enough support to succeed alone. Only 
combined did their backers have enough power to wrest the 
nomination from Kidder,
Pettigrew was appointed to the committee on permanent 
organization and was thus in a position to witness the 
manipulation of the convention delegates from the inside.
His committee named W.H. Parker, a Bennett man, to the 
chair. Moreover, William H.H, Beadle, the former Surveyor 
General, and E.A, Williams of Yankton were named secretaries. 
When Beadle declined to serve, George W. Kingsbury was named 
to replace him. All of these were Moody men.
The balloting began on August 28, 1878. Pettigrew 
and his colleagues from Minnehaha County voted for Kidder 
and continued to support the Judge all afternoon, as no 
decision could be reached. Finally, at the supper hour a 
recess was called which was to last until eight o’clock. 
During the recess the final decision was made to switch the 
Moody votes to Bennett and on the first ballot after the 
group reconvened his support almost doubled. Before the • 
balloting ended, several more counties changed their votes 
and within a few minutes Parker entertained a motion that the 
nomination of Bennett be unanimous. This motion carried
25
and Bennett was victorious. Pettigrew never changed his vote,
but he accepted the decision of the convention and later
48campaigned vigorously for Bennett. At the same time, of
course, he worked in his own behalf and was re-elected to the
territorial council in November.
The opening of the legislative session of 1879 marked
50the beginning of a new era in Dakota politics. The new
Governor, William A. Howard, crossed swords immediately with
Pettigrew, who soon demonstrated his mastery of the art of
51political vilification. Just as he smeared Governor
Burbank during the printing contract crisis in 1872, he now
attacked Howard for remarks which the Governor made in his
opening address. These remarks concerned the activities of
Territorial Treasurer E.A. Sherman during the previous two
years. Sherman had neglected to date a number of entries in
his books during, that period and Howard chided him for his 
52carelessness. The Treasurer came from Minnehaha County 
' 48Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1064-1066; 
Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew," 30. As a 
reward for his withdrawal Moody was named to fill the judge­
ship vacated by Bennett. This is the first good example of 
bloc voting in Dakota Territory politics; the North and West 
against the Southeast.
49Yankton Press and Dakotan. November 28, 1878.
50Schell, South Dakota. 198.
51
Lamar, Dakota Territory. 196.
^^Yankton Press and Dakotan. January 16, 1879.
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and was a friend and business associate of Pettigrew, who 
chose to consider the Governor’s words as an accusation of 
dishonesty. He waited three days, pretending to give Howard 
enough time to discover his mistake and apologize. When 
nothing happened during the allotted time, he sprang to the 
attack. The Governor, he declared, was mistaken and must 
withdraw his accusation since it was likely to injure the 
reputation of the Treasurer. Howard replied that he had no 
wish to smear Sherman, but that the public had a right to 
know the facts. Pettigrew, retorted that if the Governor had 
corrected his own mistake, there would be no cause for 
complaint. However, since the Governor seemed determined to 
press the matter it would have to be seen through to a 
conclusion.
■On January 18, 1879, Pettigrew moved to appoint a 
committee to investigate the accounts of the Treasurer.
53Such a committee was formed and set to work immediately.
On the twenty-third the committee reported that it could
find no basis for a charge of malfeasance against Sherman
54and the next day Pettigrew moved that he be reappointed. 
Shortly after, Pettigrew withdrew the motion, ostensibly at 
the request of Sherman, and the episode was ended. It is 
important, however, as an example of the type of political
53Ibid.. January 23, 1879.
54Ibid.. January 30, 1879.
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maneuvering that was to become Pettigrew's trademark. He 
covered his own tracks with a smokescreen of accusations 
against his opponents and attempted to divert interest from 
his own activities.
On this occasion the screen was designed as cover for 
a scheme to improve the position of some of his real estate.
He introduced a bill which if successful would result in the 
creation of one large county through the consolidation of 
Hanson and Davison Counties, which lay directly to the west of 
Minnehaha. The consolidation would place Pettigrew’s tract 
near the center of the large county where it would have an 
excellent chance to fall within the county seat. Unfortunately 
for him, the "anti-Pettigrew press" was not deceived. The 
Yankton Press and Dakotan, for example, attacked the bill 
bitterly: "It is a scheme against Rockport, the only 
promising town in the area," raged the editor. "Pettigrew 
has bought land further up river, and now relies on the 
legislature to do the rest." The bill did not pass, but 
the efforts of Pettigrew and his brothers to. locate town­
sites continued. Said the Dakota Republican:
The Pettigrews are famous for having a "big shake" in 
townsites. R.F. had a portion of Sioux Falls; Fred 
has that of Flandreau; and now J.A. proposes to sell
55Ibid.. February 13, 1879.
^^Dakota Republican. (Vermillion), August 21, 1879. This 
is a clipping found among the Pettigrew Papers.
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an addition to Watertown. All are towns on the Big 
Sioux River. There is nothing like "going in on the 
ground floor."
At the end of the legislative session Pettigrew
journeyed to Chicago where he married Elizabeth V. Fitter,
a young school teacher he met on one of his numerous
business trips. Very little evidence exists concerning the
Pettigrews’ domestic life. It is known, however, that the
young couple set up their permanent residence in Sioux Falls
and that two sons, Franklin and Arthur, were born to them in
the early 1880’s. The Pettigrews celebrated twenty-two
57anniversaries before the death of Elizabeth in 1901.
By 1879 Pettigrew’s drive for political leadership 
began to mature. He was now ready to launch his campaign 
for a seat in Congress and he intended to construct his 
support as solidly as possible. Already certain of his 
position in the Big Sioux Valley, he journeyed through the 
northern and western sections of the Territory during late 
1879 testing political sentiment. He appeared in Bismarck ' 
in the early fall and from there he travelled by stagecoach 
to Deadwood in the Black Hills. Here he inspected a quartz 
mine in which he owned an interest and opened his campaign as 
well.
The journey from Bismarck to Deadwood was a grueling 
trip of four hundred miles through hostile Indian country.
57Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"
13-14.
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All the passengers and the driver of the coach were armed, 
and no one disembarked except to eat at the numerous way 
stations. The six horses which pulled the stage were driven 
at bfeak-neck speed over the uneven terrain and changed at 
each station. There were no bridges over any of the rivers 
and each one had to be carefully forded.
When they had reached a point about forty miles from 
Deadwood, the driver suddenly stopped and summoned the 
passengers from the coach. On a hill some distance away stood 
a very large antelope, the first they had seen. While the 
driver and messenger discussed the possibility of killing the 
animal Pettigrew took a pot-shot at it and to his amazement 
the antelope fell dead in its tracks. After their initial 
shock had subsided, the men retrieved the carcass and lashed 
it to the coach. Later, in Deadwood, a big barbeque was held 
and the story of Pettigrew’s prowess with a rifle was widely 
circulated. He later related that the miners and' outdoorsssn 
of the Hills were so impressed with his feat that he was soon 
dubbed "the deadshot," and he liked to think that this 
incident helped him to carry the mining region in the election 
the following year.^®
Pettigrew remained in Deadwood about four days and 
then set out for the Cross Quartz mine. He was joined by
^®R.F. Pettigrew, "Account of Experiences During a 
Political Campaign in Dakota," Pettigrew Papers, Loose File, 
Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls, South Dakota,' 1-2.
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Jefferson P. Kidder, the former Delegate whom he had 
supported for re-election the year before. They travelled by 
stagecoach to Rapid City, and there they hired a team and 
wagon for the remainder of the trip. Their first stop was 
the Rockerville mining camp, where they stayed in the shed 
which served as a hotel and spent the evening drinking whiskey. 
As they entered the saloon, Kidder, who was already "in his 
cups," stepped up to the bar, pounded with his fist and de­
manded, "Give me some rot gut; I don't want whiskey, I want 
something you sell." The incredulous barkeep was about to 
throw the old man out when Pettigrew intervened and informed 
him that this was Delegate Kidder who had been instrumental in 
extinguishing Indian title to the Hills. While Kidder con­
tinued to demand "rot got," Pettigrew convinced the bartender 
of his identity. Finally, the man exclaimed, "If that's 
Judge Kidder, he can have anything in the house he wants and 
it won't cost him a cent." Pettigrew later recalled: "We
were then served exactly what Kidder asked for."
The two men left Rockerville the next day to inspect 
the Cross mine, in which Pettigrew had $1500 invested. After 
spending some time there they returned to Rapid City and 
from there Pettigrew returned to Sioux Falls, where he soon 
found himself embroiled in a new political crisis.^'
On April 10, 1880, Governor Howard died and soon
5QIbid.. 6.
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after, Territorial Secretary George H. Hand made known his 
desire to be named Howard’s successor. As a member of the 
"Yankton Ring" and as confidant of federal officials, Hand 
immediately drew fire from Pettigrew and his growing entourage 
of supporters. Excluding the Pettigrew following, however, 
the candidacy of Hand was greeted with enthusiasm, and it 
was not Pettigrew, but the dead hand of Governor Howard which 
finally defeated the Secretary. Howard had become convinced 
during his short tenure that it was unwise for resident 
Dakotans to hold positions of great authority in the 
Territory. Only an outsider could detach himself from the 
intra-party squabbles and factional fights which characterized 
Dakota politics. Howard had relayed his views to President 
Hayes in a letter delivered after the Governor’s death, and 
this no doubt influenced the President’s decision to by-pass 
-Hand. Instead he named Nehemiah G . Ordway of New Hampshire, 
who took office on June 25, 1880.^^
At the same time, Pettigrew continued his campaign 
for the nomination as Territorial Delegate. Judge Bennett, 
of course, desired to succeed himself, and during the early 
months of the year seemed to have a great deal of support 
throughout the Territory. The addition of a third candidate, 
however, aided Pettigrew’s cause. John B. Raymond, United 
States Marshall, threw his hat into the ring and with it came
^^Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1119.
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fuel for Pettigrew’s campaign fire. Raymond was a native of 
Mississippi and thus was open to attack as an "intruder." 
"Dakota for the Dakotans," became Pettigrew’s campaign cry, 
and the sod-busters flocked to his banner in droves.
Bennett, too, was open to attack, since he had 
originally come to Dakota with a federal commission. In 
addition, he had become closely associated with the "Yankton 
Ring" during his term of office, and though he was the 
incumbent and was popular, Pettigrew was able to make the 
most of his weakness. "Dakotans can govern themselves-without 
help from that knot of politicians in Yankton," he declared. 
Like the "Dakota for Dakotans" theme, this cry struck a 
responsive chord among the populace.
Raymond inadvertantly helped Pettigrew in another way. 
He had strong support in the north and in the Black Hills 
where Pettigrew was weak. Raymond was almost certain to get 
enough votes in these areas to hurt Bennett, even though he 
had little chance to win in the Territory as a whole.
The pre-convention campaign went on through the
summer months. Then in September the delegates gathered in 
Vermillion for the showdown.Pettigrew had been unable tc 
assure himself of enough votes to win on the first ballot,
^^Ibid.. 1131-1134.
62Alexandria Herald, undated clipping found among the
Pettigrew Papers.
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but a straw vote showed that he could count on fifty-five. 
Bennett had a like number and Raymond had thirty-one. The 
formal voting showed the same distribution through six 
ballots. Then a recess was called for one hour. It is not 
known what occurred during that recess, but on the first 
ballot after the group reconvened, the Raymond men began a 
shift to Pettigrew, and before the vote could be completed his 
nomination was declared unanimous.
Thus Richard F. Pettigrew approached the threshhold 
of political success. He controlled a powerful faction of 
the Republican party and was well known and popular among the 
voters of Dakota, Since 1874 the Republican nominee for 
Delegate had been virtually assured of election and there 
were no signs that the trend would change in 1880. His most 
virulent opposition among territorial politicos, he knew, 
would continue to come from the federal officials and the 
"Yankton Ring." But he was ready now to do battle with them, 
and his goal was nothing less than complete political control 
of the Territory. There could be no compromise with his 
enemies, no turning back. His course was set.
Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1135.
CHAPTER II
PETTIGREW AND GOVERNOR ORDWAYÎ POLITICAL 
CONFLICT IN DAKOTA
Dakota almost lost her new Delegate before he could- 
be elected. During the campaign, Pettigrew again went to 
Deadwood to check on the political situation. He journeyed 
by railroad from Sioux City, Iowa, to Cheyenne, Wyoming 
Territory, and from there by stagecoach to Deadwood.
Enroute the stage was held up by bandits at Buffalo Gap. 
Pettigrew and the other passengers decided not to attempt a 
"shoot out," thinking they were covered by members of the 
gang who did not expose themselves. At the command of the 
robbers they stepped down from the coach and stood in a line. 
As he made his descent, Pettigrew suddenly realized that he 
knew the identity of one of the masked men who stood before 
him. The man’s name was Kemsley Towles, and his family had 
a homestead near Sioux Falls. As the outlaw drew near, 
Pettigrew whispered to him, "Kemsley, what shall I tell your 
mother?" To which the boy replied, "Don’t tell her nothin’."
The other passengers noticed the conversation and
also the fact that Kemsley failed to take anything from




hard pressed to explain that he had not been involved in the 
holdup somehow. But he finally succeeded and the group 
continued toward Deadwood where they arrived safely a short 
time later.^
Pettigrew was still in Deadwood on election day 
1880. His friend Nye Phillips had joined him there and the 
next day they started home. The journey took them to Rapid 
City by wagon where they boarded a stagecoach which would 
take them to Pierre over a newly inaugurated route. On the 
first night out, however, snow fell and the driver became 
lost. The situation could have become serious, but luckily, 
after hours of aimless wandering, they found a way station. 
Here they rested a while before continuing on their way.
In due time they arrived at Fort Pierre on the west bank of 
the Missouri, only to find the river covered with a thin layer 
of ice which made crossing impossible. As a result they were 
forced to watch helplessly as the train they hoped to catch 
chugged eastward out of Pierre. While they discussed their 
next move, a steamboat making its last run of the season came 
down the river. They boarded the craft thinking their 
troubles had ended. The vessel could take them to Yankton 
where another train could be caught. Trouble, however, was 
only beginning, for the captain of the boat had neglected to
R.F. Pettigrew, "Account of Experiences During a 
Political Campaign in Dakota," Pettigrew Papers, Pettigrew 
Museum, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Loose File, 5-6.
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take on enough firewood, and before they had gone far the 
supply aboard was exhausted. The crew was sent ashore for 
more firewood, but found only green cottonwood, and this would 
not burn. Finally the ship simply drifted down stream with 
the current until it became stuck in the ice several miles 
above Yankton.
Pettigrew and Phillips went ashore and set out on foot 
to find a road. After a grueling hike they finally crossed 
what appeared to be a stage route and began to follow it in 
the direction of the capital. Shortly, an Indian came along 
driving a wagon and team. Phillips, who thought he knew the 
Sioux tongue, attempted to converse with the red man, and 
asked for a ride to Yankton. He could not make himself 
understood, however, and the Indian refused to help. them. 
Frustrated, Pettigrew and Phillips drew their side arms and 
demanded to be taken to their destination. The Indian under­
stood this, and while Phillips covered him in the back of the 
wagon, Pettigrew drove on. • They travelled in this fashion 
until they came to Charlie Wanbow’s trading post near 
Springfield. Here, they released the Indian and paid him for 
his trouble. Charlie, who spoke the native tongue very well, 
explained to the startled redman that the two whites had meant 
him no harm and he departed happily.
From Springfield the two friends drove a rented 
wagon to Yankton, where they boarded a train for Sioux City. 
There, they changed trains and finally arrived in Sioux Falls
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to discover that Pettigrew had been elected to Congress and
they had been considered lost by their families and friends
2for more than ten days.
Pettigrew was opposed in the election by Michael L. 
MacCormack of northern Dakota. The Democrats hoped that 
intra-party disputes might once again weaken the Republicans 
and bring victory as in 1870 and 1872. This time, however, 
they were disappointed. Pettigrew won by a margin of almost
3two to one, garnering 17,664 votes to 9,343 for îtecCormack. 
Thus the young politician was well on his way toward 
realizing his goals. He was immediately confronted, however, 
with a serious obstacle in the bulky form of Governor 
Nehemiah G. Ordway.
Historical assessments of Ordway vary because 
substantial evidence is lacking. However, he was a man with 
ambitions quite similar to those of Richard Pettigrew and 
the two men soon became bitter rivals fighting for politi­
cal control of Dakota Territory. Ordway looked upon his 
office as a stepping stone to wealth and power and had no 
intention of allowing anyone to stand in his way. A native 
of New Hampshire, he served in the legislature of his state, 
and for twelve years was Sargeant-at-Arms of the United States
2Ibid.. 7-10.
3Sioux Falls Press. November 2, 1880,
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House of Representatives.^ While serving in that capacity, 
he became prominently linked with the Credit Mobilier and 
in 1876 his activities were investigated before a Congress­
ional Cojnmittee headed by J.M. Glover of Missouri. The 
_report of this investigation has been lost, but even 
though it exonerated Ordway he received a good deal of bad
5publicity from the whole affair.
In Dakota, Ordway planned to establish complete 
control of territorial politics by monopolizing patronage. 
Here, he crossed swords with Pettigrew who claimed the 
patronage for himself. The result was a political duel 
which has seldom been equalled for its savagery. Carried 
on through personal encounters and through the press, this 
duel did not end until Ordway was finally removed from office 
in 1884.*
It began shortly after Pettigrew’s election when he 
was in Yankton on business. There he was visited by former 
Governor Newton Edmunds and advised to see Ordway before 
leaving. He was told that the Governor was offended at some
4Lamar, Dakota Territory. 202-203.
5
Lois Malvina Drake, "The Influence of the Newspapers 
of Dakota Territory upon the Administration of Governor 
Nehemiah G, Ordway," (unpublished Master’s thesis. University 
of Missouri, 194l), 9.
6Lamar, Dakota Territory. 203-221.
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remarks Pettigrew had made during the campaign and that unless 
he apologized, he might not receive his certificate of election. 
Outraged, Pettigrew refused to call on the Governor, de­
claring that he did not think Ordway would refuse to perform 
his legal duty. Ultimately, the certificate was issued and 
Pettigrew journeyed to Washington where he was sworn in 
on March 4, 1881.
It proved more difficult than he had imagined, how­
ever, to sidestep Governor Ordway. Pettigrew soon learned 
that Ordway intended to appoint all the territorial postmasters 
himself. Since loss of this prerogative might mean his ruin, 
Pettigrew determined at once to stop Ordway by any means 
which might be necessary. His first step was to contact 
Senator O.H. Platt of Connecticut, an old friend, and 
relate the story to him. Platt agreed that Pettigrew was 
entitled to the patronage, but suggested that he might "get 
together" with Ordway on the matter and work out a compromise. 
Although he was reluctant, Pettigrew finally consented and 
a meeting was arranged. The Governor was in Washington, 
having arrived shortly after the adjournment of the legisla­
ture, and he came to Pettigrew’s hotel room that very night. 
Ordway suggested that the two men cooperate in dispensing the
7
R.F. Pettigrew, Imperial Washington (Chicago:
Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1922), 152.
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patronage, but Pettigrew refused and they parted on unfriendly
Q
terms. Shortly afterward Ordway left for Dakota, but before 
doing so he publicly declared that Pettigrew had demanded 
control of all the appointive offices in the Territory. No 
Delegate, the Governor went on, had ever had such power, and
QPettigrew was not to be the first.
Ordway knew from his experience with the legislature 
that he too faced a powerful opponent. During the 1881 
session, elements friendly to Pettigrew were in control.
The legislature, concerning itself primarily with the 
organization of counties and the authorization of building 
bonds, passed more bills than any of its predecessors. Even 
though relations between the Governor and the legislators 
were cordial on the surface, Ordway vetoed a large number of 
these bills which were then passed over his objection.
After adjournment, he referred to the legislature publicly 
as “an irresponsible g r o u p . a n d  from this point no attempt 




Yankton Press and Dakotan. March 30, 1881.
^^Schell, South Dakota. 202.
^^Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1172.
% ew York Tribune. March 21, 1881.
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The Pettigrew press in Dakota moved swiftly to 
discredit the Governor. The March 28 edition of the Fargo
1Republican editorialized on Ordway’s “dictatorial policies," 
and shortly after, the Deadwood Times exclaimed, "Ordway 
is an unworthy, incompetent affliction. He is also a fraud.
Meanwhile the Sioux Falls Times strove to further the
1 ̂Pettigrew image:
, . attacked the corrupt official rings of the
territory and handled them so well that even the 
Democratic press which hated his ultra-Republicanism 
spoke of him with admiration.
His record gives evidence of keen knowledge of 
Dakota affairs. He knows people; has bitter enemies 
but many warm friends. We have faith in him.
The Delegate was not content with mere newspaper
attacks upon his opponent. He knew that he must rid himself
of this dangerous opponent if he were to hope for untrammelled
success in the future. Thus in May, 1881, he filed formal
charges of nonfeasance against Ordway with the Secretary of
the Interior.These charges were based on the assertion
that Ordway had left his post and gone to Washington in order
to campaign against statehood for southern Dakota. In July
Pettigrew wrote to former Congressman Glover who had headed
13Fargo Republican. March 28, 1881, Clipping, Pettigrew
Papers.
14Deadwood Times. April, 1881, ibid.
^^Sioux Falls Times. May 10, 1881, ibid.
^^Black Hills Journal. April 9, 1881, ibid.
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the 1876 investigation of Ordway, asking for information.
1 7Glover sent the material and wrote:
. . . You refer to N.G. Ordway, Ex-Sergeant-at- 
Arms of the House of Representatives, and ask if he 
ever answered the damaging evidence taken before my 
committee to my satisfaction. I answer emphatically 
No. It was impossible for him to make' satisfactory 
answer. I have no hesitancy in giving as my opinion, 
in view of all the evidence developed against him, that 
he is one of the most corrupt and unprincipled men that 
has ever disgraced the public service of this country.
I am convinced that he never held an office with the 
view of being satisfied with its honors and its 
legitimate emoluments but to prostitute it to the 
worst jobbery and fraud for money making.
On the basis of the evidence supplied by Glover, 
Pettigrew published in September a multi-page broadside 
entitled "Ordway*s Record." This savage attack was concerned 
primarily with his tenure as Sergeant-at-Arms of the House
and accused the man of demanding bribes, accepting bribes,
1 Atheft of government funds, and other crimes.
Ordway counter-attacked almost immediately. "Ordway’s 
Record," declared the governor, "is nothing but a scheme by 
Pettigrew to ruin my reputation." "The Delegate," he 
continued, "has withheld all the testimony before the Glover 
Committee which was "favorable to me."^^ Actually, Pettigrew
17J.M. Glover to Pettigrew, July 24, 1881, Pettigrew 
Papers, Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Loose 
File.
18
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never had any "favorable evidence" since Glover, who 
harbored an almost psychotic hatred for Ordway, had sent 
him only damaging material.
90On another occasion the Governor wrote;
From the moment I took my stand against these mercenary 
combinations, I expected misrepresentations and personal 
abuse would be poured out to divert the attention of the 
public from the real issues. I do not however propose to 
be diverted from the main question at issue even to 
notice the great "anonymous" containing more lying to 
the square inch than ever before blackened even a very 
poor quality of white paper.
A friendly newspaper, the Dakota Herald, tried some
diversions of its own. Said the editor, "Pettigrew is the
leader of a ’ring’ of politicians trying to control
territorial patronage. This group of local politicos is made
21up largely of a gang of speculators. . .
Pleading his case before the people of the Territory, 
Ordway argued that the legislature had been controlled by a 
combination of delegates from Moody’s district in the West 
and Pettigrew’s district in the Big Sioux Valley. After the 
agents of this combination had been made officers of the 
Council and Assembly, bills for issuing bonds and building 
public buildings were passed. No pretense was made of 
submitting these questions to the people, and for this reason
20Ordway to the Citizens of Bonhomme County,
November 1, 1881, Pettigrew Papers, Loose File.
21
Dakota Herald, March 26, 1881, Clipping, Pettigrew
Papers.
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Ordway vetoed them. This action, he declared, had brought 
down the wrath of the combination upon him. Nevertheless, he 
vowed to veto all other such bills placed before him in the 
future. "This legislation," wrote the Governor, "is a 
reckless attempt to serve certain individuals at the expense
99of the people and without their consent."
Meanwhile, the Pettigrew press took up the cry of
%removalLy "We want the President to remove Ordway," said
the editor of the Deadwood Daily Times, "he has no experience;
is dishonest and c o r r u p t . A n d  again; "The governor’s
greatest mistake is in thinking his policy of ’divine right’
is for the guidance of the people. He is one of the
territory’s greatest afflictions. He thinks he owns Dakota
24and should have complete control of appointments,"
While the charges and counter-charges flew, Pettigrew
submitted two important bills in Washington, one for the
division of Dakota Territory at the forty-sixth parallel;
25the other asking statehood for the southern portion.
22Ordway to Charles Deverns, February 4, 1881, Records 
of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, Dakota 1871- 
1884, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
23
Deadwood Daily Times. April 19, 1881, Clipping, 
Pettigrew Papers.
24Ibid.. April 12, 1881.
25Congressional Record. 47 Cong., 1 Sess., December 19, 
1881, XIII, 206.
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He knew Congress was not ready to admit another state, but
he felt that the division bill might be forced through. In
26any event, he intended to keep the statehood issue alive.
"South Dakota has many strong claims to statehood," he
declared in a press release. "The population has grown to
more than 138,000. We have over 1000 miles of railroad track
and more under construction. The eastern area of the region
has rich soil and produces immense crops while the mining
97opportunities in the Black Hills are unlimited."
Both Pettigrew’s bills were referred to the Committee
on Territories of which he was a member. On February 18, 1882,
much to his disgust, the committee reported back a
substitute measure providing that the entire Territory be
28made a single state. The Delegate was disappointed but not 
discouraged. When the substitute failed in August, he
f
promised his constituents, "The territory will be divided two 
29years hence."
Very shortly, the question of statehood for South 
Dakota was to become the crux of the Pettigrew-Ordway feud,
^^Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1624-1627.
27Fargo Republican, no date, as cited in Kingsbury, 
Dakota Territory. II, 1623-1624.
28Congressional Record. 47 Cong., 1 Sess., February 16, 
1882, XIII, 1220.
29Grand Forks Morning News. August 10, 1882, Clipping, 
Pettigrew Papers.
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but for the present Pettigrew was forced to concentrate on the 
more personal problem of his own re-election. He returned 
from Washington to find himself confronted by powerful 
opposition. George Hand, still a formidable enemy, headed a 
faction in southern Dakota which desired Pettigrew's defeat.
He campaigned hard in the southern counties and the 
competition became so bitter that when the Republican 
convention met in Grand Forks early in September, there were 
several contested delegations. To make matters worse, Ordway 
arrived as an onlooker and lent his influence to the support 
of Hand,
There was a third candidate in the person of John B. 
Raymond, who once again entered the race as favorite of the 
northern section. At the outset it appeared that he 
controlled 81 votes, while Hand had 116 and Pettigrew only 42. 
Still, the situation was not hopeless until the credentials 
committee refused to seat any of Pettigrew’s delegates from 
contested counties. This turn of events virtually assured 
his defeat, but his fertile brain did not cease to function. 
Realizing that his influence in the south might be jeopardized 
if Hand were elected, Pettigrew immediately withdrew his own 
name and before the stunned delegates could react, strode out 
on the floor to nominate John Raymond. His own votes 
combined with those already controlled by Raymond succeeded 
in preventing the nomination of Hand.
The method used to accomplish this scheme merits some
47
explanation. It required that the report of the credentials 
committee be ignored so that the Pettigrew faction could vote. 
This requirement was met by contriving that two reports, 
majority and minority, be submitted. There were eight members 
on the committee. Seven of them, all from the north, signed 
the majority report while one, C.H. Winsor of Sioux Falls, 
signed the minority report. After both had been submitted, 
the portion of the majority report dealing with uncontested 
counties was adopted. Then it was moved that the minority 
report" which admitted the Pettigrew delegates from all other 
counties, be adopted. This motion carried with the members 
of the credentials committee who had submitted the majority 
report voting for it! After this the matter was cut and 
dried. Pettigrew nominated Raymond and the latter was 
victorious on the first b a l l o t . A s  a result, the northern 
section gained control of the office of delegate while the
q *1Pettigrew faction controlled the party organization. Through 
shrewd manipulation and almost perfect timing, Pettigrew had 
salvaged victory from certain defeat.
The great struggle between Pettigrew and Ordway now 
neared its climax. With Hand defeated and Pettigrew in firm 
control of the party, Ordway’s chances for further developing 
his political power were considerably diminished. He thus
30Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1217-1224.
31Schell, South Dakota. 208.
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determined to play his trump card: the removal of the capital.
If successful, this scheme held out the possibility of great 
financial reward. The Governor owned considerable real 
estate in Bismarck, which was his first choice. In Pierre, 
the second choice, his son owned several lots and was agent 
for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad, which also
ondesired that the capital be moved.
The idea of capital removal was not new. Ordway had 
mentioned it as early as June 1880, shortly after his arrival. 
At the time, however, he felt it was more important to 
convince the leaders of the "Yankton Ring" that he was 
friendly to them, and thus the idea was not pushed. Now, in 
1883, the time for deception had passed. The friendship of 
the Yankton politicos was no longer vital. The situation 
demanded action. There was little to be lost; much to be 
gained.
For victory, Ordway relied upon the aid of a number
of friendly newspaper editors in northern Dakota. They
established the Dakota Press Association, which pushed the
removal scheme, and several of them succeeded in having
themselves elected to the Territorial Legislature. In control
of the Council during the session of 1883, they joined with
33the Governor to push through the capital removal bill.
32Lamar, Dakota Territory. 209.
33Drake, "The Influence of Newspapers, . . ." 42.
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At first it was proposed that Huron be made the new 
capital. According to plan, the Huron bill failed, but 
succeeded in enlisting the unwitting aid of that town and most 
of central Dakota in the removal scheme. It was then proposed 
that a capital removal commission be created which would 
organize in Yankton within thirty days and decide where the 
capital should go. This bill, according to plan, was 
approved. -
The citizens of Yankton, infuriated by this audacious 
plan to divest them of the capital, attempted to prevent the 
commission from organizing. Its members were kept under 
constant surveillance in the hope that the thirty-day period 
would expire before they had a chance to make their move.
Early one morning, however, an unobtrusive train passed slowly
through the city limits. In one of its cars were the
35capital commissioners who quickly organized.
Ordway and his associates were now ready to proceed. 
For two months the commission travelled about the Territory 
inspecting those towns which desired the capital. After 
much sober deliberation they selected Bismarck, and in June 
the change was made official.
At the same time an attempt was made to stop Ordway
34Lamar, Dakota Territory. 203-204.
35Ibid.. 205.
36Schell, South Dakota. 210.
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with legal action. A quo warranto proceeding was inaugurated 
against the commission on grounds that the Organic Act of 
1861 provided that the capital be located by the legislature. 
The matter was tried before District Judge Alonzo J.
Edgerton in July. He handed down his verdict favorable to 
the plaintiffs in September. By that time, however, the 
change had already been effected. The decision was appealed 
to the Territorial Supreme Court and reversed.^7
Those who opposed removal were a motley group made up 
of local politicians drawn together by their common hatred 
of Ordway, and their desire for home rule. In April 1883, 
the anti-removalists met in Sioux Falls and effected an 
important combination which was to overshadow all others in 
Dakota politics for several years to come. Pettigrew joined 
forces with the "Yankton Ring" led by Gideon Moody, William 
H.H. Beadle, an old friend who had given Pettigrew his 
first surveying contracts, and George W. Kingsbury. Moody, 
now attorney for the Homestake Mining Company, was an active 
force in Black Hills affairs, and a firm alliance with him 
brightened Pettigrew’s prospects in that area to a marked 
degree.
The combination appointed county committees to begin 
gathering facts on the activities of Ordway. These were later 
to be presented to a grand jury for consideration, in the
37Lamar, Dakota Territory. 237.
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hope that Ordway would be indicted for malfeasance in office 
and removed. If the grand jury failed to produce results,
however, the combination was prepared to demand Ordway’s
38impeachment by the federal government.
Ordway fought back valiantly, attempting to
disassociate himself from the removal scheme. He spoke to a
large gathering in Turner Hall, Yankton, early in April.
There, he recounted his accomplishments and swore that no
illegal "deal" had been entered into for the removal of the
capital, concluding: "I consented to the moving of the
capital because the last election showed a concentration of
39population in the northern area /oi the territory/."
Two weeks later, in the same hall, Pettigrew lashed
back at the Governor. "He is hostile to me because I refused
to join hands with him to control territorial appointments,"
cried the ex-Delegate. "The capital removal scheme is a
plot against those of us who wish to see South Dakota become
40a state," he concluded.
At the same time, the county committees began making 
public the evidence of corruption they had gathered against 
the Governor. It was alledged, but never proved, that Huron 
had paid someone $27,000 expecting to get the capital. It was
Ibid.. 221.
39Yankton Press and Dakotan. April 5, 1883.
40Ibid.. April 20, 1883.
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furthered claimed that one Council member confessed he had 
been offered $15,000 to vote for the Huron bill, but again 
there was no proof. In addition, there was evidence that 
Ordway vetoed bills favored by the anti-removalists in the 
legislature. If their views "changed" properly, he then signed 
substitute measures.
With evidence of this nature before it, a grand jury 
convened in Yankton late in the month of April. Before this 
body the Governor was further accused of selling county 
commissionerships to the highest bidder. He appeared to 
defend himself, but the members of the jury, who were 
decidedly hostile to him, refused to ask questions. As a 
result, Ordway could only utter a few defensive remarks and 
retire; whereupon the jury formally censured him for inter­
ference in the organization of Douglas County. Oddly, he was 
not indicted.
After his experience with the grand jury, Ordway
4P
immediately wrote to President Arthur:
I have been advised by your telegrams that certain 
elements in Yankton urged on by former delegate 
Pettigrew are seeking to create unfounded prejudices 
against the late legislature and myself on account of 
the passage of an act to remove the territorial capital . 
from Yankton to Bismarck. . . . These charges will 
undoubtedly be presented to you with a request for my 
removal.
41Lamar, Dakota Territory. 236-237.
42Ordway to President Chester A. Arthur, April 23,
1883, Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, 
Dakota 1871-1884, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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While the Governor anxiously awaited a reply, the anti-
removalist-home-rule elements led by Pettigrew and Moody
launched an active campaign for statehood. This would settle
the question of "outside interference" once and for all. In
May, 1883, they held a brief convention in Huron. Here, a
novel approach to the statehood question was presented by
U.S. Attorney Hugh J. Campbell. The lawyer claimed that
since southern Dakota met all the constitutional requirements
for statehood, it was incumbent upon Congress to admit her to
the Union. If Congress refused to act, the citizens of
southern Dakota should ignore federally appointed officers
43and independently organize a state. He declared:
. . . The peoples of southern Dakota could by united 
popular action, separate at a stroke the councils of 
the north and south, destroy the power of the political 
combination which opposed division, and begin as a 
separate state organization.
The ideas of Campbell were warmly accepted by
Pettigrew, who asserted that if Congress failed to pass an 
/
enabling act the people of Dakota should remove all territorial
officials and install a state government. This would not be
rebellion, he snorted, since Dakotans were trying to get into
44.the Union, not out of it.
Campbell’s theory was adopted as a resolution by the
43Lamar, Dakota Territory. 222.
44Yankton Press and Dakotan. April 20, 1883.
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Huron convention. It was also agreed that a convention
should be held in Sioux Falls that September to write a 
45constitution. . .
During the summer of 1883 the statehood leaders did 
everything in their power to maintain interest in the movement. 
Eastern newspapers were bombarded with articles designed to 
show that the people of the Territory demanded to be accepted 
as first-class citizens. Campbell published his theory in a 
pamphlet which was widely distributed, and Pettigrew declared 
again and again that merchants, farmers, bankers, and virtually 
all other citizens demanded statehood. This gr-ea-t- propa­
ganda campaign, however, was a gross misrepresentation 
of the facts. The fight for statehood was, for all practical 
purposes, a battle between two groups of politicians,^^
Nevertheless, interest among many was at fever pitch 
when the delegates to the constitutional convention arrived 
in Sioux Falls on September 4, 1883. Both the Republicans 
and the Democrats were well represented and the bipartisan 
nature of the gathering became apparent at the outset when a 
leading Democrat, Bartlett Tripp, was chosen to preside.
Among the important Republicans who attended were Pettigrew, 
W.W. Brookings, J.P. Kidder, Hugh J. Campbell, George W.
45Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1660-1668.
46Lamar, Dakota Territory. 225-226.
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47Kingsbury, William H.H. Beadle, and Gideon Moody. In 
addition to the politicians there were many spurred by desires 
to write specific clauses into the constitution. The
prohibitionists were there in force as were the protagonists
, 48of woman suffrage. There were also eleven land speculators
led by young Arthur G. Mellette, soon to rise to prominence
in Dakota politics. His group opposed the opening of more
Sioux Indian lands to settlement since this would cause a
costly drop in land prices.
The document which was finally produced mirrored the
desires of the politicians who wrote it. It provided for the
division of Dakota Territory at the forty-sixth parallel.
Prohibition and woman suffrage were excluded but would be
submitted to a vote of the people at a later date. A bicameral
legislature was created, the veto powers of the governor were
restricted, and Yankton was made the capital. In general, the
other clauses of the constitution were similar to those found
50in most state constitutions.
One month after the adjournment of the convention the 
constitution was submitted to the will of the electorate and 
approved by a vote of 12,336 to 6,814. Two factors concerning
^^Ibid.. 229-230.
^^Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1676-1677; 1679.
49Lamar, Dakota Territory. 230.
50See Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1293-1316, for 
a partial text of the proceedings of the convention.
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this vote marred Pettigrew’s pleasure with the victory.
His home county voted against the.document overwhelmingly,
and the total vote was so light that Congress ignored the
51outcome. In Washington, the Republican-dominated Senate
approved a statehood bill, but the Democratic House rejected 
52it, . despite furious lobbying by a pro-statehood delegation 
from Dakota.
Meanwhile, Governor Ordway, who personally led the
fight against adoption, found himself faced with problems of
a more serious nature. Several of his officers refused to
move their records to the new territorial capital in Bismarck.
The most n.otable of these was Territorial Secretary James H.
Teller, brother of Henry Moore Teller, Secretary of the
Interior. James had apparently been promised by the home-
rule-anti-removalists that he would be recommended for governor
53if statehood were not forthcoming in the near future.
Ordway, knowing nothing of this, wrote to Henry Moore Teller
complaining of his brother’s obstinacy
Will you use your good offices with your brother the 
secretary to prevent him from falling into the hands
^^Ibid.. 1716-1717.
52Congressional Record, 48 Cong., 1 Sess., March 13, 
1884, XV, 1824.
53Lamar, Dakota Territory, 238.
54Ordway to Henry M. Teller, September 22, 1883,
Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60,
Dakota 1871-1884, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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of the Yankton and Sioux Falls factions who are 
trying to precipitate a conflict between him and the 
governor and ultimately between the pretended state 
government they have set up and the federal officers 
representing national authority?
Teller, unfortunately for the governor, refused to
order his brother to move, and James, considering his own
position quite sound, could not be moved by any exhortation
from Ordway; "I believe my refusal valid. Further, I am
unaware of any U.S. statute that impowers the governor of a
55territory to control or interfere with the secretary."
Even more dangerous to Ordway was the fact that the 
home-rule-anti-removalists, furious at his attempts to thwart 
them, had sent all the damaging evidence they possessed to 
Washington. Henry Moore Teller was still considering this 
evidence when on April 1, 1884, a second grand jury convened 
in Yankton to study charges of corruption against the 
Governor. Ordway, now desperate, wrote in his own defense to 
Teller;56
All the accusations against me concerning fraud and 
dishonesty are false. I have organized 25 counties, 
but only in two have any charges been made against 
me whereas disreputable adventurers.infest them all 
with the view of plunging,them into debt and speculating 
out of county seats.
During the hearings before the grand jury, Ordway was
specifically charged with demanding and receiving bribes for
55James H. Teller to Ordway, September 24, 1884, in
ibid.
56Ordway to Henry M. Teller, March 27, 1884, in ibid.
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the organization of counties. This time he was not even
57summoned to testify in his own hehalf, and he countered
by charging U.S. Attorney Hugh J. Campbell with misconduct
and bias.^® Friendly newspapers also moved swiftly to aid
him. The Sioux Valiev News of Canton declared that the jury
was packed with enemies of Orcvay and that "certain federal
officials" Campbell were acting against the Governor with 
59malice. So vicious was the editor's attack on Campbell
that he soon found himself called before the grand jury to
explain his actions. At the sane time, Campbell wrote to U.S.
Attorney General B.H. Brewster in his own defense
I do not believe any members of the grand jury are 
personally hostile to Ordway. I declined to summon 
Ordway before the jury because his first request to 
appear as a witness agaij^t one Juno P. Grennan whom 
he charged with forging /his name a territorial 
commission and jthis is not an offence against the U.S. 
Statutes. / Sic / Last night he for the first time asked 
me to summon him as a witness in his own behalf. I 
declined but I deny and denounce the charges of 
personal malice which he has levelled at me.
In spite of his denials, the Justice Department 
investigated the charges against Campbell and found some 
substance to them. It was discovered that he had indeed acted
57United States Attorney Hugh J. Campbell to United 
States Attorney General B.H. Brewster, April 18, 1884, in 
ibid.
^^Ordway to Brewster, Ifey 8, 1884, in ibid.
59Drake, "The Influence of the Newspapers, . . . "
135-136.
60Hugh J. Campbell to B.H. Brewster, April 18, 1884, 
as cited above.
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without impartiality toward the Governor and had, in fact, 
neglected his own official duties to carry on the prosecution.^^ 
He was shortly removed from office.
Meanwhile, the grand jury handed down an indictment 
against Ordway and he was brought to trial on June 13, 1884.
His attorneys moved immediately to quash the indictment on the 
grounds that as an appointed officer of the United States 
Ordway was not indictable by a territorial grand jury. No 
matter what he had done, they argued, he could only be 
punished by the agency which had appointed him. After 
considering this motion for a very short time. Judge Edgerton 
granted it and Ordway went free. Nevertheless, public opinion 
was by now so hostile to him that he was soon removed from 
office.
Thus ended the fight by Pettigrew and his anti- 
removalist allies against a dangerous and powerful foe. The 
outcome resulted largely from the immense amount of damaging 
publicity which the two sides heaped upon each other, which 
caused disgust among the public and in Washington.
Fortunately for the home-rule-anti-removalists, the loss of 
Campbell’s office was not a great blow to them, while Ordway’s 
loss virtually ended his career. Although he continued to be
^^Lamar, Dakota Territory. 240.
14G-143.
^^Drake, "ihe Influence of the Newspapers, . . ."
^^Kingsbury, Dakota lerritorv. II, 1381-1382.
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active in politics, he was never again a serious threat to 
the dominance of local politicians. Thus Pettigrew and his 
allies were free to turn their attention wholeheartedly toward 
the quest for statehood.
From another point of view the Pettigrew-Ordway 
embroglio was more important for its symbolism than for any­
thing else, for it was emblematic of the traditional struggle 
between federal officers and local politicians in the 
territories of the United States. Nowhere was this struggle 
more acute than in Dakota, where from the very beginning of 
organized political activity the keynote was factionalism.
The dispute between Governor Ordway and Delegate 
Pettigrew involved an interest clash between two dominating 
personalities. Ordway, representing the “outsiders,” 
fought to secure political control of the Territory, and 
hoped at the same time to gain economic advantages. Pettigrew, 
representing the "home-rule" faction, had identical moti­
vations. Thus, a clash was inevitable. The years of the 
Ordway Administration were "boom years" economically, but 
were chaotic politically. Pettigrew and Ordway were competitors 
who were unscrupulous and ambitious, and they attempted to 
capitalize on this situation. They spent much time and 
effort attempting to enrich themselves through speculative 
schemes and political manipulations that could only have 
been successful in a society where political and economic 
institutions were as yet unsettled. Only by understanding
61
this can one understand why such fierce battles and such 
deep rooted personal hatreds could be engendered by the 
location of the territorial capital or the control of 
territorial patronage. The political leaders of the Territory 
were deeply interested in all such matters as the location' 
of county seats, schools, asylums, and the penitentiary.
Each affected the speculative or vested interests of one 
group or another in the Territory. And'there could be only 
one winner.
Richard Pettigrew, leader of the “home-rule” elements 
of Dakota, is a prime example of the men who fought with all 
their might to check the usurpations of outsiders such as 
Ordway. Pettigrew and his kind claimed for themselves the 
right to distribute political favors, and plan for themselves 
the economic development of their Territory. As has been 
seen, they achieved a measure of success, but then, as they 
entered the last phase of the drive for statehood, the 
leaders of the dominant Republican party began to disagree 
among themselves over the distribution of political favors 
and economic benefits. Very soon, the farmers, long an 
important force in Dakota, demanded a louder voice in party 
counsels, and their spokesmen emerged to challenge the 
combination for political leadership.
64Lamar, Dakota Territory. 97-98, 241-242.
CHAPTER III
SENATOR PETTIGREW, THE COMBINE AND THE 
AGRARIAN UPRISING
During the "Dakota Boom" years between 18’78 and 1887 
thousands of farmers emigrated to Dakota seeking economic 
independence. Led on by the advertising campaigns of the 
railroad companies and the Territorial Government they sought 
to make their fortunes in cattle, wheat, and corn.
Disregarding the fact that world-wide competition weakened 
rather than strengthened their economic position, they put 
hundreds of thousands of acres into cultivation and themselves 
into debt hoping to pay their way with profits which never 
came. Overproduction, falling prices and continual increases 
in the costs of production pushed them further and further 
into debt until many lost all hope of recovery.^
The farmers blamed the railroads and the grain elevators 
for their predicament because of the extremely high service 
rates charged by those agencies. And indeed there is evidence 
that in some cases freight and storage rates absorbed from
^Schell, South Dakota. 158-174,
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2one-third to one-half of the value of a farmer's entire crop. 
Unable to comprehend the abstractions of theoretical 
economics, the farmers turned against the railroads and 
elevators whose evil practices they abhorred. They soon 
came to believe that the unpleasant circumstances in which 
they found themselves could be mitigated.only by seizing 
control of the governments of the states and territories 
in which they lived. Acting upon this belief they formed 
"alliances" which were designed to act as pressure groups 
within existing political parties. Unfortunately these 
groups were often under the leadership of professional 
politicians who were motivated primarily by a desire to 
secure public office. Such a man was Henry L. Loucks, founder 
of the Territorial Alliance of Dakota.
Loucks was an immigrant from Canada who settled 
upon a government homestead in Deuel County early in 1884.
He was a part of the migration which entered the Territory 
toward the end of the great boom. Thus he experienced almost 
at once the hardships which were common to the farmers of the 
region and he took up their cause by organizing a "farmers’ 
club" which soon became the Territorial Alliance. In 1885
Q
this group affiliated with the National Farmers’ Alliance.
2Report of the Dakota Railroad Commission (Bismarck,
1886), 217^ '




From the very outset the Dakota Alliance worked to elect men
to the legislature who would support its demands. An
Alliance bloc attended every session from 1885 to 1889, but
achieved only limited success in bringing about the passage
of regulatory legislation. Its failure to achieve more was
due primarily to the powerful influence exerted on the
Republican party by railroad lobbyists. It was also due to
the reluctance of party leaders to allow the farm bloc any
4influence within the party itself. Among the leaders of 
the Dakota Alliance were Alonzo Wardall, John W. Harden 
and A.D. Chase. These men constituted a recognized' threat 
to the control of the party by the Pettigrew-Moody Combine.^ 
Thus a clash between the two forces was virtually inevitable.^ 
After his defeat as delegate in 1882, Pettigrew was 
out of office until he was elected to the territorial legis­
lature in 1884. When he took his seat at Bismarck in 1885, 
he found that a number of the legislators could be counted 
as "friends of the farmer." He watched closely their efforts
n
to push through far-reaching railroad legislation, and was
4K.E. Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South 
Dakota" (unpublished Master’s thesis, State University of 
South Dakota, 1959), 10-24.
5Lamar, Dakota Territory. 276.
6For evidence that the Combine recognized the threat 
see; Pettigrew to Mellett, March, 1890 (Exact date uncertain, 
Pettigrew Papers).
7Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South Dakota,"
7.
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iBomewhat relieved by their inability to do so because it
reflected their impotence as an independent political force.
Even though a railroad commission vas established, its
8emasculated powers left the coi^>anies little to fear.
Of,far greater importance to Pettigrew, and for that matter
to the Alliance men, was the statehood movement. The
legislature authored a memorial demanding that the sovereign
Q
status of southern Dakota be recognized by Congress. The
document embodied the arguments of the Campbell theory
which, though eloquent, were completely without foundation
at law. Said the Dakotans:"^
Let Dakota stand upon her own rights, and assert them, 
and act upon them. Let her say to the party in power
in Congress, in the words of the Supreme Court, in the
case of Dred Scott v. Sandford: "You have no power to
hold this people as a territory permanently" but you are 
bound to admit us as a state as soon as our population 
and situation entitle us to admission.
If you refuse us admission ve will go to the people of 
the United States on that question, and turn you out 
of power. That is the language of a free people who 
are American citizens, and have rights guaranteed by 
treaty, and compact, which are irrepressible without 
our consent.
From this point the intensive fight for statehood 
developed which lasted from 1685 to 1889 and culminated in 
the entrance of South Dakota into the Union. Since this fight 
had important side effects on Republican party politics, it
Q
Session Laws of Dakota Territory. 1885 (Chap. 126, 
Sec. 9), 186.
gKingsbury, Dakota Territor/. II, 1727-1728.
10Ibid.. 1728.
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bears detailed discussion. Pettigrew remained in the 
background leaving active participation to Moody, Mellette, 
Campbell and Judge A.J. Edgerton who had now become a member 
of the Combine, Nevertheless, Pettigrew still controlled 
party organization, and his approval was necessary for most 
of the actions taken by these men.
Opposed to the statehood faction stood the Democratic 
party and those who wished to admit Dakota Territory to the 
Union as a single state. Among the leaders of this group 
were ex-governor Ordway, and Governor Luis K. Church, an 
appointee of Grover Cleveland-.^^ They were prepared to go 
to any lengths to prevent the statehood faction from 
succeeding, and backed by the Democratic-controlled House of 
Representatives in Washington, their position was virtually 
impregnable.
Thus it was in the face of almost certain repudiation
that the advocates of statehood for southern Dakota called
a.second constitutional convention to meet in Sioux Falls in
September 1885. Pettigrew, busily engaged in business
activities, was not a delegate, but most of the other
members of the Combine attended and dominated the proceedings
from the outset. Edgerton was made chairman while Moody acted
12as floor leader. The constitution which they produced was
11Lamar, Dakota Territory. 258.
19Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1732.
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quite similar to the 1883 document and thus its actual writing 
was of secondary importance to the delegates. Rather they 
were concerned with finding some method of forcing Congress 
to grant statehood once the constitution was accepted by the
TO
voters. Here, a difference of opinion arose between two
factions of the Combine. Edgerton and Moody represented the
moderate view. They were loath to do anything which might
antagonize Congress. On the other hand, Campbell, representing
the radical view, favored the creation of the machinery of a
state government without reference to the wishes,of Congress.
Thus he offered an amendment to the preamble which gave the
citizens of the “state" the right to ". . . alter, reform
or abolish their form of government in such a manner as they
may think proper." Such a pronouncement was dangerous to
prospects for success in the opinion of the moderates and.
Judge Edgerton descended from the chair to answer Campbell.
14He declared:
. . .  I desire that we should present to Congress a 
constitution which will receive the approbation of 
Congress. I desire to appeal to them, not declare 
that we have an absolute right to establish a 
different form of government. . . .
After further remarks by Moody and the Rev. Josiah
Ward, who represented the Congregational Church of Dakota,
Campbell’s resolution was put to a vote and adopted.
13Lamar, Dakota Territory. 252,
14Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1739.
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Immediately after this vote, hovever, an adjournment was
called and the resolution vas submitted to the Committee on
resolutions. The committee returned the preamble with
Campbell’s harsh wording removed. This action was adopted
on the floor and thus the Combine was victorious, the exact
strategy employed to bring about this victory, however,
remains a mystery.^^
After the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention,
a call went out for a"Republican State Convention" to meet
in October for the purpose of selecting nominees for "state
offices." There was, of course, no legal justification for
such a convention. It was held primarily as a dramatic '
gesture to arouse the spirit of territorial voters. The
Combine was well aware that its one slim chance of success
rested on a large turn-out and overwhelming acceptance of
17the constitution, and they were willing to go this far in 
their efforts to capitalize on that chance. Most of the 
nominees were men who had been delegates to the convention 
and it was a surprise to no one when Arthur C. Mellette was
1 Qnamed candidate for governor,""'
The election took place in November. Once again the
^^Ibid.. 1742.
l^Ibid.. 1745.
17Lamar, Dakota Territory. 254. 
l^ibid.. 255.
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voters of Dakota approved their constitution by a very light 
vote. But on this occasion they also elected a "state" 
government even though they knew it could not legally 
operate. Mellette was unopposed in his bid for the governor­
ship as were all the other candidates including Moody, and 
Edgerton who were elected " s e n a t o r s , H u g h  Campbell, 
whose "we are a state" theory was in' large part responsible 
for the actions of these men, was made chairman of the 
"State Executive Committee," while Pettigrew, apparently 
content with control of party machinery, did not seek an 
office.
In December, 1885, the "legislature" of the new 
"State of Dakota" met in Huron. "Governor" Mellette addressed 
the "legislature," devoting himself almost entirely to a 
rationale for the existence of the "state," His speech 
showed a firm belief in the Campbell doctrine, and that 
Mellette was a determined advocate of home rule, and a divis- 
ionist. Regarding the validity of the "State of Dakota," 
he said:^^
The only possible argument against the case we 
present to Congress is that the Civil War materially 
changed the construction of the Constitution and 
modified the traditions of American law as to the 
relation sustained by the states to the federal 
government. It is urged that every precedent upon 
which we predicate our case is antebellum construction
19Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 17.53-1754,
20lbid,. 1759.
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of our unwritten constitution obliterated by the blood 
of that awful sacrifice. Upon careful examination, 
however, we discover that our issue is not involved 
in or related to the questions settled by the 
Civil War.
At the same time, the question of admission was
presented to Congress by Senator Benjamin Harrison of
Indiana, a personal friend of "Governor" Mellette. On
December 15, 1885, Harrison introduced a bill providing for
the admission of the State of Dakota into the Union and the
organization of the Territory of North Dakota. This measure
was referred to the Committee on Territories. However,
Matthew C. Butler of South Carolina countered immediately
with a resolution directed to the same committee, which
demanded to know by what authority a "so-called" state,
government had been organized in the Territory of Dakota.
He was joined by George G. Vest of Missouri who exclaimed;
. . . when the Senator from Indiana the other day 
presented a memorial coming from certain persons in 
that territory, in the hurried reading of the secretary 
it escaped me that it came from the official representa­
tives of a state of which I had never heard. . . .
Butler and Vest entered a formal protest against the 
creation of the "State of Dakota." "I want to know," demanded 
the Missourian, "if any senator here . . . will undertake to
say that this state can exist except by the sovereign will of




23Congress.” He also opposed the division of the Territory
and declared that the residents of the southern section were
24attempting to usurp the powers of Congress. Vest directed
his attacks personally against Hugh J. Campbell and the State
Executive Committee of Dakota
This committee has no official existence. Its chairman, 
Hugh J. Campbell, in recent events in Louisiana, 
distinguished himself as a partisan of Mr. Hayes and 
was rewarded for his efforts with an appointment as 
U.S. Attorney in Dakota. He has published an address, 
5,000 copies of which have been distributed over that 
territory, asserting the monstrous doctrine that the 
State of Dakota exists by virtue of a vote of the 
people of that territory without reference to Congress.
Vest then turned upon Harrison and demanded to know
whether he believed that the people of Dakota Territory had
the right to act as they had without regard for Congress.
At a loss to defend either the Dakotans or himself,
Harrison replied; ". . . 1  hold, and have always held, to
the doctrine that a state can neither break into nor out of 
26this Union." He refused to say more and here the matter 
was allowed to rest.
On January 11, 1886, the bill was reported back to 
the Senate unfavorably, and it was postponed. However, on 






onof thirty-two to twenty-two. It was then referred
immediately to the House where on May 25, 1886, it was reported
28adversely and dropped.
In the meantime, Dakota stock took a sudden rise and
fall. After the Harrison bill passed the Senate, Mellette,
Edgerton and Moody journeyed to Washington for an interview
with the President. They assured Cleveland that they were
not revolutionaries and that everything they had done was for
the purpose of inducing Congress to grant Dakota legal and
bona fide admission to the Union. Edgerton, who spoke for
the group, also assured the President that the leaders of
the Dakota statehood movement had done nothing for which
29historical precedent could not be cited. Cleveland, for 
his part, assured Edgerton and the others that he would 
give the matter careful consideration. Apparently the 
Dakotans were not distressed by the ambiguity of the Presi­
dent's words for they returned home with glowing reports of 
success.
Later, however, it was discovered that the House 
Committee was not disposed to report the Harrison bill
27Ibid.. 1171.
^^Ibid.. 4891.
29Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1779-1781.
3°Ibid.. 1782.
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favorably and that Congressman William M. Springer, of 
Illinois was about to introduce a counter-measure. The
31Sioux Falls Press commented bitterly on this turn of events:
It means . . , that immediate admission is out of the 
question. It means that' the Democrats are aiming to so 
divide Dakota as to put the sparcely populated section 
by itself, so that it will not be entitled to admission 
for years to come. The Democratic leaders see that it 
is necessary to do something and they are resorting to 
this division scheme as a measure which will postpone 
indefinitely the admission of one territory and that 
of the other until after the next presidential election.
The Springer bill provided for the division of Dakota
not at the forty-sixth parallel, but at the Missouri River.
News of its proposal and the imminent defeat of the Harrison
bill motivated the constitutional convention to reconvene
on May 4, 1886, to consider the situation. The delegates
were in an ugly mood and were squarely divided between those
who wanted to operate as a state regardless of Congress,
and those who opposed this step. The former group was led
by Campbell; the latter by Edgerton. The Campbellites won
39out and the provisional government remained in existence. 
However, it was with little enthusiasm that the "legislature" 
convened for the second time to hear "Governor" Mellette 
defend once more the existence of the "State of Dakota."
Afraid to pass laws or do anything to activate their paper 
government, the "legislators" drifted quietly away from the
31Sioux Falls Press. February 10, 1886.
32Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1783-1784.
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"capital” until there were too fsv left to establish a quorum. 
Soon the "session" was forced to adjourn, and it appeared
/ qqthat the Democrats and one-staters were victorious.
This point in time is significant in the fight of
Dakota for admission to the Union, first because it marks
the end of the second unsuccessful drive ; and also, because
it constitutes a pause before the opening of the final and
successful drive in which Richard Pettigrew assumed open
leadership. In the period since his final defeat of Ordway
in 1884, Pettigrew stayed for the most part in the background,
devoting much of his time to railroad promotion. But, when
the third and final drive for statehood began in February,
1887, he was ready to devote full time and energy to it.
He was confident of success and expected that his control
of the Republican party organization would place him in the
Senate when South Dakota became a state.
The territorial assembly voted to call for a ballot
34on division in November, and a convention was planned 
which would arouse the enthusiasm of the voters.
Pettigrew favored such a move and his mouthpiece, the Sioux 
Falls Press declared that all those who wanted statehood 
should get behind the movement and push. "The people,"
33Lamar, Dakota Territory. 259.
S^ibid.. 259-260.
35Kingsbury, Dakota lerritorv. II, 1801.
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declared the Press optimistically, "are overwhelmingly in
\ 36favor of division and will prove it if given the opportunity.”
On June 7, 1887, Pettigrew, Mellette, Campbell,
Edgerton and several others met in Huron and issued a formal 
call for the division convention to meet the next month.
They issued a statement declaring that the purpose of the 
convention was to unify the divisionist forces in preparation 
for the election in the fall with the hope of getting out a 
vote large enough to impress Congress.'' The importance of
the convention was highly publicized in the newspapers.
38The Sioux Falls Press. for example, declared:
In the matter of division there are three classes; 
those who favor it, those who are opposed, and those 
who are indifferent. The" first class are in the 
majority but it will not do to take anything for 
granted. Friends of division can be united and 
encouraged and the indifferent can be so thoroughly 
instructed as to cause them to become active supporters 
of the movement.
When the convention finally met, several diverse 
interest groups were represented. M.H. Day, representing 
divisionist Democrats,was there. Also, Father Robert W.
Haire, radical Socialist priest from Aberdeen, was a delegate. 
Haire was an avid supporter of the Farmers’ Alliance, but 
that group also sent its official representative, T.H. Conniff.
Sioux Falls Press, February 5, 1887.
3^Ibid.. June 8, 1886.
38Ibid.. July 13, 1887.
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His very presence illustrates the fact that the Alliance was 
rapidly becoming an important factor within the Republican 
party.
The delegates were agreed that all previous statehood 
movements were dead and that a new start was necessary.
Hugh Campbell even agreed to abandon his "we are a state" 
doctrine, at least for the time, and work for a division and 
admission bill which might be expected to pass Congress.
With the Combine in firm control of the proceedings, Campbell 
was made chairman and plans were laid to carry out an 
intensive campaign throughout the Territory in favor of 
division.
The months following adjournment were characterized
by feverish activity in every county of the Territory and
the divisionists became more and more optimistic of success.
But on November 8, when the ballots were finally cast,
Pettigrew and his friends received a shock. Northern Dakota
voted overwhelmingly against division. In the south the
40result, while favorable, was inconclusive. This unexpected 
reversal gave new heart to the opponents of the division- 
admission movement who immediately called a convention of 
their own in Aberdeen where they once again endorsed the
39Lamar, Dakota Territory. 260.
40Kingsbury, Dakota Territory, ii, 1809-1810.
77
41Springer bill. Meanwhile, in Congress, Delegate Oscar
Gifford attempted to check the one-state advocates by
introducing a bill which called for the creation of two
separate states in Dakota rather than one state and one
territory. It was the first time this idea had been officially
42mentioned and it changed the tempo of the admission fight.
To this point the quest had been only for the admission of 
the southern portion and territorial status for the north.
Now the statehood leaders asked that their territory be 
divided into two sovereign states. In the House Springer 
again led the opposition, while in the Senate Sutler and 
Vest once more attacked the demands of the Dakotans. Senator 
Harrison was joined by O.H. Platt of Connecticut in his 
drive to push the Gifford bill through.
The debates on statehood, which began in April,1888, 
became an issue in the Presidential campaign and excited 
interest throughout the country. Time and again editors of 
such partisan Republican papers as the New York Tribune 
lashed out at the obstructionist tactics of the Democrats.
The campaign of the Tribune in behalf of Dakota reached its 
climax on August 15, 1888, when it declared; "Every voter
^^Ibid.. 1810-1812.
42Lamar, Dakota Territory. 261.
43̂Ibid.. 262.
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who believes it is a crime to withhold representation from 
this state . . . should vote for a Republican member of 
Congress in November. A Republican House of Representatives
/*; Ameans the prompt admission of Dakota,"
Furthermore, the Republicans had a plank in their
platform calling for the admission of the territories "as soon
as possible," and, of course, their presidential candidate,
Benjamin Harrison, had long been the champion of statehood 
45for Dakota.
Meanwhile, in Dakota, Pettigrew, Mellette and the 
other leaders of the movement labored to excite more enthusiasm 
among the citizens of the Territory. They had now hit upon 
the expedient of calling conventions of statehood advocates 
divided according to profession. Thus Pettigrew and Mellette 
organized a lawyers* convention, and W.S. Bowen .of the 
Yankton Press and Dakotan organized an editors’ convention.
In addition there was a clergymen’s gathering and one of 
businessmen and farmers.
It was during this period of intense activity that 
the final estrangement of Hugh J. Campbell from the other 
leaders of the Combine occurred. He had now returned to his
44New York Tribune. August 15, iBBS.
45Thomas McKee, The National Conventions and Platforms 
of the Political Parties (Baltimore; The Friedenwald Co., 
1906), 241.
46Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1837.
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"we are a state” thesis which was extremely popular.
Campbell was personally more active than any of the others 
and he spoke on the subject of statehood almost every day 
during the summer of 1888. He became so enamored of his own 
importance to the movement that he began to believe that it 
could not succeed without him and that only he could
47successfully guide an-.admission bill through Congress.
Thus Campbell began to combine his own campaign for the office 
of Delegate with the statehood campaign. Unfortunately, 
his ambitions were -more lofty than the plans which the Combine 
had for him and by mid-summer they turned against him. This 
caused a split in the statehood forces which might have been 
fatal had it not been for the election of Harrison in 
November.- As it was, it meant only the loss to the Combine 
of the services of Campbell, who went over to the Farmers’ 
Alliance.
Events now moved rapidly. The success of the
Republicans in the national elections of 1888 spelled certain
success for the statehood movement in Dakota and the other
territories. On February 20, 1889, the Omnibus Bill was
passed despite vigorous opposition from Democrats led by the
49unrelenting Springer. In Dakota, when it became certain
47Lamar, Dakota Territory. 264.
48Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1846-1852.
49Congressional Record. 50 Cong., 2 Sess., February 20, 
1889, XX, 795,
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that the state would be admitted, the Farmers’ Alliance moved
to seize what it considered its fair share in the distribution
of offices. The Combine, fearing the agrarian leaders
meant to gather all political power to themselves, sought to
head off such a move.
Although there is no conclusive evidence, it appears
that the leaders of the Combine had already agreed on the
distribution of the important offices. Mellette was to be
Governor, and Pettigrew, and Moody, Senators. If possible, a
Federal Judgeship was to be procurred for Edgerton. Since
Pettigrew was in control of party organization, he had his
pick of the offices. Moody was chosen for Senator in order
50to secure the support of Republicans in the Black Hills.
On March 9, 1889, President Harrison appointed
Arthur C. Mellette Governor of Dakota Territory to serve
until the constitution could be approved and state officers 
51chosen. Immediately thereafter, plans were laid for the 
third and final constitutional convention to meet in Sioux 
Falls in July. The Republican Alliance sen, fearing that 
the Combine meant to ignore them in the distribution of 
offices, attempted to seize control of the convention. Allied 
with the Democrats and Prohibitionists, they very nearly
50Evidence, of this agreement is scanty, but see: 
Pettigrew to Mellette, September 21, 1889; ahid Edgerton to 
Mellette, October 19, 1889, as proof that it existed. Mellette 
Papers, South Dakota State Historical Society Museum, Pierre, 
South Dakota.
51Schell, South Dakota. 220.
succeeded, but by careful r&nipulaticn of delegates Pettigrew
and Moody were able to defeat thea.~
The success of the Combine in maintaining control was
soon to have a significant effect on politics in the new
state. It was to alter the history of the agrarian political
movement of South Dakota, since as a direct result some
Alliance leaders began to consider leaving the Republican
party and founding a new independent political organization
dedicated to the interests of farmers. However, the proper
time had not yet arrived. Most influential Alliance men
still agreed with Henry L. Loucks that it would be unwise to
organize a third party. They preferred to operate within the
existing parties as a pressure group, even though that method
53had brought them only limited success. Thus with the new 
state nearing its birth the Alliance men paused to reflect 
upon their future role in tne Republican party and South 
Dakota. -
On June 19, 1889, they held their last territorial
convention at Huron. Here, Loucks declared that the farming
element was entitled merely by virtue of numbers to control
both Senate seats, both seats in the House and all major state 
54offices. Hugh J. Campbell, now completely ostracized from
52Lamar, Dakota Terricorv. -26c.
53Hendrickson, "ihe Popuiist Movement in South Dakota,” 
15 .  r
64Ibid.. 15-16.
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the Combine, challenged the farmers to ”. . .go into every 
primary, caucus and convention and nominate your friends and 
not your enemies for all the offices from United States
DOSenator to constable.”
■ The Alliance made desperate efforts to gain 
recognition at the county level and despite the opposition of 
the Combine was fairly well represented at the first 
Republican State Convention which assembled at Huron, August 28, 
1889. Of primary importance here was the selection of 
candidates for the state offices. Fearing that the nomination 
of Mellette would mean their political death, the Alliance 
men sought to head off this e v e n t , b u t  were unable to 
gather enough support. In the end they did not even bother
• 57
to name a candidate of their own. Instead, they accepted
the candidacy of Mellette and the party platform, which was,
in fact, specifically designed to allay their fears. It called
for fair elections, just taxation, equitable transportation
58rates, and prohibition.
Loucks, still opposed to a third party movement, 
exerted all efforts to convince his followers that their
55
Kingsbury, Dakota Territory, II, 1884-1885.
56Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South Dakota,”
17.
57Kingsbury, Dakota Territory. II, 1904-1906.
58South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 647.
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interests would best be served by the Republicans. Through 
his mouthpiece, the Ruralist. he insisted that the Alliance 
was satisfied with the results of the convention. The 
leaders of the party, said Loucks, have heeded the demands of 
the farmers; the party nominees moreover, " . . .  are 
broadminded and conservative, and pledged to support a 
platform which embodies almost every plank in the Alliance 
platform.
Pettigrew, despite the pronouncements of Loucks, was
unconvinced as to the loyalty of the Alliance. He feared'
that pressure from the agrarian element for a greater voice
in party counsels would continue. Whether heeded or not it
would threaten the power of the Combine and perhaps endanger
his own tenure in office. In order to allay this danger, he
cleverly sought to intermesh the interests of certain
Alliance leaders with those of the Combine by doling out a
tidbit of patronage. Pettigrew advised Mellette that Donald
Needham, Vice President of the Territorial Alliance might
well be appointed to the Railroad Commission. "Mr. Needham
has been one of our closest friends and has helped us
60everywhere, . . ." he pointed out. Despite this plea,
59As quoted in Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in 
South Dakota," 18.
60
Pettigrew to Mellette, October 7, 1889, Mellette
Papers.
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Needham was not appointed. Oddly, there is no hint of disgust 
in the Pettigrew correspondence. Perhaps he feared to 
precipitate a factional dispute on the eve of success. Or 
perhaps he knew that Mellette was corresponding with the 
radical Father Haire of Aberdeen who was active in Alliance 
circles. This exchange shows conclusively that Mellette 
considered the agrarian element in the party an important 
one
In spite of the small rift in the Combine over this 
particle of strategy, the party succeeded admirably in the 
first state election. Mellette carried all but five of the 
fifty-one counties and defeated his Democratic opponent by 
more than 30,000 votes. S h o r t l y after, the legislature 
convened in the Hughes County Court House in. Pierre, the new 
capital, to. elect two United States Senators. On the--evening 
of October 15, the Republicans caucused to decide upon their 
candidates. Pettigrew and Moody of the Combine were challenged 
for the nomination by Alonzo Wardall of the Alliance. In 
addition. Judge Edgerton, who also enjoyed a certain amount 
of Alliance support .accepted a nomination. After each of 
these men was nominated a straw vote was taken. The poll . 
disclosed that Pettigrew and Moody led the others far and 
away with 98 and 85 votes respectively. Edgerton had 67 and
... 61For example see: Haire to Mellette, December 7,
1889, in ibid.
^^South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 289.
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Wardall only 44. Thus it was moved that Pettigrew and Moody 
be made the unanimous nominees. This motion carried and the 
next day the two politicos were elected by the legislature.
The only dissenting votes were those of the seventeen 
Democrats who voted for their leader, Bartlett Tripp. After 
the election, Pettigrev/ and Moody drew straws for terms and 
Pettigrew won the six year term.
On the surface, it appeared that the party was acting 
in complete harmony and that Wardall and Edgerton had grace­
fully stepped aside in favor of the more popular candidates.
This, howev-er, was not the case. Wardall was very anxious 
for the nomination and had with great confidence predicted 
his election at an Alliance convention in St. Paul seven 
months before. Loucks, who accompanied him to that convention, 
had given him full support. Although he employed great tact 
when he conceded to Pettigrew, Wardall actually harbored 
bitter resentment at having lost the senatorship.^^
As a matter of fact, many of the Alliance leaders were 
disappointed over their failure to control the Republican 
caucus. Edgerton was very popular throughout the state and 
he might have been able to secure the nomination had he 
pressed hard enough to get it. In supporting Edgerton against 
Moody, the Alliance had hoped to draw enough support to Wardall
63
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to defeat Moody-and Pettigrew, and they later claimed to 
have had enough votes lined up to elect both Edgerton and 
Wardall.
When Edgerton refused to push his candidacy and 
finally withdrew from the contest, accepting the results of 
the caucus, he was accused by Loucks of having betrayed the 
Alliance, Loucks charged that the understanding among 
Edgerton, Mellette, Moody and Pettigrew had been designed to 
eliminate the Alliance from contention. According to Loucks, 
Edgerton was to remain a candidate only long enough to keep 
anyone else from being elected and then withdraw at the 
proper moment leaving the field clear for Pettigrew and 
Moody. Edgerton was to receive his Federal Judgeship as a 
reward.
There is little concrete evidence with which to 
evaluate the charges of Loucks, but as if to bear out popular 
belief, Edgerton was duly appointed to the judiciary, by 
Benjamin Harrison. The petition on his behalf was signed by 
Pettigrew, Moody, Mellette and virtually all the other 
leading Republicans in the state. Furthermore, Pettigrew's 
correspondence reveals complicity as he kept Mellette informed 
of the progress of the appointment in November.
Naturally, Edgerton denied that any "corrupt bargain"
65For example see: Pettigrew to Mellette, November 4,
1889, Mellette Papers.
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had been consummated,^^ but Loucks concluded that his
acceptance of the judgeship proved he was a "traitor,"
Whatever the truth, it is certain that the Republicans were
determined to elect Moody over any Alliance candidate in
order to gain the support of the Black Hills. Pettigrew was
virtually assured of election no matter what, and the Combine
argued that Edgerton withdrew in order to "maintain harmony."
After the election in October Pettigrew journeyed to
St. Paul where he chartered a special train to take him home 
68to Sioux Falls. When he arrived on October 16, he was
greeted by thousands of people, a city bedecked in bunting of
red, white and blue and the adulation of the p r e s s . H e
found that his friends had prepared a royal welcome in his
private office also, which.was covered with flags. Upon his
desk was a beautiful bank of flowers upon which was woven
70in blooms of white the word, "Congratulations," That night 
there was a fireworks display and speeches by leading 
citizens. It was a spectacle to rival the greatest 
remembrance of the Fourth of July that anyone could imagine.
66Edgerton to Mellette, October 19, 1889, in ibid.
67Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South Dakota,"21.
68Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew," 21.
69Sioux Falls Press. October 17, 1889.
70Sioux Falls Argus Leader. October 18, 1889.
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To add to the personal glory of the occasion the Argus
71Leader declared:
. . . The impression is general that Frank Pettigrew 
in the Senate means sore to Sioux Falls than would the 
capital or a new railroad. The businessmen look upon 
his election as a pises of good luck. . . .
Pettigrew respondsd to his admirers by assuring them
that he was sympathetic with the problems faced by the tillers
of the soil, and pledgee to protect their interests through
Republican protectionism, it the same time, however, he
declared himself to be in favor of "an ample supply of
 ̂ 79currency but not greenbackiss."
Thus Pettigrew’s irnense personal.popularity plus the
facade of party harmony sesrsd to bode success for the
future. Harmony, however, vas not long maintained. By the
early months of 1890, Pstnigrew was already suspicious that
Mellette, dissatisfied with his lot, harbored senatorial 
73ambitions. Pettigrew believed that the Governor was 
looking for an excuse to rrn against Moody when the 
legislature convened in 1391. This matter was cause for 
considerable worry for Petnigrew since he feared that any 
chink in the armor of the Combine would provide an opening
71Ibid.. October 16, 1889.
72Sioux Falls Press. October 17, 1889.
73Pettigrew to Donald Needham, March 1, 1890, Pettigrew
Papers.
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74wedge for the Alliance. He conveyed his fear, to Mellette,
and at the same time appealed to the Governor’s party loyalty
by expressing his hope that neither Loucks, Wardall nor any
of "that crew" would be elected to office in South Dakota.
He was contemptuous of them, saying their purpose was to
destroy the Republican party and that it would be a disgrace
to have the state run by "that bunch of crooks." He then
cleverly added that he hoped the dispute between Melette
and Moody would not become serious enough to prevent the
Combine from defeating "those unholy, unrepublican cranks who
75are trying to capture Dakota."
Pettigrew’s true motive in attempting to assuage 
Mellette, however, was fear that with Mellette in the Senate, 
President Harrison would by-pass Pettigrew in matters of 
patronage. Since this would cause him to lose influence 
rapidly, he was willing to do whatever was necessary to 
avoid it. Thus during the spring of 1890, Pettigrew strove 
to "save the Combine." He succeeded for the time being and 
actually remained on cordial terms with Mellette. Indeed, 
the Governor indicated that he would abandon his senatorial 
aspirations in favor of Moody, and it seemed that the Combine 
might remain in control of the state indefinitely.^^
74Pettigrew to Mellette, March 10, 1890, in ibid.
75Pettigrew to Mellette, March 1890 (the exact date 
is obliterated).
*76Pettigrew to John Diamond, April 8, 1890, in ibid.
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Thus at the age of forty-one, Richard F. Pettigrew 
had achieved his ambitions. Wealth, honor, dignity and 
political power were all his. As popular leader of the 
Republican party in South Dakota his future seemed secure.
Yet dangers soon to manifest themselves awaited him. Against 
him stood the Alliance. Against him stood his erstwhile 
partner, Mellette. Near in the future was the depression.
All were to affect his career significantly.
CHAPTER IV 
WESTERN PROMOTER
Although politics was his first love, Pettigrew 
continued his interest in the industrial development of Dakota 
throughout the long fight for statehood. As a result of his 
labors, he can be credited with bringing five railroads to 
Sioux Falls while it was still a relatively small town.
The first of these, already discussed, was the St. Paul- 
Sioux City Line which arrived in 1878. It came, as a result 
of the activities of the Citizens Committee of which 
Pettigrew was the leader.
The committee continued its work and was shortly 
successful in bringing another railroad to Sioux Falls. This 
time it was a spur from a line being constructed between 
Sioux City and Pembina in the far distant northeastern corner 
of Dakota. This line was soon purchased by the Chicago, 
Milwaukee and St. Paul Company and remained under its 
control for many years to come.^ Thus by 1880, when 
Pettigrew first went to Congress, Sioux Falls was blessed with 
the presence of two railroads, and for the next four years,
^Bailey, Minnehaha County. 150.
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little work of a promotional nature was done.
By 1884, however, interest in railroad promotion was
again at fever pitch. 1 new Citizens Committee was organized,
the purpose of which was to get Sioux Falls on a direct route
to Chicago. The plan was to extend a branch line from
Ellsworth, Minnesota, forty-five miles away. If this were
done, the city would be connected to the Burlington, Cedar
Rapids and Northern, which had a line running to Chicago
through Burlington, Iowa. Farmers in southeastern Dakota
would then be in a better position to compete with those who
shipped through arch-rival Sioux City, which enjoyed lower
rates than Sioux Falls. Ihe plan received a good deal of
discussion throughout 1565, but no definite action was taken.
Finally, Pettigrew, who was not a member of the committee,
took matters into his own hands and invited the representatives
_ 2of the company to Sioux -alls.
The officials came to town on January 2, 1886, and 
offered to extend their line to Sioux Falls on two 
conditions. First, the people living along the proposed route 
between Sioux Falls and Ellsworth were to contribute $80,000 
to the cost of construction; and second, land for the right 
of way and for depot grounds within the city was to be 
donated. Despite these demanding conditions, representatives 
of the city agreed to them, and contracted to assume $50,000
2Parkinson, "The iarly Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"
6 8 .
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of the contribution for Sioux Falls conditional to the
agreement of the voters. A special election held on
February 9 showed that the voters approved the contract
3overwhelmingly, and the bonds were issued immediately. 
Meanwhile, Pettigrew travelled along the proposed route of 
the right of way talking to landowners. He was able to 
convince them that construction of the line would be profi­
table, and by the time he returned to Sioux Falls the success 
of the scheme was virtually assured.^
Construction of this railroad began immediately and 
was completed October 26, 1886. Its completion led the 
citizens of Sioux Falls to believe that the days of unfair 
rates were over, but unfortunately this proved to be a 
premature assumption. Nevertheless, many were so appreciative 
of Pettigrew’s work that a poem in his honor was published
5
in the Sioux Falls Press;
And don’t forget 
One thing you bet.
Give honor where’er it’s due.
This line we own.
Thro’ zeal we’er shown 
by R. Frank Pettigrew.
During the same time that the Ellsworth line was
being constructed, a movement was under way among the
officials of the Illinois Central to extend their line west
3
Bailey, Minnehaha County. 152.
4
Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"
69-70.
5
Sioux Falls Press. October 29, 1886.
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from Cherokee, lova, to Sioux Falls. People in northwest 
Iowa were in favor- of the scheme, but the assent of Sioux 
Falls was necessary before it could be carried out. On 
May 12, 1887, a delegation from Cherokee, Sheldon and Rock 
Rapids arrived in town to lay their proposition before Sioux 
Falls civic leaders. Mayor Thomas McCulla, of Cherokee, 
spokesman for the group, said the purpose of the visit was'to 
ascertain whether Sioux Falls would cooperate with the other 
towns along the proposed route. The Dakotans were asked to 
provide the right of way through Minnehaha County and 
sufficient land in Sioux Falls for station grounds, stock 
yards and sidetrack, A meeting was called for that very night 
and Pettigrew, acting as spokesman for Sioux Falls, assured 
the lowans that his people would do whatever was necessary 
to secure the construction of the line as soon as possible. 
Before adjournment the mayor of Sioux Falls made Pettigrew 
chairman of a committee to secure the right of way, and the 
lowans went home satisfied.^
Pettigrew went to work with characteristic vigor.
He conferred with officials of the company in Dubuque, Iowa, 
and assured them that everyone was ready to cooperate. These 
negotiations convinced the company to proceed on the 
condition that financial responsibility be assumed by the 
cities along the right of way. This condition was accepted
6Sioux -ails Argus Leader, May 13, 1887.
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and Pettigrew immediately inaugurated a campaign in Sioux 
Falls to obtain the necessary subscriptions. By July 30,
1887, with his associate E.A. Sherman, he had succeeded in 
raising $42,000 and the company accepted the guaranty. The 
only problem now remaining was to secure the right of way. 
During the next two weeks Pettigrew and Sherman visited almost 
every farmer whose land was involved. Gathering the sod- 
busters in the barn, the two men would talk business, while 
their "ladies’ man" associate, R.G. Parmley, would "smooth 
talk" the women in the farm house. By August 12 they had 
secured the necessary land and within a month construction 
was under way. It proceeded rapidly and the last spike was 
driven by Mayor Norten of Sioux Falls on December 11, 1887, 
amid wild acclaim for Dakota, the Committee and Richard F.
7Pettigrew.
Still the Promoter did not rest. He and Sherman were 
already at work on a scheme to bring the Wilmar-Duluth Line 
to Sioux Falls. If successful, this scheme would provide the 
wheat farmers of southern Dakota with a direct route to the 
Great Lakes Waterway. In order to succeed, however, it was 
necessary to convince the owner of the railroad, none other 
than James J. Hill, that it would be profitable. Pettigrew, 
who knew the tycoon, secured his approval by promising future 
expansion of the line to Yankton. Hill agreed, again on
7Bailey, Minnehaha County, 153-157.
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the condition that the right of way be provided along with 
a fund of SoOjCCC for construction. Pettigrew accepted and 
in turn induced the citizens of Sioux Falls to provide 
$60,000 as a gesture of good faith. The money was raised 
through a bond issue and furnished to the railroad in
p
September.
By that tine construction had already begun, but 
little progress vas nade during the ensuing weeks. Worried, 
Pettigrew and Sheman went to St. Paul to confer with Hill.
They found bin bothered by the fact that land for the station 
grounds had non yet been secured in Sioux Falls. Pettigrew 
assured him that rhere was no cause for alarm, whereupon the 
great man said, "I have agreed to put my line through to 
Sioux Falls, and it is going there." And put it there he did.
Construction vas recommenced and one year later, on
October 25, IBSB, the final spike was driven within the city 
limits.^
Pettigrew's vision now began to broaden. He decided 
to build a railroad himself. In December, 1888, he and his 
brother Fred, along with several others organized the South 
Sioux Falls Railroad and Rapid Transit Company. The line was
to be a relatively small one running from the Sioux Falls
g
Sioux Falls Arcus Leader. July 28, September 16, 1887.
9Bailey, Minnehaha County. 157-160.
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business district to the industrial area on the south edge 
of town. During the spring the grading and construction 
were completed and the first run was made on June 25, 1889.^^
The original equipment of the street railway company 
consisted of two mule drawn cars. After using these for a 
few months, the company was granted a franchise for the use 
of motor-driven cars. The addition of these modern 
conveyences required that a central power station be built, 
but after this hurdle was overcome at a cost of $80,000, the 
motor-cars went into operation and a long and prosperous 
future seemed to be in store. Unfortunately for its owners, 
however, the Rapid Transit Company went bankrupt in the panic 
of 1893, and was forced to cease operations. All that 
remained were eleven miles of railroad track; mute reminders 
to Pettigrew of his shattered dreams.
During the late 1880*s one thought dominated 
Pettigrew’s mind. It was his ambition to build a real 
railroad. Something larger than a local street car company. 
For many months he toyed with the idea of starting a line 
from Sioux Falls to Yankton, but hesitated because of the 
great expense which would be involved. In addition, he had 
hope that this project would be handled by the Duluth-Wilmar 
Company. This hope, however, had faded by 1888. Thus in the
^^Ibid.. 161.
^^Tarkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"
76-77.
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spring of 1889, acting in his capacity as President of the 
Sioux Falls ConEDsrcial Club, Pettigrew sent D.R. Bailey 
as his emmisary cc the Territorial Legislature. Bailey’s job 
was to lobby for tne passage of an act which would allow the 
Territory to aid in the construction of railroads. He 
succeeded, but the lav was rendered void when South Dakota 
entered the Union in October.
At the sane cine Pettigrew was forced to delay the 
project and devote full time to his duties as U.S. Senator, 
and nothing was dene cor three years. Then, at the end of 
the congressional session of 1892, Pettigrew organized the 
Yankton, Sioux Falls and Southwestern Railroad Company with 
himself as presidenc. In September, he was given assurances 
by the civic leaders of Sioux Falls that the city would 
render all possible aid to his project, and he began 
construction at once. Grading contracts were let within a 
month, and the laying of track began soon after. By 
August 15, 1893, crains were running between Sioux Falls and 
several small towns along the route. In October the tracks 
reached Yankton: cne Yankton, Sioux Falls and Southwestern 
was completed. Peccigrsw, the proud owner of the line, was 
feted at a gala celebration in Yankton one day after the 
completion of his railroad. Dignitaries from each of the 
small towns along che line attended. There was a sumptuous 
feast with ample drinks, and cascades of flowers to match 
the speeches of gratitude which were showered upon the hero
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of the hour. It was a joyous occasion. One to be remembered 
long after failure had tarnished the gleaming cup of 
success
The grandest project of all now approached reality. 
Still convinced that Sioux Falls could be made the industrial 
center of the Midwest, if it were on the route of a trans­
continental railroad, Pettigrew decided to build that road 
himself. He proposed to build a railroad from Sioux Falls 
west to Pierre, the capital; the'nce westward through the 
Black Hills, Wyoming, the Yellowstone Country and Washington 
to the mighty port of Seattle. When this was done his dream 
would be complete. His town would be connected with Chicago, 
the Great Lakes and the West Coast. The opportunities for 
industrial expansion would be unlimited; wealth would pour 
into South Dakota, and much of it would be his.
Pettigrew made several junkets to New York in quest 
of financial support. He interested his contacts there in 
his scheme and once he was assured of aid he organized the 
Midland Pacific Railroad Company with himself as president. 
Shares in the corporation sold quickly to local investors, 
interested parties along the proposed line, and eastern 
financiers. Some were even sold in England, and plans were
12
Bailey, Minnehaha County, 165-167.
13
Pettigrew Papers, Loose File, Pettigrew Museum, 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The articles of incorporation 
along with a prospectus of the Midland Pacific are intact.
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under way to advertise their sale throughout the British 
14Empire.
With the funds derived from the sale of stock, 
Pettigrew took options on land along the proposed roadbed 
and paid for the survey. In the early months of 1893 some 
grading was done near Sioux Falls and later near Pierre. In 
the same year, however, financial disaster struck and the- 
entire project had to be abandoned. When the panic came, 
almost every property owner along the route upon whose land 
options had been taken, demanded full payment. Pettigrew 
had sunk much of his available cash into the project and was 
hard pressed to meet these obligations. Finally, through the 
sale of the Yankton line to Hill’s Great Northern, he was 
able to cover most of his debts, but his losses had been 
great. His dream was dead. In later years he recouped much 
of his fortune, but never again did he engage in the promotion 
of railroads.
During the vintage years Pettigrew did not confine 
himself to transportation in his quest to develop the Sioux 
Falls area into a mighty industrial complex. Very early in 
his career he proposed to build a flour mill which would be 
among the finest in the nation. He sought eastern capital, 
and finally persuaded one financier, George Seney, to come
14Parkinson, "ihe early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,"80.
15Ibid.. 80-81.
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to Dakota in June 1878. Pettigrew had arranged for Seney
to come at that particular time in order that he might see
the wheat crop at its best. Seney was impressed. Pettigrew
also arranged another impressive sight for the New Yorker.
Since the Sioux River was low at this particular time, he
constructed an earthen dam across it north of the city.
At the proper moment, the dam was opened and Seney
witnessed a tremendous volume of water passing through the
channel. The water supply, he thought, was more than
adequate to power a large mill.^^
Construction began in August 1879, and the building
was ready for occupancy by October 1881. It was one of the
engineering marvels of its day. The huge structure, built
of Sioux Falls granite, measured 80 by 100 feet and was six
stories high. Inside, according to contemporaries, were ten
miles of belting, eight miles of spouting, three miles of
17conveyors and two miles of elevator shaft.
This maze of machinery, the best that money could 
buy, was designed to produce 1,200 barrels of flour a day, 
but it never did. The milling operations which began on 
October 25, 1881, were never run at capacity because there 
was seldom adequate water power. Finally, in 1883, the plant 
was shut down. During its short period of operation the
^^Ibid.. 83.
17Bailey, Minnehaha County. 383.
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mill provided no profits to its owner and when it was 
attached on April 20, 1383, there was an outstanding
■J Q
indebtedness of 557,000."
The Queen Bee Mill stood idle for more than twenty- 
five years. Finally, it resumed operations on a limited 
scale in 1911, reraining open until the end of World War I.
At that time it closed for good and stood empty, another 
ghost to the drears of Richard Pettigrew, until it was 
destroyed by fire in 1556."^
Another of Pettigrew’s projects was a combination 
stock yards and meat packing plant. Once again he sought 
capital in the Bast, and in the summer of 1889, organized 
the Sioux Falls Stock Yards Company with himself as president.
By 1891 over 5370,000 had been spent but the project 
was still incomplete. Then, the panic of 1893 made further 
work out of the question and the project was temporarily 
abandoned. Two years later, however, the company was 
reorganized with capical stock of $2,000,000 and the building 
of the yards was completed. Still, there were no funds for 
the purchase of machinery and further delays were 
encountered. It was net until 1899 that the plant was 
opened. It remained open for exactly three months, until 
closed by the courts. During all the time which had 
elapsed no thought had been given to the adequate disposal
18Ibid.. 353.
19Schell, Soutn Dakota, 363.
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of sewage. When operations finally began waste materials
were simply dumped in the river. Residents along the stream
immediately complained and sought an injunction. Their suit
was successful, bringing the demise of the Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Company, The loss to the promoters and investors was
20reported to be in excess of $1,000,000.
At about the same time he promoted the stock yards, 
Pettigrew also built a woolen mill in Sioux Falls. He 
provided the land himself and built a small two-story building 
to house the mill. The Senator was confident that he had 
adequate influence in Washington to secure government contracts 
for the manufacture of blankets. This proved to be a pipe- 
dream. There were no contracts, and the mill was forced to
n 1
close furing the depression. Years later the machinery
22was sold to a New England firm, but the building stood idle
23until it was destroyed by high winds in 1930.
In addition to his other enterprises in the 1880's 
Pettigrew built an axle grease factory and a corn starch 
factory. There was also a corn canning factory and a linen 
mill. In addition to these, he owned two railroads, and the
20Bailey, Minnehaha County. 384.
21Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew," 86.
22Pettigrew to E.P. Beebe, March 8, 1902, Pettigrew 
Papers, Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
23
Parkinson, "The Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew," 86.
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packing plant looked like a prospective gold mine. Then 
there was the knit underwear factory worth $250,000 and 
employing 250 persons, the felt boot factory valued at
$150,000, an oil mill worth $10,000 and a sash, door and blind
24company. All of these properties were lost in the panic
25of 1893.
In surveying the business enterprises of Richard 
Pettigrew it soon becomes apparent that he was over-optimistic 
and somewhat irresponsible. But his optimism was symbolic 
of the time and place in which he lived. In the 1870’s 
and early eighties Dakota was a frontier area into which 
vast numbers of emigrants were pouring in search of their 
fortunes. With them came the railroads along with speculators 
and promoters like Pettigrew who were willing to risk much 
in quest of large profits. They dealt in real estate, 
tbwnsites and railroad rights-of-way. They sought to 
manipulate territorial politics to their own advantage.
Yet they cannot be said to have been completely evil men, 
for many of them, like Pettigrew, were dreamers who saw more 
in the future than profits alone. They dreamed of a day when 
cities would rise on the prairie; when shining rails would 
cross and re-cross the vast grassy stretches breathing vibrant 
life into dormant lands. Like Pettigrew, many promoters were 
overly exhuberant in their optimism. Pettigrew dreamed of
24
Sioux rails Press. September 26, 1889.
25
Parkinson, "ihe Early Career of R.F. Pettigrew,” 87.
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making Sioux Falls a vast metropolis which would become a 
distribution center for beef and wheat; a railroad hub; a 
city great enough to support large numbers of subsidiary 
industries. Although his results fell far short of his 
expectations, he was, nevertheless, largely responsible for 
the rapid economic growth of his home city and is thus 
entitled to commendation as one of those unsung heroes of the 
Gilded Age who, sometimes by design, often unwittingly, 
contributed much to the vital economic development of 
America.
From another point of view, there can be no doubt 
that the staggering financial losses suffered by Pettigrew 
after 1893 affected his political thinking. Heretofore, no 
man was more dedicated to the capitalistic system and the 
Republican party than he. But from 1892 onward he began 
to revise his opinions of bankers, financiers, lawyers 
and even the party itself. In time all became anathema to 
him. He became one of the loudest advocates of free silver 
in the United States and gradually accepted much of the 
socialistic dogma of the Populists. Midway in his Senatorial 
career he allied himself with the People’s party and turned 
upon his former Republican colleagues with a ferociousness 
which became legendary. Pettigrew became notorious for his 
biting criticisms on the floor of the Senate. No one was 
safe from the intimidations which spilled from his bearded 
lip. None could predict who might next feel the barbs of
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his sarcasm during the heat of debate.
Let it not be forgotten, however, that Richard 
Pettigrew was a professional politician before all else.
While it is certain beyond reasonable doubt that his financial 
losses were important in his spectacular change of parties, 
it is also true that the immutable economic forces at work 
upon the nation as a whole affected his thinking to a degree. 
He watched as the farmers of South Dakota and other states 
rose up in quest of political power. He feared they might : 
succeed. Knowing their success would destroy the Republican 
party, he saw as his only salvation a chance to seize the 
reigns of this mighty apocalyptic movement and control it 
for his own purposes. To men such as Pettigrew it was vital 
to stay in office. No sacrifice was too great to achieve this 
end. If principles must be changed or abandoned; so be it.
The most important thing was to stay in the mainstream of 
political opinion and in 1892 the current was switching 
channels. Populism was at flood tide. A re-evaluation was 
in order
CHAPTER V
A WESTERN SENATOR AND REPUBLICAN PARTY POLITICS
Twenty years of intense activity had told on Richard 
Pettigrew. When he arrived in Washington in 1889 he appeared 
much older than his forty-one years. He was still tall, of 
course, but now his shoulders were slightly stooped; his face 
pale and drawn. Faint downward lines now marked his 
countenance giving the observer the erroneous impression that 
Pettigrew suffered from constant fatigue or lethargy. A full 
beard complemented his sagging face so that Pettigrew somehow 
reminded one of a basset hound. Still, his most striking 
characteristic was a shrill, whining voice which, when it 
reached crescendoes of emotion-packed oratory, made the blood 
run cold.^
In education and experience Pettigrew compared 
favorably with any freshman Senator and many of his ’’veteran” 
colleagues. His training in the law was more than adequate 
for the day, and coupled with nearly twenty years of practice, 
made Ig'im an expert in the nuances of a complex profession.
1C.W. Thompson, Party Leaders of the Time (New York; 
G.W. Dillingham and Co., 1906), 89.
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In addition, his political experience was vast. He was 
recognized by most of his new colleagues as "boss" of the 
South Dakota Republicans and this reputation entitled him to 
a position of respect among his fellows.
It must not be forgotten, however, that Pettigrew’s 
experience in Republican politics was of a unique character. 
He had matured on the political activities of a territory, 
not a state, and this fact had a marked effect on his 
philosophy. It has already been shown that he had developed 
a hatred for federal authority. This hatred for "outside" 
interference in affairs of local concern marked all his 
relations with the administrations under which he served, 
whether Republican or Democratic. More important, his 
provincial orientation prevented him from becoming an 
integral part of the national Republican machine. When he 
began his senatorial career, he found himself for the first 
time surrounded by men to whom South Dakota was a matter 
of secondary import. This discovery affected his subsequent 
actions fully as much as did the specific issues with which 
he dealt.
In his first session of Congress Pettigrew was 
assigned to the Committee on Railroads and the Committee on 
Indian Affairs. Later, in April 1890, he,became a member of 
the Committee on Public Lands. Each of these committees 
dealt with matters which were of vital concern to the
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Senator and he threw himself into their activities with a 
will.2
Pettigrew’s first move in Congress was to exercise 
his patronage prerogative by removing every Democratic Indian 
Agent in South Dakota. He replaced the incumbents, many 
of whom were not only Democrats but "outsiders,” with South 
Dakota Republicans. Unfortunately, his attention to jobbery 
was more scrupulous than his attention to ability and the 
result was a noticeable decline in the quality of agency 
administration. His "crowning achievement" was the removal 
of the powerful Pine Ridge agent, D.H. Gallagher, who had 
served with distinction since 1886. The Senator removed 
Gallagher on the pretext that the agent was unable to maintain 
order on the reservation. In,his place Pettigrew appointed
Dr. D.F. Royer of Rapid City who apparently knew nothing at
3all about Indian affairs. Within a few weeks of his 
appointment Royer demonstrated his ignorance and fear of 
the Indians by demanding that troops be sent to stop the "ghost 
dance* craze among the Sioux. Since none of the other agents 
considered the deployment of troops necessary, none were sent. 
Nevertheless, Royer continued to demand military aid, and his 
panic was' a prominent factor in causing the Wounded Knee
Congressional Record. 51 Cong., 1 Sess., December 16, 
1889, XXI, April 2, 1890, 175, 176, 2959.
3
G.E. Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle (Nprman; University 
of Oklahoma Press, 19567, 254.
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tragedy which took place shortly after.^
The Indian Commission was aware of Royer’s incompetence 
and sought to replace him with an experienced Sioux agent,
Major V.T. McGillicuddy, who had served at Pine Ridge from 
1879 to 1886. When Pettigrew learned of this he wrote Royer 
that he would do everything necessary to protect his place:
"Put McGillicuddy off the agency if he appears again," 
declared Pettigrew. "I consider him a scoundrel. He would
5like to be your successor."
Pettigrew also wrote McGillicuddy declaring that he 
would not consent to his entering the Indian Service again.
“I feel that you did not act the part of an honest agent 
while you were in the employ of the government before," wrote 
the Senator. "And my suspicions have not been removed."^
Later, McGillicuddy wrote to Governor Mellette 
complaining of the opposition of Pettigrew. The letter is 
an excellent example of the attitude held by most people who 
did not find themselves within the "charmed circle" of 
Pettigrew’s favor. "I am catching ’Hail Columbia’ from 
Pettigrew and the crowd," wrote the Major. "If they are to
^Ibid.. 259-260.
5
Pettigrew to D.F. Royer, Undated, Pettigrew Papers.
6Pettigrew to V.T. McGillicuddy, January 14, 1892,
in ibid.
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7run South Dakota forever I may as veil emigrate to Alaska,"
In an effort to remove the Indian service from the 
realm of party politics, the Administration sponsored a bill 
early in 1892 which transferred the control of Indian 
Agencies to the Army. Pettigrew naturally voiced his vehement 
disapproval of the plan. It would destroy his patronage and 
with it his influence among South Dakota Republicans. The 
Senator declared that agents should be qualified to teach 
the Indians the "value of money and property ownership." 
Despite the fact that some of his own civilian appointees 
appeared to be incompetent on this score, he argued that 
Army officers did not possess the proper qualifications. He 
declared flatly that civilian agents had never been 
responsible for past examples of dishonesty and corruption, 
but that Army officers who served as agents were to blame. 
"Thus," raged the Senator, "the proposition to replace 
civilian agents with Army officers is absurd,"
In the debate on this matter Pettigrew clashed with 
his colleague, James Henderson Kyle. Senator Kyle submitted 
that charges of corruption and incompetence against civilian 
agents could be corroborated by high ranking Army men, 
Pettigrew flatly contradicted Kyle's statement. Furthermore,
Q
he declared:
^McGillicuddy to Mellette, April 7, 1892, Mellette
Papers,
8Congressional Record, 52 Cong., 1 Sess., March 30, 
1892, XXIII, 2686-2689.
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Kyle also states that certain agents are appointed 
because they have influence and that they are placed 
for work done in a certain /political_/ campaign and 
for the purpose of settling certain bills. I say that 
I did select some men of influence because it is a mark 
of superiority. Further, if I were to recommend a man 
it should be a Republican because I believe the Republi­
cans of this country to be the majority of the best that 
is in it.
Despite these intonations, Pettigrew’s fanatical 
patronage policy; his insistence upon assuming sole responsi­
bility for Department of Interior appointments, created a 
rift in the South Dakota Combine. Mellette, who was aggrieved
by the great power Pettigrew seemed to be developing,
9complained to his friend President Harrison. Harrison in 
turn brought the matter to the attention of Secretary of the 
Interior, John W. Noble, and Pettigrew soon began to encounter 
difficulties with his appointments. Immediately, he wrote 
to Perry Heath of the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette asking 
for clarification of the matter. Heath was an important 
figure in the Republican hierarchy, and had great influence 
with Harrison. Pettigrew said he believed Noble and Mellette 
were scheming to undermine his strength, since Noble had 
adopted a policy of refusing to act on Pettigrew’s 
recommendations. The Senator pointed out to Heath that such 
a policy could only serve to weaken the party in South Dakota.
. 9Mellette to Halford, August 21, 1891, Benjamin 
Harrison Papers, Vol. 128, May 13, 1891, Vol. 122, Manuscripts 
Division. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
10Pettigrew to Heath, Washington, May 20, 1891, 
Pettigrew Papers.
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Despite his plea to Heath, the situation did not 
improve. In September, 1890, Pettigrew wrote the newsman once 
again asking him to talk with the President in an effort to 
learn whether the Administration intended to fight him 
regarding the appointments. He declared blandly that if this
were the case he would accept it but wanted to be certain
11about Harrison’s position. Then he added:
You had better get a copy of the /Chicago 7 Inter-Ocean 
of the seventeenth of this month which has an interview 
with me with regard to the President and also with 
regard to Blaine. It might not do any harm to show it 
to Harrison.
Even this obvious threat to pull South Dakota out of the 
Harrison camp did not avail. Noble continued to ignore 
Pettigrew's recommendations. As a result the Senator soon 
lost all confidence in the Administration and began to
12seriously consider supporting Blaine for President in 1892.
In spite of Pettigrew’s obvious political motivations 
in his policy of Indian appointments, the matter cannot be 
dropped without the comment that his attitude toward the 
Indians themselves was in many ways realistic and benevolent. 
Pettigrew had become well acquainted with the Sioux Indians . 
of Dakota over the years. He knew their problems and was 
sympathetic. Even though he favored their removal or 
assimilation to make way for the economic development of the
^Settigrew to Heath, September 28, 1891, in ibid.
12Pettigrew to Heath, September 8, 1891, in ibid.
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state, he believed that they should be dealt with as fairly
as possible. Shortly after he entered the Senate, Pettigrew
donated a large tract of land near Flandreau for the
13construction of an Indian School. Furthermore, he asked
Congress to appropriate $150,000 for the construction of two
more schools at Chamberlain and Rapid City.^^ Although the
institution at Chamberlain never materialized, the government
ultimately constructed an Indian boarding school at Rapid 
15City. Pettigrew favored such schools because he believed 
that Indians should not be educated in the East only to be 
returned to the reservation, and because he believed that 
agency day schools contributed little toward the process of 
civilizing the Indians. His view was that Indian children 
should be given a practical education at an industrial board­
ing school near their home. He believed one year in such a 
training school would be worth more to an Indian child than 
five or six years in an ordinary day school. "Indian 
children," declared the Senator, "who are not removed from 
camp life gain nothing from their exposure to education.
Their parents oppose their learning English and the ways of
13
Pettigrew to Roger Brennan, July 11, 1890; Pettigrew 
to James E. Helm, Santee Sioux Agency, Nebraska, March 31,
1891, in ibid.
14Congressional Record. 52 Cona.. 1 Sess.. Anril 1.
1892, XXIII, 2826. --------- ■
15Schell, South Dakota. 327.
115
the white man."^^
Pettigrew also believed that the vast Indian reserva­
tions of South Dakota should be opened to white■settlement 
as soon as possible. He had advocated this policy since 
territorial days when he served as Delegate. Cession of the 
Indian lands, he believed, would facilitate two important 
objectives: additional land for settlers and further exposure
of the Indians to the society of the white man. It would
also be of great economic benefit to South Dakota. As the 
17Senator wrote :
I want to close out all Indian Reservations just as 
soon as possible. We have either got to pursue that 
course or else pursue the course pursued by the other 
western states; that of getting rid of the Indians in 
some other way. We cannot develop and build up a state 
with such vast areas of unoccupied and untaxable property.
Pettigrew was obviously not motivated by a feeling of
humanitarianism. During his early years in the Senate he was
yet quite actively engaged in promotional enterprises. He
was still driven to a large extent by his passion for
attracting railroads to Dakota; railroads which would bring
with them emigrants, increasing land prices and profits for
the shrewd investor. Sympathetic as he was toward the Indians,
he never lost sight of his primary objectives: economic
development for South Dakota; wealth and power for himself.
■ 16 .Pettigrew to Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
January 23, 1892, Pettigrew Papers.
17Pettigrew Diary, "Notes and Comments on Men and 
Events," 17, in ibid.
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In his zeal for the economic development of his state, 
Pettigrew, like many westerners, became vitally interested 
in the question of land laws. One of his most important 
activities while in the Senate was his work in connection with 
the withdrawal of forest lands. Oddly, though his motivations 
were selfish, he helped in the long- run to establish the 
national forest policy of the United States.
When Pettigrew entered the Senate in 1889, the question 
of a general revision of the nation’s land laws had already 
been before Congress for nearly ten years. During his first 
days as a member of the Public Lands Committee, Pettigrev/ 
found that the group was considering a House Bill sponsored 
by William S. Holman of Indiana, providing for the repeal of 
the act of June 3, 1878, which allowed the sale of timber lands 
in the Pacific states. Chairman Preston B. Plumb of Kansas 
appointed a sub-committee to study the' measure consisting of 
himself, Edward C. Walthall of Mississippi, and Pettigrew.
The sub-committee amended the Holman bill by adding twenty- 
three sections which in effect completely revised the land laws 
of the United States.
The amended bill encountered stern opposition when 
returned to the House. Thus a conference committee was 
appointed to adjust the differences. This committee consisted 
of Plumb, Walthall and Pettigrew for the Senate; and for the
18D.H. Smith, The Forest Service (Washington, D.C.;
The Brookings Institution for Government Research, Service 
Monograph No. 58, 1930), 18-19.
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House, Holman, John Pickier of South Dakota, and Lewis E .
Payson of Illinois. During the closed sessions of the 
conference. Secretary of the Interior Noble, influenced by 
the American Forestry Association, asked that a rider be 
inserted authorizing the President to establish forest reserves. 
His efforts were successful and thus a twenty-fourth section 
was added to the bill which provided for the creation of the 
reserves. This procedure--the introduction of a new provision 
in a conference report--was contrary to the rules of Congress. 
Thus when Plumb brought the bill back to the Senate floor he 
insisted on its speedy consideration and it was passed without 
being printed and with little time for comment.
The twenty-four sections of the new law repealed the 
Timber-Gulture and Pre-emption Acts, amended the Homestead and 
Desert Land Acts making them less susceptable to fraud, and 
abolished the public sale of government lands, in addition
20to giving the President the power to reserve forest lands.
Senator Pettigrew was the author of section seven of the 
21law. This section was a modification of the Desert Land Act ' 
providing that settlers on arid lands might purchase tracts
19John Ise, The United States Forest Policy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1920), 115-116.
20Smith, The Forest Service. 19.
21Pettigrew to William T. LaFollette, September 28,
1894, Pettigrew Papers.
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of 320 acres or less for SI.GO per acre upon filing proof that 
such land had been reclaimed and cultivated within a period 
of four years after the initial settlement. Furthermore, 
section seven provided that the government might at any time 
within the four year period demand additional proof that all
22legal requirements for the issuance of patents had been met.
The most important section of the new law to everyone 
concerned, however, was section twenty-four. Within a few 
months of its enactment the President had withdrawn about 
2,500,000 acres of timber land in Wyoming and Colorado. By 
1893, more than 17,500,000 acres had been reserved. 
Unfortunately, the law did not provide for the administration 
and protection of the reserved lands. For this reason, and 
also because of political opposition from timber and mining 
interests in the western states, no further withdrawals were
made after September, 1893, pending the creation of
2 <administrative machinery.
Pressure for the enactment of administrative rules 
and regulations was sustained for several years by the 
American Forestry Association, Finally, in 1896 the 
Association prevailed upon Secretary of the Interior Hoke 
Smith to call upon the National Academy of Sciences for a 
commission to make a careful study of the forestry question.
22United States Statutes at Large. 51 Cong,, 2 Sess., 
March 3, 1891, 1097.
23Smith, The i-orest Service. 19.
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The commission, appointed under a $25,000 appropriation by
Congress, consisted of Professor C.S. Sargeant, Alexander
Agassiz, Henry L. Abbot--a prominent hydrographer--Professor
24W.H. Brewer of Yale, Arnold Hague, and Gifford Pinchot.
This group began its work in July, 1896. The next February,
Professor Sargeant submitted a preliminary report recommending
the creation of thirteen new reserves totaling more than
2521,000,000 acres. Pinchot opposed the preliminary report.
He believed that the recommendations for new reserves should
be accompanied by definite plans for their administration and
protection. He also anticipated great danger in withdrawing
26millions of acres of land with no provision for its use. 
Nevertheless, upon receiving the letter from Sargeant,
President Cleveland, on February 22, 1897, proclaimed all of
27the new reserves. His action provoked immediate hostility 
in the Senate.
In this attack Senator Pettigrew joined with Senators 
Mantle of Montana and Clark of Wyoming to demand that the 
proclamation be revoked. ihis move nearly succeeded, but
"̂̂ Ise, The United States Forest Policy, 129.
2^U.S. Congress, Senate, Papers Relating to the 
Establishment of Forest Reservations. 55 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Senate Document 21, April 5, 1897, 14-15.
^^Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 129-130.
27U.S. Congress, Senate, Papers Relating to the 
Establishment of rorest Reservations. 55 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Senate Document 21, April 5, 1897, 16-36.
^^Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 131.
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the westerners were forced in the end to settle for a 
temporary vacation of the order pending the creation of
OQadministrative machinery. However, when the Sundry Civil
Bill carrying this rider reached the White House, it was
pocket-vetoed by Cleveland, and the western men were forced
to await the pleasure of William McKinley.
Meanwhile, Charles D. Walcott of the Geological
Survey, went to Senator Pettigrew in an effort to convince
him that there was an opportunity to do great service for the
country by securing the passage of legislation for the
administration of the reserves. Pettigrew was amenable,
and Walcott drew up a bill and asked Pettigrew to introduce
30it as an amendment to the Sundry Civil Bill. Pettigrew 
took the proposed bill, made several changes in it, and sub­
mitted it shortly after the opening of a special session of
31Congress called by McKinley. This amendment subsequently 
played an important role in the history of forest reservations.
The changes which Pettigrew had made in the bill as 
prepared by Walcott made numerous concessions to western 
opponents of forest reserves and thus were instrumental in
29Pettigrew to I.J. Webb, Deadwood, South Dakota, 
November 30, 1898, Pettigrew Papers.
30Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 132.
31 Congressional Record, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., May 5,
1898, XXX, 899.
32Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 132.
32
121
passage of the measure. As prepared by Walcott, the amendment 
contained a provision that settlers, miners, residents and 
prospectors mentioned as being entitled to free timber should 
include only individuals and not corporations. Before 
introducing the amendment, however, Pettigrew consulted with 
Gideon Moody, still head counsel for the Homestake Mining 
Company of South Dakota. Moody removed the provision referring 
to individuals and Pettigrew prepared to introduce the measure 
in this form. Despite the vigorous protests of Walcott, he 
did so on May 5, 1897.
As submitted by Pettigrew, the amendment provided that 
reserves might only be set aside for specified purposes--"to 
improve or protect the forest," or "for the purpose of - —
securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish 
a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of 
citizens of the United States." The inclusion of lands more 
valuable for minerals or for agricultural purposes was 
forbidden. Also, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized 
to give free timber and stone to settlers, miners or 
residents for firewood, fencing, building, mining or other 
purposes. In addition, the reserves were opened to mining and 
prospecting; and, as a last concession to opponents, a clause 
was added which allowed any person with a patent to land 
inside a reserve to relinquish his patent and select land of 
an equal area outside.
"̂ Ibid.. 140.
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Or, c.r.er hand, many sections of the Pettigrew 
Amendment sr.cvsd -ha influence of those who favored forest 
reserves. Tna Secretary of the Interior was empowered to 
make rules arc regulations for the administration of the 
reserves. ^Isc, he vas authorized to regulate the sale of 
timber fror vrcr.cravn lands, and restore any reserved area to 
public ccrair. if it vas found to be better suited to agri­
cultural uses.^
lecare cr. che Pettigrew Amendment turned on the issue
of whetrer ere recert reserves should be permanently suspended.
Pettigrev ccrciruec to insist that they should and was
supportée 'ey rcec of the other western Senators, primarily
Clark of Vycrirg, White of California, Rawlins of Utah and
Wilson of a'aehirgccn. The best they could do, however, was
to secure a ricer calling for the temporary suspension of
the reserves, arc che measure was sent to the House in this 
n 35 —form. rare, ore debates also turned upon the question of 
the Cleveland reservations, and the bill encountered severe 
opposition f o r  vestern Representatives. Freeman Knowles, 
Populist fror Scucr Dakota, declared that th'e issue of this 
"villainous crcer* meant that 15,000 people in the Black Hills 
area would ca evicted from their homes. He was particularly
-orcressronal Record, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., May 6,
1897, XXX, 132-133.
9 2 4 . '
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indignant thaï Cleveland had failed to consult the wishes of
the West. "We know that the ’rotten boroughs of the West,’
as the New York World calls us, have little influence with
this administration," he declared. "Our representatives warm
their heels in the anterooms not only of the President, but
those of the heads of Departments, while the Representatives
and Senators fror the East file past them and have the quick
ear of every branch of the Government
Four days after the Sundry Civil Bill and the Pettigrew
Amendment reached the House, debate was ended by John F. •
Lacey of Iowa who introduced a motion of non-concurrence.
37This motion was adopted by a vote of 100 to 39. Immediately 
after, it was sent to a conference committee composed primarily 
of men who favored forest reserves, and several weeks later 
the bill emerged with only one important clause of the 
Pettigrew Amendrent revised. That was the provision relating
Opto lieu selections by settlers of forest reserves.
As originally introduced, the Pettigrew Amendment 
provided; "Any person who may have initiated or acquired any 
lawful claim cr right to land within any forest reservation, 
might exchange said claim for land outside the reserve and 
have the new claim patented to him free of charge." This
Quoted in Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 137.
37Congressional Record. 55 Cong., 3 Sess., May 10,
1897, XXX, 1013.
^®Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 139.
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clause vas very generous because it would allow anyone who 
had merely initiated a claim to patent a new claim anywhere 
-in the public domain. Thus speculators could take advantage 
of the lav by making entries on lands likely to be reserved, 
and then trade their claims for patents elsewhere.
Representative Lacey of Iowa led the attack on the 
lieu secuion of the Pettigrew Amendment and offered a 
substiruce which gave "any settler or owner" of an "unperfected 
bona fide claim or patent" included in a forest reserve the 
right tc relinquish and select instead any vacant tract open 
to settlement. It differed from the Pettigrew lieu section 
in that it gave the settler no better title than he had had 
in the forest reserve before.
The report of the conference committee adopted the 
provisions of the Lacey substitute. Thus, even though all 
other important sections of the Pettigrew Amendment were 
unaltered, many westerners opposed the adoption of the report. 
Pettigrev himself dismissed the previous compromise and again 
demanded che permanent revocation of the Cleveland reserves.
He said he would fight for this even if it meant the defeat 
of the Sundry Civil Bill to which his amendment was attached. 
Thus it appears that the lieu selection clause was very 
importanc co him, since he had previously agreed to the 
temporary suspension of the reserves. Despite the opposition 
of the West, the conference report was adopted by the Senate 
on May 27, 1897, and on June 4, the Sundry Civil Bill
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containing the Pettigrew Amendment was signed into law by 
President McKinley.
In its final form the act of 1897 was certainly a 
corpronise. The temporary suspension of Cleveland’s procla­
mation gave ample time to speculators who wished to establish 
claims against the government and gave mining companies like 
the Homestake ample time to cut supplies of timber. Further­
more, the clause limiting the uses for which reserves might 
be set aside was not too severe, while the provision opening 
the reserves to mining certainly caused measurable reduction 
in one hostility of westerners. On the other hand, the 
Pettigrev Amendment did provide a workable basis for the
40administration and protection of the nation’s forest reserves. 
Thus, altnough the Senator himself was motivated almost 
entirely by sectional demands, he must be credited as the 
legislative sponsor of a most important measure. The fact 
that at one point he found himself demanding the revocation of 
a proclamation creating more than half the existing reserves, 
while at the same time sponsoring an amendment providing for 
their administration and protection, is incongruous but true.
Many years later, Pettigrew put forth the claim that 
he had been the author of section twenty-four of the act of 




41forest lands. However his claim was vigorously disputed
by ïiaicott and the American Forestry’ Association, and the
research of Professor John Ise of the University of Kansas
shews as conclusively as possible that Pettigrew's claims
were exaggerated. Nevertheless, the part which Pettigrew
42acsuaiiy played was far from insignificant.
While Senator Pettigrew was embroiled in his work on
the forestry bill and other matters in 1890, he was forced to
devote at least a part of his attention to political events 
in South Dakota. He was greatly concerned over the creation, 
or. June 6, 1890, of the Independent party of South Dakota. 
This organization was founded by the Farmers' Alliance and 
ios inception was an important step in the gestation of
roculism.■ Even such conservative Alliance leaders as
Henry L. Loucks now declared that the move was justified on
grounds that the old parties paid no attention to the demands
of the farmers for reform and redress of grievances. Loucks
was present at the Alliance convention which made this
starolinc move and it was he who suggested the name for the 
44new parry.
“Gifford Pinchot to Pettigrew, February 18, 1913; 
Pettigrew to Pinchot, April 1, 1913, Pettigrew Papers.
^^Ise, The United States Forest Policy. 115.
43Huronite, June 6, 1890.
Ù.&.'Aberdeen Daily News. June 7, 1890.
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One month later the first state convention of the
Independent party met in Huron to adopt a platform and nominate
candidates for office. Planks were laid which demanded the
ad-liticn of the national banking system, direct issuance
of currency by the government, an income tax, a tax on real
estate mortgages, government ownership and operation of
railroads, and the Australian ballot. Loucks led the list
45or nominees, being selected to stand for governor.
The general trend of events had been moving in this 
direction for many months, but Pettigrew and his associates 
had at first looked askance at the possibility that the 
alliance could succeed as an independent political organi­
zation. Pettigrew, for his part, looked disdainfully upon 
the talents of the Alliance leaders, and, although he was 
willing that the Alliance exist as a non-political 
institution, he had no intention of allowing the farmers to 
gain a foothold in the control of state politics.
Ivavertneless, by the early months of 1890, he was already 
predicting that a severe fight with the "Loucks crowd" was
47in tne offing, and he began to plan his strategy accordingly. 
One newspaper proclaimed that the major elements
^̂ Huronite, July 10, 1890. 
aô
Pettigrew to John S. Proctor, Pierre, January 21, 
IcPl, Pettigrew Papers.
47Pettigrew to S.F. Conklin, Watertown, February 10, 
1591. in ibid.
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of -0=1= independent movement were "Democrats and sorehead
Sepodlfnans," while Pettigrew suggested attacking the new
parr} nrrough what he considered its weakest point: its 
- 49
*I see that Loucks is nominated for Governor," he
wrore ir feigned understatement to Governor Mellette. "I
have wrinten to Frank Phillips to commence looking up his
his e a r } f  And to Phillips he wrote asking that a check be
run r: ascertain where Loucks was naturalized, where his home
was ir ianada, and who his antecedents were. "Send someone
to Decei County to check on Loucks," wrote the Senator, "I
51wars 0 0 icok him up thoroughly."
Pettigrew also suggested that it might be wise for 
the ?.ecudlicans to show in the campaign that they were doing 
ever}orirg reasonable for the best interests of the farmers. 
One oancidla effort which might be made, he thought, was for 
the parry leaders of South Dakota to register more interest 
in free silver. "Silver is an illustration," he wrote to 
his oonfifant, John Diamond. "This session of Congress will
"'Aberdeen Daily News. June 10, 1890.
'Pettigrew to,John Diamond, June 25, 1890, Pettigrew
Parers.
"'Pettigrew to Mellette, July 11, 1890, Mellette
Pettigrew to Frank Phillips, Watertown, July 11, 
IBPi, rattigrew Papers.
129
«52probably pass a free coinage act. This is the first mention 
of free silver which appears in Pettigrew’s correspondence. 
Whether he really believed in it as a panacea at this time 
is an open question, but within less than two years he was 
to become a confirmed advocate.
The bill to which Pettigrew referred was the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act then under discussion in the Senate.
He did not take part in the debates on this measure, but cast 
his "aye" when it came to a vote. He seems to have already 
concluded that the volume of currency in circulation should 
be expanded and to have thought this bill might be a step in 
the right direction. It is fairly certain, however, that in 
1890 he had not yet realized what, an apocalyptic effect free
5 0silver was to have on his own career.
It must not be forgotten that Pettigrew’s major 
objective in 1890 was victory for the Republican party. He 
would defeat the Independents if he could, cater to them if 
he must. But he would win at any cost. Thus in their 
efforts to appease the farmers, the Republicans included in 
their platform several "glittering generalities" as well as 
a few planks that practically duplicated the most important 
features of the Independent platform. Among these were calls
52Pettigre-w to Diamond, June 25, 1890, in ibid.
53Pettigrew to À.F. Van Doren, Aberdeen, February 17, 
1890, in ibid.
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for the expansion of the currency, legislation to insure
the use of the entire silver output, the Australian ballot,
54anti-trust legislation, and prohibition.
At the same time, Pettigrew sought to muster further
support at home by demanding that the tariff bill under
consideration during the summer of 1890 contain duties on tin
to protect the budding tin mines in South Dakota. The Senator
went to Representative William McKinley who was sponsor of
the bill with this proposal. Pettigrew informed McKinley that
he expected the tariff on tin to be adopted and that if it
was not, South Dakota would vote against the duty on tin
products which was designed to protect the tin manufacturers
of Ohio. According to Pettigrew, McKinley agreed, but when
the matter came to a vote in committee, he changed his mind
and cast the tie-breaking vote against the tariff. When
Pettigrew was told of this by Robert M. LaFollette, he angrily
confronted McKinley, whereupon the Ohioan blandly declared
55that he considered a tariff on tin "unwise."
Later, when the bill was under consideration by a 
conference committee, Pettigrew joined with Preston B. Plumb, 
A.S. Paddock of Nebraska, and several other westerners to 
vote against it. As a result, Pettigrew was told by
5A
South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 647.
55Pettigrew Manuscript, "The McKinley Tariff," 
Pettigrew Papers.
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President Harrison that he could no longer be considered a 
Republican.Still later, when the tariff bill came to the 
Senate fcr final approval, Pettigrew registered his disgust 
by neither speaking nor voting upon it.^^
Despite his failure to secure a duty on tin and the 
dark pronouncements of Harrison, Pettigrew still represented 
the Republican party at home and was.faced with the necessity 
of defending party policy. Thus he turned a different side 
of his Janus face toward the farmers of South Dakota when he 
declared: "Stress the tariff to the farmers in the coming
campaign. Show them that what we want is an American market 
for farm products, and that the present bill will increase 
employment if it passes.
The pressure in South Dakota was even greater on 
Gideon Moody than on Pettigrew, since the Judge would have 
to stand for re-election before the next session of the 
legislature. Recognizing his problem. Moody 'toured the state 
defending the Republican policy against the onslaughts of the 
Independents. When he spoke before a group of farmers in 
Sioux Ralls after the passage of the McKinley Act he declared 
that the Republicans had lowered the tariff on hemp in order
William fc. Connelly, The Life of Preston B. Plumb 
(Chicago: Browns and Howell Co., 1913), 325.
57Congressional Record. 51 Cong., 1 Sess., October 1, 
1890, XXI, 10740.
''Pettigrew to Hackett, July 28, 1890, Pettigrew Papers
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to cut the cost of binder twine which was so vital to the 
farmers. "The Independents," he continued, "say that the 
tariff is of no help to farmers, but it does put a duty on 
everything imported that is raised here to allow our producers 
to hold the market by underselling."
There was yet another factor which bothered Pettigrew 
during the election year of 1890. He was mightily displeased 
with the performance of his colleagues. Congressmen John L. 
Pickier and Oscar. 0. Gifford. The former had introduced the 
Farmers* Alliance Subtreasury Bill in the House. Pettigrew, 
who called the subtreasury plan "the most insane and idiotic 
scheme ever concocted outside a lunatic asylum," considered 
Pickier a stupid politician and actually worse than no 
representative at all. "I want somebody in the lower house 
who can do some work," he wrote to Mellette. "I don*t 
care if some of the prohibitionists are against Gamble, 
they ought to be glad to get rid of such a worthless chap 
as Pickier."
Pettigrew referred to his friend and political crony 
John R. Gamble of Yankton, a notorious drinker, whom he would 
have much preferred to see in the House of Representatives 
than the "untrustworthy" Pickier. The Senator failed in his 
efforts to oust Pickier, however, and by August of 1890 he 
concluded that it would be wise to renominate the Congressman 
and put Gamble in Gifford’s place in order to insure against
Huronite. October 29, 1890.
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rebellion from Pic>isr’s following in the s t a t e . T h u s  with 
Mellette for Governor, and Pickier and Gamble for Congress, 
a combination would be formed within the party which would 
place the success cf the Republican ticket beyond doubt,
But shortly, events took another turn when Pettigrew 
learned that Pickier was not only “stupid" but "deceitful." 
Pettigrew had backed a bill in the Senate which provided for 
the opening of the Port Randall Military Reservation to 
settlement. The bill passed the Senate but was killed in the 
House, and Pettigrev blamed Pickier for its defeat. "He 
thought it would secure the vote of Marshall County for him 
at the state converrion," wrote the Senator, "I now want him 
beaten.Pettigrew, however, did not have sufficient power 
at the convention tc stop Pickier, and he was nominated. In 
the general election that November, Pickier and Gamble won 
handily
The severe fight with the “Loucks crowd" that Pettigrew 
had predicted materialized in November also. Independent 
candidates reduced Republican majorities by 20,000 votes
^^Pettigrev to Mellette, August 11, 1890, Pettigrew
Papers.
61
Pettigrev to C.k. McKinney, Sioux Falls, August 11, 
1890, in ibid.
Pettigrev to Gamble, August 19, 1890, in ibid.
^^South Dakota Legislative Manual (1921), 245.
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64over those secured in 1889. Mellette, who had polled 54,000 
votes The year before,now polled only 34,000 in winning the 
governorship. Henry L. Loucks, the Independent candidate, 
polled 2-,XC votes even though he carried only thirteen 
counties."'' Thus, the results of this election were a source 
of greet concern, to the leaders of the Republican party.
Even more serious to Pettigrew and his cronies, however, was 
the feet cnec they lost control of the legislature.
In one state senate the Republicans had a majority of 
one over one combined votes of the Independents and Democrats. 
In the ncuse, however, forty-three Independents had been 
elected. Ey combining their strength with the nineteen 
Democrats, oney found themselves in a tie with the Republicans. 
The balance of power thus fell to one Charles X. Seward, a 
Republican who did not consider himself bound by the dictates 
of the Corbins. Although both sides made overtures to Seward, 
he joined wioh the Independents and Democrats, thus enabling 
them to ccnorcl the organization of the lower body of the 
legislature by a majority of one. Seward was subsequently 
elected speaker by one vote.^^
Tne first important order of business before the 
legislature was the election of a United States Senator, since
5-Tcic.. 246.
"^Irid. (1911), 284.
""Hccinaon, History of South Dakota, I, 343-344.
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Gideon Moody’s short term had expired. Moody was unanimously
renominated by the Republicans at a caucus held on the night
of January 19, 1891. The Independents, on the other hand,
could not settle upon a single candidate. Former Alliance
leaders Alonzo Wardall, Georgs Grose,' and John W. Harden
were all determined to win and each had a certain amount of
s u p p o r t . T h e  Democrats nominated their acknowledged leader, 
68Bartlett Tripp. Pettigrew, of course, still favored the
re-election of Moody, and came to Pierre to lend his influence
to Moody’s support.
The first ballot was taken on January 21 with Moody
receiving 76, Tripp 24, Harden 20, Grose 15, and Wardall
10 v o t e s . S i n c e  85 votes were necessary to win with all
members present,• Moody had not received a majority and
another ballot was necessary. Still the Black Hills leader
70stood nine votes shy of victory.
During the succeeding days the Independents caucused 
every night in an effort to agree upon a single candidate. 
From subsequent events it became apparent that they decided 
to give all their votes to Wardall, Grose and Harden on 
succeeding days and then drop them if they could not win. On
ÔTHuronite, January 20, 1891.
^^South Dakota Senate Journal (1891), 127.
69Huronite, January 27, 1891.
7°Ibid., January 23, 1891.
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January 30 Wardall got 55 votes, far short of the required 
majority. The next day Harden got 41. Wardall and Harden 
then vithdrew from the contest, but the supporters of George 
Cross refused to concede and continued to vote for him. The 
Independents still had not found a candidate upon whom they 
could all agree.
On February 3 the Independents switched their support 
to Hugh J. Campbell, erstwhile member of the Republican 
combine. He held only 55 votes, however, and had no chance 
for victory. On the same day rumors began that the Democrats
and Independents would combine their votes once again to
elect a Senator. These rumors, however, were not taken 
seriously.
Meanwhile, with the blessings of Pettigrew, the 
Republicans switched their support to A.B. Melville who had 
been an ardent Moody man until the Judge released his support. 
Melville, however, could do no better in gathering support 
to himself.
During the next few days the respective political groups
cast the bulk of their votes for Campbell, Melville and Tripp
but no one could obtain enough support to win. Finally, on
February 13, the Republicans shifted their full support to
Thomas Sterling of Redfield, while the Independents shifted
theirs to a dark-horse candidate, James Henderson Kyle of 
71 'Aberdeen.
71Huronite. January 27, 28; February 2, 4, 5, 11, 13,
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So unusual vas the entrance of this man into South 
Dakota politics, that it demands a bit of explanation. Kyle 
was a Congrscatioaalist minister who had only recently come 
to the state. He vas a public speaker of some note and his 
popularity ancng the Independents sprang from a Fourth of 
July oration he had given at Aberdeen in 1890. His speech 
entitled "Perils and Safeguards of the Republic," hit upon two 
of the most ircortant problems to which Independent thinkers 
addressed themselves. The first of. these was unrestricted 
immigration which menaced the laboring classes and "jeopardized 
the Sabbath." The other was the concentration of wealth in 
the hands of large corporations. To safeguard the "rights 
and liberties" cf the people he called for further immigration 
restrictions, complete liberty of the press, universal and 
compulsory education, universal suffrage, the secret ballot, 
and prohibition. The day following his speech Kyle was 
nominated for the legislature by the Brown County Independent 
Convention. He vas elected and thus he appeared in Pierre 
with a ready made reputation the next January.
With the nomination of Kyle, Republican leaders began
%
to fear the outcome of the senatorial election. William T. 
LaFollette wrote tc Mellette that the Republicans had better 
go to the preacher, arrange with him to vote Republican in 
the Senate and then elect him. LaFollette declared that in
72aberoeen Daily News. July 5, 1890.
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'his opinion the election of a true Republican was now 
73impossible. And Pettigrew voiced deep concern over the
"wrangle" the Republicans had gotten themselves into. "I now
fear," he wrote, “that the matter has been delayed so long
that no Republican can be elected.
Pettigrew's analysis of the situation was correct.
Kyle was elected on February 16, due to an understanding which
had been reached between the South Dakota Alliance men in the
legislature and -he Democratic party of the state of Illinois.
Under the terms cf this agreement, the Democrats of South
Dakota were tc vote for the Independent candidate if the
Alliance men of Illinois would support the Democratic
candidate in that state. The Democratic candidate in Illinois
was John M. Palmer, with the help of the three Populists
(Alliance men) in the senate, the Democrats had a majority of
two over the Republicans, 103 to 101, and Palmer was 
75elected. In South Dakota, eight Democrats continued to 
vote for Bartlett Tripp, but the rest were loyal to the 
bargain.
"^'"LaFollette to Mellette, February 4, 1891, Mellette
Papers.
^Pettigrev to v.E. Prentis, February 16, 1891, 
Pettigrew papers.
75Dictionary of American Biography. "James H. Kyle,"
X, 515-516.
~̂ Ŝouth Dakota Senate Journal (1891), 513.
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"Well, Kyis is elected,” wrote William T. LaFollette,
”I predict that the parties who elected him will dominate
77state politics for the next five years.”
Pettigrev was incensed with election of Kyle.
"Those parties vho were responsible . . . ,” he wrote, "ought
not to receive any recognition for years from the Republican
7 8party," Tne Senator felt constrained, however, to offer 
party comity no his new colleague in Washington. When Kyle 
arrived, Fstcigrev offered him a seat on the Republican side, 
and asked thac he take his committee assignments from the 
Republicans. Tc the chagrin and disgust of the politico,
Kyle refused point-blank, saying he preferred to think of 
himself as an "Indecrat." He took a seat with the Democrats 
and received his committee appointments from them. In doing 
so he earned the undying hatred of Pettigrew, who felt Kyle
JQ
had made a foci of him.  ̂ Kyle and Pettigrew became bitter 
personal enemies and often clashed verbally during Senate 
debates.
The remaining months of 1891 were spent in preparation 
for the campaign of the succeeding year. Pettigrew feared
77rarouie--e to Mellette, February 18, 1891, Mellette
Papers.
78Pettigrev to James McDowell, Huron, May 1, 1891, 
Pettigrew Papers.
79Pextigrsv to George Schlosser, Aberdeen, December 15, 
1891, in ibid.
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that unless the Republican party faced the campaign with a
80united front it vould be defeated by the Independents.
From his point of view, the major threat to Republican party 
unity was Arthur C. Mellette whose ambitions for a seat in 
Congress had begun to blossom afresh. ". . . He is so crazy 
to go to the United States Senate,” wrote Pettigrew of the 
Governor, "that he is willing to do a n y t h i n g . Pettigrew’s 
great fear was that Mellette, friendly as he was with the 
Harrison Adrinisrration, meant to deprive him of the patronage. 
The controversy with Secretary Noble had never been resolved, 
and Pettigrew suspected that Mellette had already promised the 
state to Harrison for the next year in exchange for the right 
to influence Department of the Interior appointments. 
Pettigrew’s suspicions led him to oppose the renomination of
Harrison and favor instead the candidaoy of Secretary of
82State James G. Blaine.
To make matters worse, Pettigrew suspected that 
Mellette was auuempting to influence the President against 
Gideon Moody, for whom Pettigrew sought a circuit judgeship. 
However, Presidential spokesmen advised the Senator that he 
could insure Mccdy’s appointment by promising to support the
80Pex'iorew to S.B. Milton, Redfield, March 30, 1891, 
Pettigrew Papers.
81Pemcrew so Conklin, March 30, 1891, in ibid.
82Per-rorsw zo J.E. Jolley, April 5, 1891, in ibid.
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Administration, and Pettigrew wrote Moody that he was willing
83to make this trade. Pettigrew's concession, it must be
noted, was quits insincere.
Faced with stern opposition from the Mellette-
Harrison faction in South Dakota, Pettigrew sought to insure
his control of the state by gaining control of the delegation
to the Republican National Convention. Mellette had the same
idea and the fight which ensued was spectacular and highly
publicized. "The Pettigrew-Mellette fight has caused a
split in the party," commented the Minneapolis Evening Tribune.
"Both sides want to send delegates to the National 
86Convention."
Pettigrew declared publicly that South Dakota would 
send a delegation to Minneapolis which would represent the 
sentiment of the state, but privately he declared that he did 
not care whether the delegates to the Minneapolis convention 
were for Harrison or Blaine, so long as Mellette "and his 
crowd" were left out.^^ He admitted again, however, that 
his personal choice for the Presidency was Blaine, but of 
course at the time he did not know whether the Secretary
83Petxigrew to Moody, April 21, 1891, in ibid.
84Minneapolis Evening Tribune. February 3, 1892, 
Clipping, Pettigrew Papers.
85Peitigrew to William B. Sterling, Huron, January 29, 
1892, Pettigrew Papers.
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would coDserit to run.®^
*I never attack the Administration in any of my
letters,* wrote Pettigrew, "but say that it has been a good
87one although you know what I think of Harrison," "He never 
did anything for the statehood of Dakota," fumed the Senator.
"In fact his actions really delayed statehood for several, years. 
Now he is siding with Mellette to uuurp my patronage."^8 
This indictment of President Harrison was grossly 
unfair. Hs had indeed labored as well as he might to get 
South Dakota into the Union. But he had done so because of 
his political association with Mellette, not Pettigrew. Thus 
his continuac loyalty to the Governor was not unusual. Neither 
was it unusua.1 that Pettigrew sought to eliminate Mellette 
once and for all by controlling the convention which 
would name delegates to the national convention. "We must 
carry this convention," he wrote, "that ends Mellette. Then 
we will put our man in.the field for Governor and gain 
control of state patronage
By the time the convention met in Chamberlain late 
in March, tne battle lines were drawn. However, Pettigrew
85Psrtigrew to C.S. Sherwood, Clark, January 29,
1892, in ibid.
87Pectigrew to O.K. 'Henry, Chamberlain, February 2,
1892, in ibid.
B5_--■sccicrew to Donald Needham, Crow Lake, February 16, 
1892, in ibid.
Pettigrew to Needham, February 25, 1892, in ibid.
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continued to attempt to make it appear that no tempest marred
the peaceful sea of South Dakota Republican unity. “Pettigrew
could not have controlled the selection of delegates if he
wanted to,*' said the Sioux Falls Press. But in the same
issue the paper declared, "Mellette has been badly defeated
in the election of delegates and Pettigrew is stronger than
ever. The administration has been injured by allowing Mellette
90to control patronage,"
Pettigrew sent Moody to Chamberlain to attempt to 
“ramrod" the selection of delegates, but the Judge was only 
partially successful. When the smoke of battle had cleared 
away, there was great confusion as to whether the delegates 
had been instructed, and if so, for whom. Two reports, one 
for Harrison, the other for Blaine, were introduced at the 
same time, and when Moody rose to speak on them he was booed 
so loudly that he could not be heard. The motion of 
instruction for Harrison finally carried, but many of those 
present thought the procedure had been invalidated by 
confusion. “ ihe next day Moody declared that the delegation 
had not been instructed at all, but that it made no 
difference because Pettigrew was not working against the best
90Sioux rails Press, March 18, 1892, Clipping, 
Pettigrew Papers.
91Sioux rails Daily Gazette. March 24, 1892, Clipping, 
Pettigrew Papers.
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92interests of Harrison. But Pettigrew himself indicated in
a remarkable interview that the delegation from South Dakota
would vote for the President only if he did not need their 
93votes to win!
While the newspapers from out of state reported the
confused conditions which existed among the South Dakota 
94Republicans, party organs within the state sought to gloss
over these matters and preserve the facade of unity. “It was
a very satisfactory convention," said the Aberdeen Daily News.
"Mellette and Pettigrew men voted for each others' candidates.
The question of positive instruction was an honest difference
of opinion among Harrison men. Those who opposed instruction
95were among the President’s warmest friends."
96And the Sioux Falls Press declared;
Outside#papers like the Sioux City Journal and the 
Minneapolis Tribune are trying to create dissension 
among South Dakota Republicans and spoil the marked 
good feeling which the Chamberlain convention inspired 
in the ranks of the party. They talk about Pettigrew 
being "burned down" as if they were Democratic papers.
They ought to mind their own business.
92
St. Paul Pioneer Press. March 24, 1892, Clipping,
in ibid.
93Sioux City Journal. March 25, 1892, Clipping, in
ibid.
94Minneapolis Newspaper (The title and date are unknown, 
This is a clipping found in a scrapbook among the Pettigrew 
Papers). '
95
Aberdeen Daily News. Undated Clipping, in ibid.
96Sioux Falls Press. March 26, 1892.
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And later; "Many ghost stories have been written
about relations between Pettigrew and the administration. All
97are exaggerations."
Finally the Sioux Falls Gazette published an article
on state politics which quite admirably reduced the problem
to its essentials: " . . .  Now the Combine has separated.
Pettigrew and Moody still hang together with Mellette and
Edgerton on the other side attempting to *do up* Pettigrew as
Moody was ’done up* two years ago. Mellette wants to go to
98Congress. . . ."
Once the delegates had been selected, Pettigrew turned
his attention to the approaching national convention. "South
99Dakota is unquestionably a Blaine state," he boasted.
He travelled to Minneapolis several days before the opening 
of the convention to do what he could for the "Plumed Knight."
He declared to the minions of the press that Blaine would be 
nominated on the first ballot since he had the support of all 
the West.100
Meanwhile, Benjamin Harrison and his political advisors
*^Ibid.. April 8, 1892.
98Sioux Falls Daily Gazette. April 22, 1892, Clipping, 
Pettigrew Papers.
99Minneapolis Journal. May 26, 1892, Clipping,
Pettigrew Papers.
lOODetroit Free Press. May 28, 1892, Clipping, Pettigrew 
Papers; Sioux Falls Press. May 28, 1892.
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were watching the situation closely, with special interest 
centered on the silver producing states of the West. "I do 
not fear the outcome of the Minneapolis Convention," wrote
the President. "Those who talk against my re-nomination can
101point to no official delinquency or inadequacy," Then, 
at 12:45 P.M. on June 4, 1892, came the event which shocked 
the nation. James (T, Blaine resigned as Secretary of State,
in order, thought most people, to wrest the Presidential
102nomination from his chief,
Pettigrew was not surprised. . The resignation, he 
declared, should have come sooner, but despite the lateness 
of the hour, Blaine would still secure the nomination.
It is difficult to believe that Pettigrew actually thought 
Blaine had a chance, but he went through the motions regardless. 
However, it was all in vain. Although the "Plumed Knight" 
received some support, the Harrison men were in control of the 
convention and he received the nomination on the first 
ballot. South Dakota, true to the prediction of Richard 
Pettigrew, cast her sight unneeded votes for the President.
^^^Harrison to William A. Russell, Boston, June 2,
1892, Benjamin Harrison Papers, Vol. 141, Manuscripts Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
102. Blaine to Harrison, June 4, 1892, in ibid.
103New York World. June 6, 1892, Clipping, Pettigrew
Papers.
104Telegrams from A.J. Michener and Russell B. Harrison 
to Secretary Halford, Washington, June 6-10, 1892, Harrison 
Papers, Vol. 141; New York Tribune. June 11, 1892.
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Mark Hanna summed up the attitudes of anti-Harrison 
Republicans in a letter to John Sherman. "The renomination 
of Harrison fell like a wet blanket on the. convention except 
those personally interested. In Cleveland and Chicago there 
is indifference toward his success.
And Pettigrew, frustrated in his efforts to stop the 
President, wrote to Harrison in an effort to smooth the matter 
over. He said that the South Dakota delegates feared that 
Harrison would disregard the representatives of the state 
chosen by the people/"Pettigrew/ and consult only with 
persons of the President's own choosing/Mellette_/. "This 
causes me annoyance," wrote the Senator, "and I have under­
taken to counteract that impression, but am confronted by a 
statement that the present Governor and his friends assert 
they have assurance from you to that effect.
At the same time Mellette wrote to the President;
Senator Pettigrew is making a great effort to control 
the coming state convention and has almost the entire 
federal patronage to aid him. If he succeeds you may 
have to come to terms with him although I fear his 
pledges are worthless and he will try to make good his 
prediction that you cannot carry South Dakota,
105Hanna to Sherman, June 14, 1892, John Sherman 
Papers, Vol. 583, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
106Pettigrew to Harrison, June 30, 1892, Harrison 
Papers, Vol. 143.
107Mellette to Harrison, June 30, 1892, in ibid.
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Indeed, Pettigrev had now turned his full attention 
toward the "coming state convention." He stayed adroitly in 
the background, but nevertheless was in complete control of 
proceedings through the activities of his agents John 
Diamond, A.B. Kittridge, and Nye Phillips. In his letters 
he spoke approvingly of a number of candidates for governor, 
but indicated that his correspondents should "see what his 
friends Kittridge and Phillips think." He was attempting to 
stay out of the limelight while at the same time he influenced 
the selection of the candidates. It was to be a crucial 
election. Pettigrev needed a friendly governor to help him 
in the 1894 legislative elections, for his own seat in the 
Senate would be at stake in 1895.^^®
The Republican State Convention was held in Madison 
late in July, and Pettigrew was delighted with its outcome. 
"Every chap who was engaged in the conspiracy to defeat 
Moody was thoroughly cleaned out," he gloated, "and every 
fellow who bolts the Republican nominations hereafter will 
be returned to the shades of private life forever in the 
f u t u r e . H i s  words were more prophetic than he knew.
Pettigrew and the other Republican leaders of South 
Dakota now turned their attention once more to the threat 
of the Independents. They feared that the Independents
108See Pettigrev Correspondence, June-July, 1892, 
Pettigrew Papers.
109Pettigrev to J.F. Norton, Sioux Falls, August 3,
1892, in ibid.
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contemplated e combination with the Democrats in order to 
carry the state as they had in the legislature of 1891 to 
elect Kyle to the^Senate. The Senator had information which 
led him to believe that fusion was to be attempted in order 
to gain control of the major state offices. The plan, 
according to rumor, was to give the Democrats the offices 
of state auditor and treasurer, while the Independents were 
to get the rest of the positions.
The Republicans were also fearful of the influence 
that the Independents might.have on the voters of foreign 
extraction. Pettigrew therefore proposed to place one 
hundred agents in the field in an attempt to hold the 
foreign-bom voters within the party. He declared that it 
was absolutely essential that the party be sure of the 
Scandinavian and German votes.
Pettigrev also proposed to "see that the press was 
taken cars of,* particularly his own organ the Sioux Falls 
Press. and the leading German paper, the South Dakota Ekko 
A fund of 510,000 was supposed to be supplied by the 
Republican national Committee for these activities, but because 
of Pettigrew’s opposition to Harrison, only a trickle was 
received. So urgent did Pettigrew consider the situation that 
he appealed to Chairman Thomas H. Carter to send the entire
110Pettigrew to Republican National Chairman Thomas H. 
Carter, New York, October 16, 1892; Pettigrew to J.M. Greene, 
Chamberlain, October 17, 1892, in ibid.
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111amount,—  but there is no evidence that Carter heeded this 
plea.
Pettigrew’s information concerning fusion was correct.
Efforts were already under way to form combined tickets at
the local level. However, there was still a strong tide of
opposition against fusion within the Independent party
itself, and thus, success was not as great as it might have
been even though some degree of combination occurred in
thirty counties. The Independents State Convention met at
Redfield in June and under the leadership of Henry Loucks,
who opposed fusion, a full slate of candidates for state
offices was nominated. At about the same time the Democrats
also held their state convention and named their own
112candidates for office.
The careful planning of the Republicans coupled with 
dissension over the fusion question brought overwhelming defeat
to the Independents in November. South Dakota went Republican
113by a large majority. On the other hand, the Harrison 
administration was repudiated by the natipn at large, and 
thus, the results were entirely satisfactory to Pettigrew.
111Pettigrew to Carter, October 1, 1892, in ibid.
■^^ankton Press and Dakotan. July 30; August 9; 
September 2, 29; October 4, 28; June 22, 1892.
113Huronite. November 11, 1892.
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"It is fortunate for me that Harrison is beaten," wrote the
Senator, "He would have used the entire power of his
administration to have me defeated two years from now. I am
well aware of that."^^^
In addition to the defeat of Harrison and control of
the state, Pettigrew also had the written pledge of John
Pickier that the Congressman would not oppose him for a
115Senate seat in 1895. Thus at the opening of the year 
1893 Pettigrew’s political position appeared to be as strong 
as it had ever been. However his conversion to the forces 
of free silver had already begun. He had already passed the 
zenith of his power within the Republican party.
114
Pettigrew to R.E. Carpenter, Waterton, January 13, 
1893, Pettigrew Papers.
115Pettigrew to William I. LaFollette, December 6,
1892, in ibid.
CHAPTER VI
SENATOR PETTIGREW AND THE SILVER QUESTION
From 1890 to 1896 the keynote of American politics 
was "free silver." Politicans could seldom avoid the 
controversy. For many, careers were drastically altered by 
it, and there were few examples which more perfectly illus­
trate this fact than that of Richard Pettigrew. In order to 
understand the implications of the free silver controversy, 
it is first necessary to grasp the meaning of the term for 
those who used it, and what arguments were presented for and 
against the policy of free coinage. Once these questions 
are understood, Pettigrew’s position can more easily be 
analyzed.
The term, "free coinage of silver," meant that an 
individual had the right to take silver in any form to the 
government mint and have every 371.25 grains stamped, free of 
charge, into a dollar. The.factors which prompted the so- 
called silverites to demand the renewal of this right require 
some explanation. On April 2, 1792, Congress passed the 
first Mint Act which established the value ratio of silver 
and gold at 15 to 1, This legislation had the effect of
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undervaluing gold; that is, the bullion in a gold dollar was 
worth more than one hundred cents when sold on the commercial 
market. Thus gold coins did not circulate and gold was 
shipped abroad in exchange for commodities at its commercial 
value.
The situation did not change until 1834 when the 
quantity of gold in a gold dollar was reduced from 24.75 grains 
to 23.22 grains. At the same time the ratio of coinage was 
fixed at 15.988 to 1 or approximately 16 to 1. This action 
undervalued silver and now it came to be used commercially 
instead of being coined. As a result silver dollars became 
obsolete and as years went by they passed out of circulation. 
This situation was recognized by Congress in the Currency 
Act of 1853.^ No attempt was made in this piece of legis­
lation to alter the legal ratio and thus bring silver dollars 
back into circulation. Thus it is important to remember that 
the use of silver as an unlimited legal tender was actually 
abandoned in 1853, not in 1873 as is often supposed.It 
was a matter of circumstance, not law, which gave greater 
notoriety to the legislation passed in the latter year, and 
caused it to become known as the "Crime of *73."
^Edward 0. Leech, Director of the Mint, "The Menace 
of Silver Legislation," North American Review. CLII (March, 
1891), 299-300.
2J.L. Laughlin, The History of Bimetallism in the 
United States (New York; Appleton and Co., 1896), 82.
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The Mint Act of 1873 was similar to the act of 1853 
in that it made no mention of the ratio between silver and 
gold. Furthermore, it dropped the silver dollar piece from 
the coinage list, and thus became known as the act which
3"demonetized" silver. The act of 1873 passed unnoticed by 
the public for about two years. But the speculative mania 
which had followed the Civil War came to its inevitable 
collapse in 1873, and large numbers of people were suddenly 
caught in the pincers of “tight money" currency. As a 
result, demands for inflation were heard. Most of the people 
affected were located in the western states and territories 
where they had participated in speculative enterprises of 
various nature until caught in the panic. Now they found 
themselves trapped by debt, and sought desperately for an 
escape. Led by skillful politicians, they began to demand 
that the government come to their aid by issuing more currency 
That is, they demanded inflation which would allow them to 
unburden themselves financially by means of artificially high 
prices for the goods they produced.^
It has been said that the cry for free coinage began 
where the demand for unlimited paper money left off, and this 




experienced a marked increase after 1875, which resulted in 
a decline in the commercial value of the product.^ Thus 
silver dollars appealed to debtors who still desired the 
cheapest available unit with which to liquidate their 
indebtedness, and the demand for the free and unlimited 
coinage of silver dollars worth intrinsically less than one- 
hundred cents each came to receive the support of all who had 
previously demanded an expansion of paper currency. At the 
same time, the cry was taken up by the producers of silver 
who desired a ready market for their product, and "free 
silver" quickly became a political issue.
The demands of silver men resulted in the passage in 
1878 of the Bland-Allison Act. This legislation was the 
result of a two year period of sporadic agitation which began 
on July 26, 1876, when Representative William Kelley of 
Pennsylvania introduced a bill to restore silver coinage as 
it had existed before 1873. This bill failed, but a similar 
measure sponsored by Richard P. Bland of Missouri passed 
the House on November 5, 1877. When the bill reached the 
Senate it was amended by William B. Allison of Iowa, who 
proposed that the government purchase from two to four 
million dollars worth of silver each month to be coined into
5Historical Statistics of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960), 371.
^Laughlin, Bimetallism in the United States. 219-221.
156
dollars of full legal-tender value. This amendment was 
accepted by both Houses and submitted to President Hayes who 
promptly vetoed it. Shortly after, it was passed over the
7veto of the President and became law on February 28, 1878,
The Bland-Allison Act proved to be unsatisfactory to 
the silverites since the Treasury insisted on purchasing 
only the minimum amount of bullion prescribed by law. Thus 
the desired inflationary effect was not produced,® Pressure 
continued and finally resulted in the passage of the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act of 1890, This law required the government 
to purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver per month at the 
market price of the metal. Of this amount 2,000,000 ounces 
were to be coined each month for one year. Thereafter, 
only such silver dollars were to be coined as were needed for 
the redemption of treasury notes. However, the Secretary of 
the Treasury was given the option of redeeming the notes in 
gold or silver at his discretion,^ Like the Bland-Allison 
Act, this legislation was not completely satisfactory to 
the silverites, who claimed that the option clause gave the 
Secretary the power to keep silver out of circulation by
^Horace White, Money and Banking (Boston; Ginn 
and Co., 1911), 169-170,
8Laughlin, Bimetallism in the United States. 262,
9Leech, "The Menace of Silver Legislation," 300,
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redeeming only in gold. Furthermore, they argued, the act did 
not provide for unlimited free coinage and thus did not 
produce the inflationary trend in the economy for which they 
hoped,
By 1890, the year the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was 
passed, it was quite apparent that the "silver fever" had 
spread out of the mining states to infect the western 
agricultural states. It already has been pointed out that the 
most noticeable symptom of this disease was a demand for 
inflation. The Greenbackers, followed by the Grange, the 
Farmers* Alliance, and finally the Populist party took up the 
cry and unfurled the banners of their cause before the 
nation. The Populist-silver-inflationists of the 1890’s 
based their demands on the correct assumption that the 
existing currency formula of the United States worked to the 
disadvantage of the producers of agricultural commodities.^^ 
But the reasoning upon which they based their conclusion 
was incorrect, and they failed to arrive at an economically 
feasible solution to their problem. The silver men argued 
that a simultaneous increase in the value of gold and decrease 
in the value of silver had occurred since 1873. This 
phenomenon had in turn affected the English wheat and cotton
10C.S. Thomas, "Bimetallism and Legislation,"
The Arena. XI (February, 1895), 380-381.
^^White, Money and Banking. 169.
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12markets to the detriment of American farmers. According to
the theory, very little wheat and cotton were brought from
India to Europe before 1872. After this date, however,
English buyers were able to purchase these commodities within
the Empire using exchange purchased at a heavy discount.
Because of the declining value of silver, Englishmen could
increase the purchasing power of their money by exchanging it
for American silver and then minting it into Indian rupees
having an artificially high face value. Silverites were fond
of citing examples such as the following: "The English buy
American silver at ninety cents an ounce and then work it off
in India at about $1.37 per ounce for wheat and cotton.
These staples thus come into England at such low prices, that
American growers, whose prices are fixed by Liverpool, lose
13money on their crops."
When silver was demonetized, explained the silver 
men, the parity between gold and silver was destroyed, and 
henceforth, the price of farm products came to be governed 
by the price of silver. In the British Empire, where, the 
silver standard was maintained, the purchasing power of the 
metal remained stationary. Thus there was no discount on 
the silver which Indian producers received for their wheat,
12John P. Jones, United States Senator.,. Nevada,
■What the Remonitization of Silver would do for the Republic,' 
The Arena. XVI (October, 1896), 736.
13Samuel Leavitt, "India, Silver, Wheat and Cotton," 
The Arena. X (July, 1894), 192-200.
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and they began to increase their exports. American producers,
on the other hand, who sold on the same market, often suffered
an exchange discount of up to thirty per cent.^^
Unfortunately, the silverites by and large did not
understand the real problem which faced them. The decline in
the price of American wheat was not caused by fluctuations in
the value of silver or by rate-of-exchange differentials.
Rather, it was caused by tremendous increases in the volume
of wheat produced and exported by the United States, Canada,
Australia, Argentina, and India in the last half of the
nineteenth century. In that period the supply of staples
15increased, and as a result, their price went down. While 
foreign production figures for the years before 1890 are 
quite rare, this statement can be adequately documented with 
existing information. India, for example, did begin to 
export large quantities of wheat in 1873. The reason for 
this was not the declining price of silver, but the fact that 
the export duty was removed from Indian wheat in that year.
No exact production figures are available before 1890; however, 
it is known that exports of wheat from India to the United 
Kingdom increased gradually after 1873 until India became a
14W.M. Stewart, "Silver and the Need for More Money," 
The Forum. XI (June, 1891), 437.
15E.W. Zimmerman. World Resources and Industries 
(New York: Harper Brothers, 1951), 212.
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leading competitor of the United States on the Liverpool 
market,
The situation in the United States can be described 
more precisely. From 1870 to 1890 wheat production in this 
country experienced an overall increase of 55 per cent. This 
was caused primarily by the fact that wheat acreage doubled 
in that period, and secondarily by a slight increase in the 
yield per acre. Increasing production was accompanied by 
decreasing prices. From a high of $1.25 per bushel in 1871, 
wheat fell to $.83 in 1890. This situation was worsened 
by the depression of 1893 which drove the price of wheat 
down to $.49 in that year. American wheat prices never
17again exceeded $.80 a bushel in the nineteenth century.
The farmer-silverites became convinced that the only 
solution to the price problem, indeed the only cure for all 
the ills of American economy, was the complete remoneti­
zation of silver. This would have the effect of once 
again anchoring gold to silver at the ratio of 16 to 1.
Money would thus be made more stable and the value of silver 
would be buoyed up and maintained thus enhancing the value 
of farm products. Furthermore, the metallic basis for
16Annual Register (London; Rivington’s, 1883), 360-361,
17UiS. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Statistics. 1936. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1936, pp. 5, 11.
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1 Rcurrency would be enlarged, thus ending contraction.
One of the foremost exponents of these views in the 
United States Senate was Henry Moore Teller of Colorado. He 
agreed with the theorists that the changing ratio of gold to 
silver had affected the relative value of all other property, 
and he felt that the worst result of this situation was the 
increasing financial burden which fell upon debtors. Never 
had there existed a clearer case of class struggle with the 
creditor class having the advantage of government-created 
appreciation. The act of 1873 had altered the legal 
currency standard, and this, according to Teller, was its 
greatest evil. Furthermore, the evil had been compounded by 
the resumption of specie payments in 1875. This legislation 
had the effect of making the debtor redeem his borrowings in 
dollars worth far more than those he had originally received, 
and, as a result, he found himself caught in a financial trap 
from which extrication seemed impossible. Teller believed 
the government had a legal and moral obligation to rectify the 
situation without delay.
The silver question grew to be the most controversial 
political issue of the day. It involved not only free coinage, 
but also the entire concept of monetary standards in the
18Stewart, "Silver and the Need for More Money," 437.
19Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller (Caldwell, Idaho:
The Caxton Printers, 1941), 185-186.
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United States. It crossed party lines and divided 
politicians according to the economic interests they repre­
sented. Richard Pettigrew studied the question at length and 
came to accept the position of the silverites in its entirety. 
Thus he gradually separated from the orthodox Republicans 
and became identified with a group known as the "Silver 
Republicans." Among the Senate leaders of this group were 
Teller, John P. Jones of Nevada and Fred T. DuBois of Idaho, 
both of whom wrote extensively on the subject of free coinage; 
William B. Allison of Iowa, and, after 1896, Pettigrew 
himself.
As a national political issue, the question of
standards was not primary during the decade of the eighties.
It played little part in the election of 1888, and there was
no mention of silver in President Harrison's inaugural 
26address. The great controversy between the "gold bugs"
and the silverites actually was joined with the issuance of
the annual report by Secretary of the Treasury William Windom
in 1889. The Secretary suggested that the use of silver be
expanded through government purchase of all silver offered 
21for sale. Windom*s suggestion brought the silver question 
to the forefront, but his scheme was rejected by both the gold 
men and silverites. The former opposed it because it put no
20H.W. Faulkner, Politics. Expansion and Reform 
(New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), 185-186.
21U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 51 Cong., 1 Sess., Executive Document No. 2,
December 2, 1889, Ixxiv-lxxxii..
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limit on the amount of silver the government would be 
permitted to buy; the latter because the plan did not return 
silver to a parity with gold. The value of silver notes 
under this plan would fluctuate with the market price of 
silver.
Despite its obvious deficiencies, the Windom plan was
not without political motivation. The Secretary hoped to win
support for the Administration in silver mining states by
creating an artificial market for silver. Support from these
states was essential for the maintenance of the tariff and was
made even more important by the very small majority enjoyed
22by the Republicans in Congress after 1888. The attempts of
Windom and other Republican leaders to secure support from
the silver states were noted by observant editorialists.
E.L. Godkin, "gold bug" editor of The Nation, wrote prior to
passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act;^^
The drift is toward free coinage. When Sherman says 
there should be more money in circulation and that the 
government should buy all the silver produced in the 
country, he is not telling what he believes to be good 
financial policy, but what he believes to be good 
politics. He is trying to save the party.
To Senator Teller and all the silverites we say:
. . . Bring on your free-coinage bill, if you have 
enough votes, and then let President Harrison sign 
it or veto it according to his mood.
22-Faulknew, Politics. Expansion and Reform. 104,
^^E.L. Godkin, "The Silver Debate in the Senate,"
The Na-tion. XL (May 22, 1890), 403.
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The Windom plan and another calling for free coinage
of silver passed the Senate but both were defeated in the 
24House. The measure which was finally passed under the
popular title, "The Sherman Silver Purchase Act," was a
compromise accepted by the gold Republicans in order to gain
support for the McKinley Tariff bill which was under discussion
25at the same time. The silver men accepted the compromise 
because they saw no hope for complete remonetization in this 
session of Congress. Very soon, however, it was discovered 
that the Secretary of the Treasury was exercising his option 
to redeem treasury notes in gold. Thus the legislation did 
not produce the inflationary effects which had been hoped for 
by the silver men.^^ They felt that they had been betrayed.
After the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 
the Harrison Administration sought to avoid further agitation 
for inflation. Harrison wrote to Lemuel E. Quigg of the 
New York Tribune that the ill effects of free coinage should 
be publicized. Furthermore, Harrison wanted the idea 
circulated that every dollar was equal in value to all others. 
By this means he hoped to rekindle the fiction of gold-silver 
parity in the public mind without actually resorting to
24Faulkner, Politics. Expansion and Reform. 104.
25Ibid.. 105.
^^C.S. Thomas, "Bimetallism and Legislation," The 
Arena. XI (February, 1895), 378-389.
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27unlimited free coinage. The President wrote:
It should be shown that our courts have held that 
contracts for payment in gold can be made and enforced 
and that if we have a difference in the commercial use 
of gold and silver dollars, bankers will require payment 
in gold while workmen will have to accept a promise to 
pay in dollars which will eventually be honored in 
depreciated money.
Meanwhile, during the "lame duck" session of Congress,
in 1890-91, several bills providing for the free and
unlimited coinage of silver were introduced. Little interest
could be generated in these measures, however, and they all
died in committee. Also, Secretary Windom died and Harrison
replaced him with Charles foster whom he instructed to soft-
peddle all discussion of ideas for increasing the circulation
of currency. "Until we are forced to advocate the repeal of
the silver bill," wrote the President, "I do not think other
suggestions should be discussed. You will be able to claim
for the Administration a large increase per capita if we
28stand by existing legislation for the present."
The orthodox Republican position was that remonetization
would only be feasible if accomplished on an international
basis. Thus, by 1892 Harrison began to consider calling an
29international monetary conference. By late spring
^^Harrison to Quigg, October.19, 1891, Benjamin 
Harrison Papers, Vol. 130, Manuscripts Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
^®Harrison to Foster, October 19, 1891, Vol. 131, 
Harrison Papers, in ibid.
in ibid.
^^Ibid.. January 16, 1892, Vol. 131, Harrison Papers,
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invitations to such a conference had been issued to all the
principal nations of the world, and in November the delegates
gathered in Brussels, Belgium. Representing the United
States were Senators William B. Allison of Iowa and John P.
Jones of Nevada, Representative James B. McCreary of Kentucky,
Ex-Controller of the Currency H.W. Brown, Professor E.B.
Andrews of Brown University, and United States Minister to
Belgium E.H. Terrell. They were instructed to secure an
agreement favoring international bimetallism; that is, the
remonetization of silver by all nations. Unfortunately, it
proved to be an impossible task because the persistent
efforts of Congress to force unilateral bimetallism were
looked upon with suspicion by most of the European powers.
The failure of the conference caused little surprise
among ardent silver men in the United States. Richard P.
Bland, leader of the silver Democrats in Congress, was not
alone when he declared that the meeting had been called solely
31to postpone legislative action on the silver question. At 
about the same time,however, the Harrison Administration was 
repudiated at the polls and it remained to be seen what the 
stalwarts of "Bourbon Democracy" could do for silver.
Within three months after the inauguration of
QfS
A.B. Hepburn, A History of Currency in the United 
States (New York; The McMillan Co., 1924), 346-347.
31Richard P. Bland, FThe Boons and Banes of Free 
Silver," North American Review. CLVI (February, 1893), 171.
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Grover Cleveland the nation was rocked with depression. Blame
for the panic was fastened squarely by the silverites on the
fact that free coinage did not exist. Cleveland, a "hard
money" man, promptly called a special session of Congress
32to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Even though 
the silver men deemed the law inadequate, they rallied to 
fight its repeal since they believed the cure to be 
infinitely worse than the disease.
Up to this time Senator Pettigrew had said little 
publicly on the silver question, even though he thought about 
it almost constantly. By 1893, however, he came out solidly 
for free coinage. There were two very specific reasons for 
his stand. First, he believed that the appeal of free silver
was spreading among the people. He was alarmed by the strong
showing which the Populists made in the election of 1892,
and he felt that unless the Republicans accepted free
silver, they were doomed to extinction as a major party. 
Secondly, Pettigrew was becoming convinced, from his own
business losses, that a larger volume of currency was
33necessary to save the nation*s economy,
Pettigrew opposed the repeal of the Sherman Act, 
saying that it would cut off a needed supply of money. He
32J.D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents. IX, 401-403.
33Pettigrew to A.J. Conklin, April 1, 1892,Pettigrew Papers.
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feared that a further contraction of the currency would -
result because of the inadequate supply of gold which was
34then available to the financial community. He declared:
If ve repeal the Sherman Law, silver will decrease 
twenty points and will be difficult to restore.
The lav does us ho harm. With silver demonetized and 
the world on a gold basis there will be a constant 
decline in the value of credits to the ruin of the 
debtor.
Pettigrew was in the thick of the cloak-room politics 
which accompanied the debate on silver. With the other silver 
men of the Senate he negotiated with House leaders and an 
agreement was reached concerning the debate in the lower 
chamber. Repeal was to be considered for fourteen days, after 
which a vote was to be taken on an amendment calling for 
free silver at 16:1, If this could not pass, free silver at 
17:1, 19:1 and finally 20:1 would be considered. All these 
failing, the Bland-Allison Act was to be restored,
Pettigrew and his associates thought they were in an 
excellent position to win because they could count on 201 
votes for free coinage. However, "We forgot to reckon with 
patronage," wrote the Senator, "when the vote came . , ,we 
could muster only 101 votes. The debate did not bring the 
change. Patronage did it,"^^
After success in the House, the repeal bill came to
^^ettigrew to W,S, Bowen, Yankton, September 19,
1893, Pettigrew Papers.
^^Pettigrew Manuscripts on Free Silver, Loose Files,
Pettigrew Papers,
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36the Senate where opinion was more evenly divided.
Pettigrev, recognized as a leader of the anti-repeal forces,
was approached by Senator Matthew S. Quay of Pennsylvania, who
opposed repeal, with the proposition that the repeal bill ■
should be postponed, and a general discussion of the currency
question be inaugurated. Pettigrew was askéd"to canvass the
South to determine if enough votes could be secured to prevent
passage of a tariff bill in exchange for maintenance of the
silver lav. Pettigrew accepted this proposal and set to
37work immediately.
Meanwhile, the repeal bill was considered by the
Senate Finance Committee under Daniel ¥. Voorhees of Indiana,
a long-time opponent of President Cleveland. The President,
however, was able to win the support of Voorhees by handing
him the entire patronage of Indiana in return for which the
38Senator pushed the repeal bill through committee. Voorhees
received the bill on August 28, 1893, and it was reported to
39the floor later in the same day. But the debate which
ensued lasted for more than two months.
3&Faulkner, Politics. Expansion and Reform. 129.
^^Pettigrew Manuscripts on Free Silver, Loose Files,
Pettigrev Papers.
38 ' ''Faulkner, Politics. Expansion and Reform. 149-150.
39Congressional Record. 53 Cong., 1 Sess., August 28, 
1893, XXV, 1001-1009.
170
Between the first of September and the middle of
October it appeared that the silverites had a chance to stave
off repeal. They were led on the floor by Henry M. Teller
and Edward C. Wolcott of Colorado, George G, Vest of Missouri,
William M. Stewart and John P. Jones of Nevada, Henry W.V.
Allen of Nebraska and William Peffer of Kansa s,A lth oug h
he considered himself a silver!te, Pettigrew did not speak
during the debate because he feared political repurcussions
at home. However, as has already been indicated, he worked
mightily, albeit futilely, for the cause behind the scenes.
At the height of the debate, Pettigrew wrote to A.B, Kittridge
of Sioux Fails: ■. . . There are many of my friends who
honestly differ with me . . . /3utJ7if I were sure to lose my
seat in the Senate tomorrow I could not change my position
42on the silver question." Kittridge was perhaps a poor choice 
for this confidence, although Pettigrew did not know it at 
the time. The Sioux Falls man had for some time been 
Pettigrew’s close associate in South Dakota affairs. He was, 
however, completely unshaken by the Populist threat and held 
conservative views on the money question. In short, Kittridge
^James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle (New York: Dodd,
Mead and Co., 1931), 277.
"^'Faulkner, Politics. Expansion and Reform. 150.
^^Pettigrew to A.B. Kittridge, Sioux Falls, October 16, 
1893, Pettigrew Papers.
171
and Pettigrev, like Pettigrew and his party, were soon to 
part company.
After many weary days of filibustering on the part of
the silverites, the repeal bill was brought to a vote on
43October 20, 1893, and was passed by a vote of 43 to 32. The
silverites, however, had gained more than they knew by
defeat. The discord and confusion which up to now had
weakened their forces was gone. They had a specific cause
for which to fight and which they could present to their 
44constituents. Unfortunately, in the days to come, the 
silver leaders overplayed this advantage and convinced them­
selves that the political aspirations of the people of the 
Middle Border were governed entirely by free silver. This 
did not prove to be the case.
By the end of 1893 Senator Pettigrew found himself in 
a peculiar position. He was fully convinced that the tide 
of free silver was about to sweep the country, but he was 
still unwilling to abandon the Republican party. Thus he set 
out to modify the appeal of his party so that silverites could 
in good conscience stay with it. He sought to carry out his 
program in South Dakota by establishing bimetallic leagues 
throughout the state which would act as distributors of 
Republican propaganda. "The political battle," he wrote,
4-3Congressional Record. 53 Cong., 1 Sess., October 30, 
1893, XXV, 2958.
44.Barnes, John G. Carlisle. 286.
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"is going to be between the Republicans and the Populists and 
I am somewhat worried over the result." Pettigrew advised 
his associates at home that care should be taken in the. 
organization of the leagues to see that the majority of the 
members were trustworthy Republicans. At the same time, he 
cautioned, the leagues should appear to be non-partisan with 
as many Democratic and Populist members as possible. Pettigrew 
felt that such organizations would go far toward convincing 
the farmers to stay within the Republican party by advising 
them that the best interests of free silver could thus be 
served.
When the organization of the leagues did not progress 
as rapidly as Pettigrew had hoped, he became even more 
concerned over the political situation and confessed privately 
that he believed Populist chances throughout the country were 
increasing
The leaders of the silver states and the brightest 
men of the southern states are seriously discussing the 
question of forming a new party and while I want to go
through the next year’s campaign in South Dakota as a
Republican, I am convinced that this is the last fight
we will make for the Republican party. . . .
I am sure that the Republican party will never elect 
another President and never again control either house 
of Congress.
45Pettigrew to William B. Sterling, Huron, September 9, 
1893, Pettigrew Papers.
46Pettigrew to A.B. Kittridge, Sioux Falls, September 13, 
1893, in ibid.
173
Pettigrew also attempted to influence the Sioux
Falls Press to come out in favor of free silver, but editor
E.V. Caldwell, usually amenable to his suggestions, now proved
recalcitrant. "Your paper," chided the Senator, "is certainly
losing the opportunity of a lifetime in pursuing a non-
commital course with regard to s i l v e r . P e t t i g r e w  further
complained that the Press did not reprint the laudatory
clippings which he sent to Caldwell. He felt that such a
48policy was injurious to both the party and himself.
The attitude taken by Caldwell, the failure of the 
bimetallic leagues and several other factors which gradually 
came to his attention convinced Pettigrew by 1894 that he 
was losing control of the Republican machine of South Dakota. 
As early as October of 1893 he intimated to his close friend 
John Diamond his belief that ex-Governor Mellette was 
organizing an attack upon him. To meet the threat Pettigrew 
wrote to several men he thought were involved hoping to 
elicit from them statements which could later be used against 
them if the need should arise.^9 in addition he ordered that 
some "discreet fellow" of doubtless loyalty should join the
47Pettigrew to E.W. Caldwell, September 9, 1893, 
Pettigrew Papers.
^^Pettigrew to A.B. Kittridge, October 6, 1893, in
ibid.
49Pettigrew to Diamond, October 5, 1893, in ibid.
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Mellette Combination in order that it might be fought from 
the inside.
Pettigrew believed that Mellette*s objective was to 
gain control of the state convention of 1894 with the idea of 
electing a slate which would insure Pettigrew's defeat before 
the legislature in 1895. On that score, however, the Senator 
did not fear Mellette nearly as much as he feared the possi­
bility of fusion between the South Dakota Populists and the 
Democrats. He had information which led him to believe that
Senator Kyle had agreed to throw the Populis.t vote to Bartlett
51Tripp if the latter decided to run for the Senate.
■Tripp will be my real opposition,” wrote the Senator.
During the spring of 1894 Pettigrew tried to convey 
the impression that he was not anxious about his own re- 
election. "All I want," he wrote, "is that Republicans be 
elected to the legislature and agree to stand by the Republican 
caucus. Of course I feel certain of success in that event, 
but if it should result in the selection of someone else I 
shall find no fault.
The fact that Pettigrew feared a combination of
50Pettigrew to C.H. Palmer, Brookings, October 6,
1893, in ibid.
^^Pettigrew to N.G. Nash, Canton, April 3, 1894, in 
ibid. The Independents had affiliated with the People's 
Party. 52Pettigrew to W.S. Bowen, Yankton, April 5, 1894,
in ibid.
53Pettigrew to George V. Ayres, Deadwood, April 6,1894, in ibid.
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Democrats and Populists did not mean that fusion of the two
organizations had already occurred, Henry L. Loucks, for
example, fought fiercely against fusion at the Populist state
convention, saying he feared it would cost the Populists
thousands of votes.Loucks successfully controlled the
convention and was thus able to insure the nomination of his
55slate of "hard core" Populists.
MeanwhilePettigrew's fear that Mellette meant to
manipulate the Republican nominations to his own advantage failed
to materialize. Charles H. Sheldon was nominated for a
second term as governor, while John Pickier and Robert J.
Gamble were named for Congress. In addition, the platform
carried demands for railroad regulations as an appeal to the
farm vote. Pettigrew favored this idea and though he detested
both Sheldon and Pickier, the Senator declared that their
nominations would help maintain party u n i t y . I n  fact, the
Senator was overjoyed when Pickier accepted another term in
Congress, eliminating him as a possible senatorial candidate
57against Pettigrew. Nevertheless, though he predicted 
54Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South Dakota,"
38.
S^Ibid.. 39.
56Pettigrew to D.H» Henry, Chamberlain, May 21, 1894, 
Pettigrew Papers.
57Pettigrew to Kittridge, April 2, 1894, in ibid.
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victory for Sheldon and the others, he was uncertain about 
the legislature. . .We are sure, of electing governor 
and congressmen," he wrote, "but there is a bare possibility 
vs w&'f lose the legislature if the Democratic-Populist 
combination is thorough.
Thus Pettigrew set out to insure his own security. 
During September and October he wrote to each Republican 
candidate for the legislature congratulating him, wishing him 
success and informing him of his own candidacy for re-election
59
to the Senate. At the same time he appealed to the 
Democrats by warning them that they faced political assimi­
lation if they combined with the Populists. "The fight in 
South Dakota is between me and the Populists," he wrote, 
■therefore every Democrat in the state ought to feel interested 
in my success.Meanwhile, Pettigrew ordered his followers, 
throughout the state to prevent Populist-Democratic fusion in 
as many counties as possible. Although there is no way to 
determine how this was done, the success of the scheme in 
many important counties is apparent from Pettigrew’s letters.
It is probable that Republicans posing as Populists 
infiltrated the conventions in some of these counties.
^^Pettigrew to Kittridge, April 2, 1894, in ibid.
59Pettigrew Correspondence, September-October, 1894.in ibid.
^^Pettigrew to Samuel Blum, Deadwood, October 19, 1894,
in iDia.
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At this juncture also, Pettigrew was faced with a 
problem of another order. Rumors began to circulate in Sioux 
Falls that the Midland Pacific Railroad would never be built.
To combat this adverse publicity he wrote to Lemuel Quigg of 
the New York Tribune asking that an interview with one Hibbard, 
who had inspected the project, be published in as many papers 
as possible.About one week later a statement by Hibbard 
appeared in the Tribune. He declared emphatically that the 
Midland Pacific would be completed and that it would be of 
great economic benefit to the states through which it passed, 
particularly South Dakota. “Sioux Falls, South Dakota, the 
eastern terminus of the railroad, will double in population 
within five years of its completion,“ he stated.
On the same day the Hibbard interview appeared, 
Pettigrew received good news from Bartlett Tripp. The 
Democrat declared that he would not run for the Senate, and 
that he preferred Pettigrew to any of the Populists. “In any 
event," predicted the Senator, "there won’t be more than a 
dozen Democratic members in the legislature."^^ The threat 
of a Populist-Democratic combination which Pettigrew feared 
so much had failed to materialize.
61Pettigrew to H.M. McDonald, New York City,
October 20, 1894, in ibid.
^^Nev York Tribune. October 29, 1894.




On election day the Republicans were overwhelmingly 
victorious. Governor Sheldon was re-electpd by a wide margin 
as were Pickier and Gamble. In the legislative contest the 
Republicans won more than one-hundred seats while the 
Populists were able to control only twenty-four.^^ True to 
Pettigrew's prediction the number of seats controlled by the 
Democrats was negligible. j
In spite of party victory Pettigrew did not remain 
idle. He now sought to insure his nomination through control 
of the party legislative caucus. In this effort he was once 
again successful for on January 8, 1895, he was re-nominated 
by acclamation. The Sioux Falls Press commented on the out­
come of the caucus: "(It) is a political marvel. Anybody who
has been acquainted with South Dakota politics has known the 
bitterness of the opposition of certain Republicans against 
Senator Pettigrev.■ The Press went on to say that Pettigrew’s 
unanimous re-nomination proved the Senator had truly achieved 
a position of leadership. "It can hardly be said hereafter," 
declared editor Caldwell, "that Senator Pettigrew is the 
leader of a party faction.
Two weeks later Pettigrew was elected to his second
64South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 304; South 
Dakota Journal of the House (1895). 226;South Dakota Journal 
of the Senate (1895). 186.
^^Sioux Falls Press. January 8, 1895.
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term in the United States Senate by a strict party-line 
vote.^^ His success did not reflect new confidence in the 
Republican party, however, nor did it reflect his own power 
adequately. He was ever fearful of the dangers of encroaching 
Populism, and he had made bitter enemies in his own party. 
Therefore, he continued his espousal of free silver, and moved 
even further to the "left" by declaring that he favored the 
demand of South Dakota Populists that the powers of the State 
Railroad Commission be increased. In fact, Pettigrew had 
announced that he favored the establishment of rate controls 
by the state as early as December 1894. "I am earnestly in 
favor of such a law," he wrote, "I want to give the state 
railroad commissioners the power to prevent discrimination."^^ 
He knew that this was an extremely delicate matter since most 
Republican leaders in the state opposed such legislation. 
Nevertheless, he believed that to survive, the party must 
redeem its campaign pledges and he was determined to see this 
done.^®
The Populists in the legislature introduced a bill 
which would give the state railroad commission the power to 
regulate rates. Pettigrew immediately wired the Republican
°^Huronite. January 23, 1895.
67Pettigrew to C.A. Jewett, Sioux Falls, December 15,
1894, Pettigrew Papers.
68Pettigrew to A.C. Johnson, Pierre, February 1,
1895, in ibid.
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floor leaders urging them to support the measure, but he was
ignored. Furthermore, he was severely criticized in Republican
newspapers for alleged "interference? in legislative matters.
In spite of this he- maintained his position, declaring that
he was ready to do whatever was necessary to bring about
69favorable action on the bill. Pettigrew’s influence, 
however, would not stretch so far. The railroad bill died in 
committee.Commenting on the result Pettigrew wrote; "I 
am much surprised that the railroad lobby could go there and 
manipulate everybody; it is certainly astonishing. My
visympathy is with the people on every and all questions."
So outspoken did Pettigrew become on the question of railroad 
legislation that the Populists began to predict that he 
would soon abandon the Republicans. They were aware of his 
growing disagreement with his party on both the railroad and 
silver questions. Thus Loucks* Dakota Ruralist declared in
December, 1895, that Pettigrew would soon be joining the
79Populist ranks.
69Pettigrew to Jobbers and Manufacturers Association 
of Sioux Falls, February 6, 1895, Pettigrew Papers.
“̂ Ŝouth Dakota Journal of the Senate (1895), index to 
bills, X, xi. ~
^Pettigrew to C.A. Soderburg, Sioux Falls, March 16, 
1895, Pettigrew Papers.
^^Quoted in Schell, South Dakota. 234.
CHAPTER VII 
A SILVER REPUBLICAN
In the spring of 1895 Richard Pettigrew once more 
found himself in a difficult position. In Washington he was 
viewed as one of those who was rapidly drifting away from the 
Republican fold. In South Dakota his control of party 
machinery was greatly weakened because of his stand on the 
railroad bill during the last legislative session. Yet he 
made no move to recant from the unorthodox position he had 
taken. He believed in regulatory legislation- aimed at 
railroads and other large business concerns. He believed in 
free silver. The latter, he thought, must be accepted as 
soon as possible if the economy of the nation was to survive. 
The American banking system, declared the Senator, was 
organized so as to take from the producer the result of his 
efforts, and to control the volume of currency to the 
advantage of the organizers and managers of industry. This 
system was based upon the maintenance of a small volume of 
currency. It was the system of the Republican party and there 
could be no hope for relief for the agricultural classes while
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that party vas in power.^ That this was now Pettigrew’s
political-philosophy, there can be no doubt. It appears in
his correspondence and in his speeches. He was committed to
these principles as he had never been before. Yet he still
sought to gain political advantage. "In the next/TpresidentialJ?
campaign," he wrote, "we are going to try to nominate a silver
Republican." He was already at work on the project and thought
the West was shortly to be joined by certain silver advocates
in the East and South to form an organization which would
2control the Republican convention of 1896.
Pettigrew’s first choice for President was William B. 
Allison of Iowa, whose name had long been prominently
3
associated with the cause of free silver. "With a man from 
the Northwest in the field," wrote Pettigrew, "we will be able 
to defeat McKinley when the time c o m e s . T h e  South Dakotan 
then turned his attention to the problem of getting himself 
named as a delegate to the national convention which would 
meet in St. Louis in June, 1896. He knew that he would 
encounter stern opposition among his former friends in the
^R.F. Pettigrev Manuscript, "The Monetary System," undated, Pettigrev Papers.
^Pettigrew to E.W. Caldwell, Sioux Falls, March 18,
1895, Pettigrew Papers. ^
3
Leland L. Sage, William Boyd Allison (Iowa City;
State Historical Society of Iowa, 1956), 255.
4Pettigrev ro John Longstaff, Huron, January 15, 1896,
Pettigrew Papers.
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party, but he felt, rather naively, that this opposition would 
not be of a personal nature. Instead, he expected it to be 
based entirely on issues like railroad rate regulation and 
free silver, A.B. Kittridge and Nye Phillips of Sioux Falls 
were now both on the other side of the political fence 
because of the railroad bill controversy, and Republican 
newspapers around the state were not so friendly to Pettigrew 
as they had been in the past. Although the Senator made 
specific attempts to reconcile himself with his former friends 
prior to the opening of the state convention, all efforts 
failed,^ and he was forced to enter into a vigorous 
correspondence with men he had previously considered his 
enemies hoping to develop some support as rapidly as 
possible.^
Pettigrev believed, and rightly so, that a combination 
had been formed against him to get control of the Republican 
party. The new Combine was led by Kittridge and Phillips, 
both of whom were employees of the Milwaukee Railroad Company, 
"It looks as if they will succeed," wrote Pettigrew, "and 
will probably defeat me as a delegate to the St. Louis
5
Pettigrev to H.G. Fuller, Pierre, January 30, 1896, 
in ibid. Also see the files of such newspapers as the Sioux 
Falls Press. Huronite and Aberdeen Daily News.
Pettigrev to C.G. Sherwood, Clark,South Dakota, 
February 3, 1896, Pettigrew Papers.
7Pettigrew to Coe I. Crawford, Pierre, January 30,1896, in ibid.
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Convention. The people are apathetic and the railroad has
Qagreed to furnish them with all the money they need." It is 
interesting to note that nov for the first time in his career 
Pettigrew was genuinely alarmed by intra-party opposition to 
his leadership. But he declared repeatedly that he wanted 
to push the fight for free silver and would remain a 
candidate for delegate.^ Pettigrew wanted the state 
convention to be held as early as possible and in a city east 
of the Missouri River. Here he was successful as the 
convention to nominate delegates was called to meet in Huron 
in March. By the middle of February, however, Pettigrew 
claimed to have given up hope of being made a delegate to the 
national convention. "This does not bother me much," he 
wrote. "I desired to go so that I could help frame a platform 
which would allow silver Republicans to remain in the party." 
Pettigrew felt that if this were not done, the silverites, 
including himself, would be forced to leave that party, and 
thus the state would be lost.^^ "I am inclined," he wrote,
"to think we had better let them go ahead and name their 
whole ticket, for with such a row as this in the Republican 
party, how can we elect any ticket? And is it not better for
0
Pettigrew to Thomas H. Brown, Sioux Falls,
February 4, 1896, in ibid.
9Pettigrew to J.W. Shannon, Huron, February 4, 1896,
in ibid.
*̂̂ Pettigrew to William T. LaFollette, Chamberlain,
February 10, 1896, in ibid.
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them to be defeated than ourselves?"^^
When the nominating convention convened in Huron,
however, Pettigrev was still a candidate for delegate, despite
12the fact that anti-silver men were in control. The Senator,
however, cleverly avoided making free silver the major issue,
substituting in its stead railroad legislation, and was
elected a delegate to the national convention. His opponents
thought they had bound him to the will of the majority by
extracting a pledge from all delegates to support the national
ticket, whatever the outcome of the national convention, but
Pettigrew disclaimed any obligation to support a "sound
money" platform and declared himself to favor free silver now 
13more than ever.
Immediately after the adjournment of the convention, 
A.B, Kittridge wrote jubilantly to ex-governor Mellette that 
the delegates were tied by an "iron-clad" oath to support 
McKinley and endorse sound money. "By a resolution aimed 
directly at Senator Pettigrew," said Kittridge, "the Senator 
was compelled to take the floor and agree to stand by these 
instructions. It would have been comparatively easy to 
defeat his election as a delegate, but upon the advice of
^^Pettigrew to Conklin, February 4, 1896, in ibid.
^Sfankton Press and Dakotan. March 26, 1896.
13Pettigrew to Perry S. Heath, Cincinnati, April 11,
1896, Pettigrew Papers.
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14'friends* ve concluded the above was sufficient,"
Pettigrew, on the other hand, gave the situation an
entirely different connotation. "I am free," he boasted,
■as a delegate to the St. Louis Convention to work for a
silver plank in the platform, . . .  We did not endorse sound
money and. . . .  I hope to be chairman of the delegation and
secure a plank at St. Louis that will enable an honest silver
15man to support the Republican ticket." The Senator believed 
thax his next move was to attempt to gain control of the 
state party convention which would meet in Aberdeen in July.
He vrcce to Moody that he had undertaken to harmonize things 
at Huron and had even "agreed to the platform." Nevertheless, 
his opponents were now assailing him in the newspapers. This 
course could only do damage to the party, he co n c luded.To 
another of his confidants he wrote, "We have got to destroy
the machine in South Dakota, or have the machine destroy
1 "T"us."* Pettigrew was now clearly "on the other side of the 
fence."
14Kittridge to Mellette, March 30, 1896, Mellette
Papers.
15
Pettigrew to Jfi’ank C. Day, Fairmont, April 2, 1896, 
Pettigrev papers.
“°Pettigrew to Moody, Deadwood, April 2, 1896, in
ibid.
"^Pettigrew to Joseph Paul, Webster, South Dakota,
April 2, 1896, in ibid.
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"Ws must begin to organize for the Aberdeen Convention
all over the state," wrote Pettigrev to B.H. Lien of Sioux
Falls. "If we want to control it we must not go up there,
as we did to Huron, without any definite purpose, but we must
18know that ve have the votes to control the convention." 
Pettigrev wrote many letters to such "progressive silverites" 
as Oscar Gifford, Samuel Elrod, and Lien, but there is 
a glaring absence of any letters to Kittridge, Phillips,
W.B. Sterling and other members of the machine with whom 
he had formerly been so closely associated.
At the same time that Pettigrew fought so valiantly 
to control the South Dakota Republican machine for the 
silverites, he attempted to convince the party’s national 
leaders that he supported the candidacy of William McKinley. 
Allison’s star had apparently fallen well before the time of 
the national convention and Pettigrew wrote to Mark Hanna that 
McKinley would receive his "loyal support.Pettigrew was 
willing at this point to identify himself with any party
nominee if he could force a free silver plank into the
20platform. However, he was not convinced that McKinley had 
“^Pettigrew to Lien, Sioux Falls, April 3, 1896, inibid.
1 Q“ Pettigrew to Marcus A. Hanna, Cleveland, April 3, 
1896, in ibid.
20Perrigrew to Oscar S. Gifford, Canton, South Dakota, 
April 3, 1896, in ibid.
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the nomination "in the bag," "It’s hard to tell who will be 
nominated," declared Pettigrew, "and strange events may 
occur before November. There is a great feeling of unrest
and dissatisfaction pervading the minds of all people and
21it is hard to tell what may come of it."
Pettigrew was probably sincere in his belief that
the money question had evoked a ^great feeling of unrest and
dissatisfaction" among the people of South Dakota. He feared
that the Republicans would be unable to carry the state in
the election if a gold plank were adopted. "If this occurs,"
wrote Pettigrew, "the people will disregard old party
22affiliations and stream to the banners of Populism."
Perry S. Heath of the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette 
visited with Pettigrew in Washington during April, 1896.
Heath was now leading member in the McKinley-Hanna organi­
zation and was later to play a significant part in the
OOdistribution of "sound money" literature to the voters. 
Apparently acting for McKinley, he offered to guarantee 
Pettigrew complete control of South Dakota patronage and 
"very much more than that," in exchange for support at the
^^Pettigrew to E.W. Miller, Elk Point, April 3, 1896,
in ibid.
^^Pettigrew to Perry S. Heath, April 8, 1896, in ibid.
23Dictionary of American Biography. VIII, "Perry 
Sanford Heath,** 489-490.
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24national convention. Since Heath and his associates were 
well aware of Pettigrew*? position on the money question, it 
follows that this offer was an attempt to bribe Pettigrew 
into supporting the gold faction of the Republican party.
The refusal of the Senator to accept the bait reflects 
his devotion to free silver since absolute control of state 
patronage had always been his political goal.
On April 28, 1896 Pettigrew wrote to J.W. Shannon 
of Huron, publisher of the Huronite. setting forth his
ORposition on the eve of the national convention:
I want to state to you confidentially that the 
situation is decidedly mixed, and that our friend 
McKinley hasn't a sure thing on the nomination, 
although of course I shall support him loyally and 
faithfully in accordance with the instructions given, 
but if that convention declares for a gold standard,
I shall talk with my friends before I decide what I 
shall do. I will not do anything rash, but it will 
be very hard for me to support such a platform and I 
do not believe I shall do it.
Pettigrew probably knew by this time that there 
was little hope for silver at the national convention. Thus 
his decision to leave the party was made more easily. 
Nevertheless, he wrote shortly before going to St. Louis:
"It is a hard thing to leave a party we have acted with 
all our lives. But there is a duty greater than our
24Pettigrew to E.W. Caldwell, Sioux Falls, April 9, 
1896, Pettigrew Papers.
25Pettigrew to Shannon, April 29, 1896, in ibid.
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26obligation to the Republican party." , The final decision
had been made. If the Republicans would abandon silver,
Pettigrew would abandon the party.
Pettigrew had also decided to drop his plan to gain
control of the state convention at Aberdeen. Instead he
began to correspond with Henry L. Loucks, apparently in
anticipation of Republican refusal to honor free silver.
Loucks was now President of the National Farmers* Alliance
and chief of the Populist political machine in South Dakota.
Although the two had been bitter opponents until 1895,
Pettigrew’s stand on free silver and the railroad question
27apparently convinced Loucks of his sincerity, and from this 
point the two men began to confer regularly on matters of 
political strategy.
Meanwhile, on the national scene, interest centered 
on the developing contest for the Republican nomination. In 
addition to McKinley and Allison, Levi P. Morton of New York, 
Thomas B. Reed of Pennsylvania and Cushman K. Davis of 
Minnesota were prominently mentioned. By convention time, 
however, no one had a chance to wrest the nomination from 
McKinley. Marcus A. Hanna had planned too well. From the 
very beginning of the campaign Hanna Controlled the national
^^Pettigrew to X, Canton, South Dakota, June 9, 1896,
in ibid.
27Dictionary of American Biooraohv. XI, "Henry 
Langford Loucks," 426.
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committee. He had pledges from thirty-five of the fifty 
members agreeing to "stand firm for the right." That is, to 
support William McKinley. Hanna also had gained control of 
many state delegations prior to the convention, especially 
in the South. The chairmen of the various state and 
congressional committees were instructed to maintain control 
of the local conventions at all costs. These officers 
certified the election of McKinley men as delegates no matter 
what the outcome of the balloting.
At the same time, the friends of Allison, Reed and
Morton also attempted to stir up support in the South, but
they relied on the obsolete method of controlling the majority
of the delegates to the state conventions. When the anti-.
McKinleyites in many states realized that steamroller tactics
were being employed, they had no recourse except to bolt and
hold conventions of their own. Thus when Pettigrew and the
other Republican "renegades" heard that certain states were
"good," they had actually received news of these bolting
groups. Of course, at St. Louis, the credentials
committee refused to seat "renegade" delegations, and
McKinley was for all practical purposes nominated before
28the convention began.
Once the matter of securing delegates had been
28
Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding 
(New York; G.P. Putnam*s, 1922), 171-177. Also see 
Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York; Harper 
and Brothers, 1959), 62-63.
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settled, Hanna turned to the platform. The manager favored
the insertion of a plank which would allow silverites to
remain in the party even though McKinley were nominated.
Here he was not so successful because the platform committee
led by Herman H. Kohlsaat of Illinois drafted a plank stating
unequivocally the opposition of the party to the free coinage
of silver. The rough draft of the plank was submitted to
McKinley and approved before being inserted in the final
draft of the platform. Thus, despite the objections of
Hanna, the loss to the party of the Western silver men was
29also assured in advance. ,
Henry M. Teller, still the guiding light of the silver
forces, had been planning his strategy for many months. He
sought to organize the insurgent Republicans well enough to
force the party to adopt a silver plank. His activities,
however, were apparently confined to the Rocky Mountain area
and did not include the Pettigrewites of South Dakota.
Teller’s plan was to introduce a silver resolution and demand
its adoption. If the convention refused he would bolt,
followed, he hoped, by a large number of delegates. His only
chance of success was based upon the hope that the insurgents
could rally enough support to force the party leaders to
30accept their demands or face a ruinous split.
S^Thomas Beer, Hanna (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1929),
143.
^%lmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller (Caldwell, Idaho:
The Caxton Printers, 194l), 252, 261.
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Richard Pettigrew, for his part, still deemed it 
vital to his cause that he be made chairman of the South 
Dakota delegation. But when the delegates formally organized 
after arriving in St. Louis, he was not given that honor.
Five of the eight delegates were strict machine men and 
opposed the Senator at every turn. The humiliation and fury 
experienced by Pettigrew was mirrored in the Sioux Falls 
Press:̂ ^
The South Dakota delegation met in St. Louis and 
proceeded to carry through the Kittridge program.
Every effort was made by the Combine to humiliate the 
Senator. The Combine men were French, Williams, Lucas 
Snead and Sherwood. Only Meacham and Mizener stood by 
Senator Pettigrew. French was elected chairman and 
Williams, the "gold bug" banker from Webster was 
elected to the resolutions committee.
The fireworks began on the second day of the convention 
vhen the platform was submitted to the delegates for approval. 
Senator Teller, who had been the lone silverite on the 
resolutions committee, took this opportunity to make his 
move. He submitted a minority report demanding that a silver 
plank be added to the platform. It was signed by several of 
the silver men attending the convention, including Pettigrew. 
Teller knew very well that the minority report would be 
defeated. Therefore, he used the opportunity to present an 
emotional appeal for all silverites to rally to the call, and 
ae concluded by announcing his official departure from the 
Fapublican party. When Teller had finished, Joseph B. Foraker
^^Sioux Falls Press. June 16, 1896.
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of Ohio immediately moved that the minority report be laid 
on the table. Teller asked for a rollcall vote on this motion 
and his demand was accepted. The vote was 818 1/2 for to 
105 1/2 against, with six of Pettigrew's colleagues from South 
Dakota voting to table the resolution. After the vote Teller 
rose and with great dignity made his way out of the 
convention hall followed by Senators Pettigrew, Cannon of 
Utah, DuBois of Idaho and several others. As the silverites 
walked slowly toward the exit they were booed and hissed by 
their former comrades; and someone in the balcony began to
sing, "Goodbye, My Lover, Goodbye." The parting of the
32ways had come.
Back in South Dakota, the Sioux Falls Press devoted 
a great deal of space to the events in St. Louis. The paper 
declared that Senator Pettigrew after mature deliberation, 
had concluded it was no longer possible for him to support the 
gold standard platform of the Republican party. Pettigrew 
believed, declared the Press. that Wall Street and the 
financiers of Great Britain controlled the party and its 
conventions. Thus he could envision no relief for the 
laboring classes of America if the Republicans were allowed 
to remain in power.
The Press expressed its deepest respect for Pettigrew,
^%ew York Tribune. June 19, 1896.
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and his beliefs but vent on to declare that it could not
endorse his move. Editor Caldwell stated that the paper
would support Pettigrew without hesitation as long as he
remained within the Republican party, but if free silver
carried the Senator out of the party, the association must
end because "honest patriotism and duty can best be served
33within the Republican party,"
The following day the Press carried a statement issued 
by Pettigrew containing his explanation for leaving the con­
vention. The reasons given were those commonly enunciated 
by silver men: "Maintenance of the gold standard may result
in a further decline in prices to the utter ruin of all 
producers of wealth, , , , I believe that the gold of the 
world is cornered by the professional creditors of the world 
who hold . , . bonds, mortgages, and other credits; and for 
people already debtors to multiply those , , , is the height 
of folly,
Meanwhile, after leaving the convention, the 
insurgents met formally to organize the Silver Republican 
party. They issued an address to all the silver men in the 
country urging them to unite behind the candidacy of Henry 
M. Teller, They were interested in the forthcoming 
convention of the Democratic party, where they hoped Teller
33Sioux Falls Press. June 18, 1896,
^^Ibid.. June 19, 1896,
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might be nominated for President. To no one’s surprise,
shortly after tha Silver Republicans issued their statement,
H.£. Taubeneck, chairman of the Populist National Committee,
came out in favor of Teller, and thus on the eve of the
Democratic Convention the Silver Republicans and the
Populists were agreed that their next move was to induce the
Democrats to name Teller as their candidate. If this failed
they would be forced to nominate him through their own
parties, for to support a regular Democrat, even though he
might be pledged to free silver would mean political suicide.
To force Teller upon the Democrats, therefore, was their one
chance of success.
To implement their plans the insurgents attempted
to gather support for their man from among the leading Silver
Democrats, Senator DuBois went to Springfield, Illinois, to
interview Governor Altgeld, while Pettigrew journeyed to
Arkansas hoping to enlist the aid of Senator James K.
Jones. Pettigrew returned to Chicago in company with Jones
and wrote Teller that Jones might support his nomination.
"It all depends upon Illinois and Ohio," wrote Pettigrew.
"If they will say that you can carry those states, you will 
35be nominated." Unfortunately, Teller did not take his own 
candidacy seriously. He thought his nomination by the 
Democrats would be "injudicious" because of his recent
3 5 Ellis, Henry Moore Teller. 262-269.
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separation from the Republicans. Still, his disciples hoped
to amend his attitude before the opening of the convention,
and Senator DuBois wrote him that;
The serious obstacle which confronts me is the state­
ment, repeatedly made, that you will not accept the 
nomination at the hands of this convention. . . .  
Pettigrew . . . and other loyal friends insist that 
if we undertake to support a Democratic candidate it 
will destroy them and the cause of silver.
Meanwhile, Pettigrew was kept busy analysing the
effect of his action on South Dakota politics. He received
hundreds of letters and telegrams from all sections of the
state and from people representing all shades of political
belief. The vast majority of these messages endorsed his
action in glowing terms. One telegram arrived from V.P.
Ross of Yankton which declared that the people of Yankton,
Bon Homme, Clay and Hutchinson Counties were in favor of
37silver. Another came from Freeman Knowles, Populist editor 
of the Deadwood Independent, and candidate for Congress.
"Men of both parties in the Hills," wrote Knowles, "congratu­
late you on your noble stand. This entire section favors your
action and nine-tenths of the people favor free coinage even
38though the machine denies it."
36Ibid.. 270.
37V.P. Ross to Pettigrew, telegram, June 19, 1896, 
Pettigrew Papers.
38Knowles to Pettigrew, June 22, 1896, in ibid.
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From Iowa one B.V, Leonard wrote the Senator,
39■Thousands applaud your course. , . E.H. Sellers,
President of the National Council of Patriotic Associations
of the United States, boasted to Pettigrew that he represented
four million voters and suggested that Pettigrew join with
him to form a new party to be called the "American Party of
the R e p u b l i c . M o r e  encouraging was a communication from
J.V. Teibil, Chairman of the South Dakota State Democratic
Committee, who lauded Pettigrew for his action and declared
that the Senator's bolt had gained him many additional
41friends throughout the state. Mark D. Scotty publisher of
the Sioux Falls Journal, commended Pettigrew with the
encouraging news that many residents of Minnehaha County
42were in favor of his stand, while his friend Cyrus Walts 
was more specific. " . . .  The people of Sioux Falls and 
Minnehaha County . . . praise your action. The country 
people are ten to one for you and the city two or three to
4-3
one." C.J. Johnson, a leading Kansas Democrat, wrote 
44the Senator;
I am glad to see you bolted the Republican convention.
Leonard to Pettigrew, June 20, 1896, in ibid.
^4sellers to Pettigrew, June 22, 1896, in ibid.
^^Teibel to Pettigrew, June 23, 1896, in ibid.
^^Scott to Pettigrew, June 20, 1896, in ibid.
■^^Walts to Pettigrew, June 23, 1896, in ibid.
Johnson to Pettigrew, June 20, 1896, in ibid.
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I am glad you, Teller and the others had the manhood 
and loyalty to the American people to protest against 
a system that has empoverished the American people. . . . 
If a coalition can be made of all the silver men . . . 
we will be able to sweep out the gold bugs and have 
prosperity once more,
Pettigrew also received a series of letters from
M.S. Bowen, publisher of the Yankton Press and Dakotan.
■You have long halted between conscience and party," wrote
Bowen on June 19. "Conscience seems to have won out at
St. Louis, and the machine is horrified. I believe three-
45fifths of the state will go for silver." Three days later
Bowen wrote that the best chance of success would be for a
bolt of the Republican state convention to be organized
There will not be a silver majority at the convention, 
but there will probably be a fairly large silver 
following. The convention will be controlled by the 
machine. I have conferred with Populist leaders and 
they are willing to coalesce on almost any terms. They 
are well organized in every county and have about 
27,000 votes. I suggest you write to trustworthy friends 
over the state at once and advise a silverite bolt at 
Aberdeen and the creation of a silver convention in 
another hall. It might be best to appoint a discreet 
committee of eight or ten persons to wait upon the 
Populist convention at Huron and arrange a ticket with 
that organization.
Bowen soon wrote to Pettigrew again; "The prairies 
are ablaze with bimetallism and Pettigrewism. There is great 
enthusiasm for you," wrote the publisher. "The officeholders
45Bowen to Pettigrew, June 19, 1896, in ibid.
4&lbid., June 22, 1896, in ibid.
200
do not participate in this and are exceedihgly anxious about 
their tenure. To abandon the platform of the Republican 
Party means defeat at the next convention. To adhere to the 
platform means defeat in N o v e m b e r . A n d  in another two days 
Bowen reported; "The gold standard men oppose you but 
sympathy for silver is strong among the masses especially 
farmers. Many leading Germans and Norwegians in this/Yankton7 
County are behind you. The country areas seem to be wholly 
for silver.
Thus Senator Pettigrew was bolstered by reports of 
overwhelming support from, his constituents. His sympathy for 
free silver seemed to have been vindicated in the most 
gratifying manner, and political success seemed a certainty, 
as the delegates to the Republican State Convention began to 
gather in Aberdeen on July 10, True to Bowen*s prediction the 
gold men were in the majority and when a free coinage 
resolution was introduced by Pettigrew's friend C.H. Palmer 
of Minnehaha County, it lost by a vote of 499 to 103. 
Immediately, the silverites left the convention declaring
49they intended to meet with the Populists later in the month.
The Republicans proceeded to draw up a platform favoring the 
gold standard. They did, however, insert planks declaring
47Ibid.. June 24, 1896. in ibid.
^^Ibid.. June 26, 1896, in ibid.
4QYankton Press and Dakotan. July 10, 1896.
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themselves to be against trusts and combines, and in favor
wa 
51
50of stricter railroad legislation. Their ticket s
headed by A.O. Ringsrud of Elk Point for Governor,
The Populists convened in Huron on July 14. The 
Silver Republicans, including Senator Pettigrew met at the 
same time to decide what course they would pursue. According 
to previously laid plans, they concluded that if the proponents 
of free silver from all parties could unite on one ticket, 
it would be possible to defeat the "gold bug" Republicans,
Therefore, the Silver Republicans endorsed the Populist
52ticket. On July 15, Senator Pettigrew addressed the
convention and the Sioux Falls Press reported that his
appearance- was' the sensation of the day. He would not resign
from the Senate, he declared, no matter what charges the
Republicans might hurl against him. Their demands that he
must abandon his seat for refusal to stand on the party
platform would be ignored. "I will continue to fight
against Wall Street criminals and gamblers under the banners
53of Populism," roared the Senator.
50Ibid.. July 11, 1896.
51South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 314.
^^Huronite. July 14, 1896.
^^Sioux Falls Press, July 15, 1896.
202
Meanwhile, the Democratic National Convention had
assembled in Chicago on July 7. Unlike the Republicans at
St. Louis, they had no idea who they would nominate for 
54President. Even though the Silver Democrats were in control
of the proceedings they never gave serious attention to the
candidacy of Senator Teller, since he was, after all, a 
55Republican. Among the foremost contenders were William C. 
Whitney of New York, standard bearer of the Democratic 
hard-money forces, and Richard P. Bland of Missouri, spokes­
man for the silveritesHowever, William Jennings Bryan, 
former Congressman from Nebraska, had been working hard for 
the nomination behind the scenes. He had the support of 
such popular organizations as the National Silver League 
and the American Bimetallic League, but more important, he
had the backing of the silver faction of the Nebraska 
57Democrats.
On the second day of the convention the delegates 
voted to oust the gold delegation from Nebraska which action
54Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion. 192. 
^^Ibid.. 193.
^^Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland; A Portrait in Courage 
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1933), 689-701.
57Paxton Hibben, The Peerless Leader. William Jennings 
Bryan (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1929), 175-177.
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assured Bryan a seat. From that point the entire proceeding
assumed the form of a polemical society for free silver.
After the reading of the platform, which had been prepared
by John P. Altgeld, the gold men offered amendments. This,
of course, had been expected and the debate which ensued set
the stage for Bryan to deliver his well prepared and classic
"Cross of Gold" speech. This masterpiece, combined with
the months of planning which had gone before, won the nomina-
58 ^tion for the Nebraskan.
Back in South Dakota the nomination of Bryan and the
overwhelming endorsement of silver by the Democrats had
certain effects on Populist strategy. At the state convention
a resolution was introduced calling for the endorsement of
Bryan as Populist candidate for President. This resolution
was hotly contested by those who feared that fusion would
serve only to destroy the Populist party as an independent
political organization. Nevertheless, it was finally carried
59by the overwhelming vote of 499 to 71. The South Dakota . 
Populists then instructed their delegates to the Populist 
National Convention to favor the endorsement of Bryan as the 
candidate of the party. However, a dispute arose when 
Pettigrew and several others opposed the acceptance of Bryan 
in favor of a separate candidate. In order to get an
58Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion. 193-196.
59Aberdeen Daily News. July 15, 1896.
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agreement Senator DuBois summoned Pettigrew to Manitou
Springs, Colorado, where they conferred with Teller. After
much persuasion DuBois and Teller convinced Pettigrew that
60supporting Bryan was the correct move. Teller then wrote 
to Bryan that he could expect complete support from the Silver 
Republicans in the West.^^
In South Dakota, however, the Populists controlled the 
selection of candidates. Here, the positions of the two 
parties were reversed for it was the Democratic party which 
fused with the Populists. The most prominent candidate for 
governor was Andrew E. Lee of Vermillion, a successful merchant, 
He favored free silver and the regulation of railroads and 
other corporations by the state. Moreover, he was eager to 
run. Lee was acceptable to Pettigrew, whose acquiescence was 
considered necessary, and with the endorsement of the 
Senator, he received the nomination. Then, shortly after 
the Populist convention adjourned, the Democratic State Central 
Committee voted to call off their pending state convention to 
endorse the Populist ticket. It seemed quite certain that
^^Ellis, Henry Moore Teller. 275.
^■^Teller to Bryan, August 1, 1896, William Jennings 
Bryan Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C,
^^Lee to Pettigrew, June 22, 1896, Andrew E. Lee 
Papers, State University of South Dakota Museum, Vermillion, 
South Dakota; also State Historical Society Museum, Pierre, 
South Dakota.
63Aberdeen Daily News. July 15, 1896.
64Yankton Press and Dakotan. August 9, 1896.
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the forces of free silver, would control the state in the 
coming elections.
The campaign of 1896 was the most hotly contested in 
the history of South Dakota. The issues were well defined; 
free silver versus the gold standard, protection versus free 
trade, and railroad rate regulation versus laissez faire .. In 
addition, the forces of prohibition and license were factors 
which could not be ignored. For the most part the former 
were with the fusionists and the latter with the Republicans.
The Republican machine was torn apart over the silver 
issue and was further weakened by the loss of Pettigrew and 
his followers. In addition, the fusionists hurled the first 
line of their oratorical forces into the fray. Bryan himself 
toured the state in September, stopping to speak at Sioux 
Falls and the farming communities of Salem, Vilas, Huron, 
Redfield and Aberdeen. His speeches on behalf of silver 
attracted large crowds of the curious and dedicated who 
screamed their approval of his oratory with unrestrained 
enthusiasm.Pettigrew and Lee also stumped the state in 
behalf of free silver, speaking to large crowds wherever they 
went. On October 31, the “Grand Old Man" himself, Henry 
Moore Teller, appeared to the rejoicing multitudes. Indeed' 
the cause of free silver was well attended.
^^Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South 
Dakota," 45,
^^G.W. Smith, South Dakota: Its History and Its 
People (Chicago: S.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1915), 674-
675.
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Despite the magnificent efforts of the fusionists
67they nearly lost the state. Bryan won by only 183 votes.
Lee carried 35 of the 61 counties but defeated Ringsrud by
only 319 votes. However, the Republicans won lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, superintendent
of public instruction and commissioner of school lands. In
the congressional race. Populist Freeman Knowles won a seat
in the House by a slim margin, but his colleague John E.
Kelley was d e f e a t e d . I n  the legislature the fusionists
won a majority of nineteen. Fifty-three Republicans, nine
Democrats, and seventy free silverites were elected. The
latter category included Populists and Silver Republicans as
69well as some Democrats. The Republicans charged fraud in 
the election and threatened contests, but these never 
materialized.^^
Obviously, the election was not an unqualified success 
for Pettigrew and the Populists. It is interesting to note 
that the narrow victories of Governor Lee and Knowles came 
about not because of a significant reduction in the number 
of,Republican votes, but because of the great increase in the
^^E.E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote. 1896-1932 
(Stanford; The Stanford University Press, 1934), 317.
^^South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 315-321. 
^^Smith, South Dakota. 675.
^^Aberdeen Daily News. November 17, 1896.
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Populist vote. Most of this increase can be accounted for 
by the combination of the Populist and Democratic parties and 
one is thus forced to conclude that despite the great propa­
ganda campaign carried on by the silverites, they simply did 
not succeed in changing the votes of many regular Republicans, 
Certainly it is true that Pettigrew and many like him were 
sincerely committed to the principle of free coinage, but 
apparently the "Battle of the Standards" was not the burning 
issue among the rank-and-file voters that it has been made by 
some writers. As they were to demonstrate in the coming months, 
the fusionists'in the legislature were much more interested in 
railroad regulation than in the currency question and it was 
for this reason that many of them were elected. This is by 
no means to say, however, that adherence to the principle of 
free silver among political leaders was a sham. Pettigrew, for 
one, did not drop his contention that the existing monetary 
system was inequitable. Far from it, he became even more 
convinced of the correctness of his position as time went on.
Although he was disappointed in the results of the 
election, Pettigrew felt that it might still be possible for 
the Populists to gain complete control of the state through 
the manipulation of patronage. This required, however, 
that another fusionist be elected to the United States Senate, 
James H. Kyle, whose term was about to expire, was anxious 
for re-election, but Pettigrew, Lee and most of the other 
fusionist leaders opposed him, since it had been rumored that
208
71he was negotiating with the Republicans, According to the
reports, an understanding had been reached whereby Kyle would
receive Republican support for re-election in return for
which he would vote with the G.G.P. and receive committee
72assignments from it in Congress.
When the balloting began it was evident that the 
Republicans had united in support of one candidate while the 
fusionists had not. Congressman John Pickier, now under no 
political obligation to Pettigrew, was selected as the
73Republican candidate at a caucus held on January 14, 1897. 
However, when formal nominations opened in the state senate
five days later the fusionists presented four candidates:
_ 74Henry L. Loucks, r.M. Goodykoontz, A.J. Plowman, and Kyle.
The night before they had gone through twenty-nine ballots in
75caucus but were unable to unite on a single candidate.
Senator Pettigrew was offered the nomination if he would 
resign the seat he held, but declined. His term of office 
would not end until 1901 and he was fearful of the outcome of
^^ee to I. Gunderson, Centerville, South Dakota, 
February 2, 1897, Lee Papers.
^Pettigrew Diary, Notes and Comments on Men and 
Events. January'5, 1897, Pettigrew Papers.
73Yankton Press and Dakotan. January 14, 1897.
74South Dakota Senate Journal. (1897), 300.
75Aberdeen Daily News. January 18, 1897.
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this election due to the split in the fusionist ranks. The
Senator vas ready, however, with an attack upon the
Republicans if they should swing their support to Kyle, since
he knew Kyle opposed protection. "The absurdity of the
Republicans voting for him is apparent,"he wrote, "The excuse
that they are doing it to spite me is not placing the party
in the state in a very good light.
The senatorial election remained unsettled for several
weeks. Pettigrew counselled all the fusionist candidates to
drop out of the race and select a new candidate by caucus
since control of the state depended on the outcome. Much to
his chagrin, only Loucks complied. Shortly after, the
situation was complicated further by the introduction of a
new factor. The Democratic National Committee, anxious to
have a fusionist elected, sent A.C. Johnson of Pierre to
help settle matters, and the anti-Kyle men were instructed to
77place themselves under his orders. Soon, however, Pettigrew
and Lee began to suspect that Johnson was actually working
in favor of Kyle, thinking him to be the only fusionist
78candidate with a chance for election. Within a week after
^^Pettigrew to U.S.G. Cherry, December 18, 1896, 
Pettigrew Papers.
77Aberdeen Daily News. February 5, 1897; Pettigrew to 
Loucks, March 2, 1897, Pettigrew Papers.
78Aberdeen Daily News. February 6, 1897.
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the arrival of Johnson, Governor Lee was certain that their
suspicions were correct. Nevertheless, the Governor assured
79Pettigrew that Kyle would not win.
During the week that followed, the situation remained 
unchanged. The fusionists were hopelessly split and the 
Republicans could not muster enough votes to elect Pickier. 
Suddenly, however, on February 18, 1897, Kyle was re-elected. 
In an overnight move he had gained the support of fifty-two 
of the fifty-four Republicans, in addition to ten Populists
on
and three Democrats. With a total of sixty-five votes Kyle
was victorious over his nearest rivals Goodykoontz and
81Plowman. Governor Lee was beside himself with anger. "It 
waa-the foulest and dirtiest piece of work I have ever seen," 
he wrote Pettigrew. "In addition to the complete defection 
of Kyle, the Republicans 'bought' thirteen votes which are 
now aligned against us on all other questions."
Lee feared that the fusionists would now be unable to 
gain control of the patronage which he and Pettigrew thought 
to be so vital to control of the state. Without the support 
of the thirteen fusionist legislators who had voted for Kyle, 
Lee would be unable to get his appointments approved. He 
was most discouraged and felt that his administration was
79Lee to Pettigrew, February 11, 1897, Lee Papers.
®®Aberdeen Daily News. February 18, 1897.
81South Dakota Senate Journal (1897), 782-787.
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doomed to failure. On February 20, 1897, the Populists in
the legislature held an indignation meeting and read Senator
89Kyle out of the party. But it gained them nothing.
Kyis sav no inconsistency in his position. He claimed 
that he had in no way surrendered his stand on important 
public issues by his "understanding" with the Republicans.
He denounced the action of a "small clique of selfish men," 
for attacks upon himself and his friends, and for expelling 
him from the party "I helped to found." The Populist party 
could not hops for success, he declared, if left under the 
"present dictatorship." He predicted the disintegration of
— " Q O
the party unless the situation were changed.
Senator Pettigrew, of course, had watched the 
senatorial election in South Dakota closely, for upon it his 
next move depended. If a fusionist had been elected he 
intended to declare his complete conversion to Populism. As 
matters stood, however, his confidence in the new party was 
shaken and he decided to continue as a Silver Republican. 
Thinking of the election of 1900, Pettigrew wrote to his 
friends in South Dakota that it was now essential to push 
the organization of the Silver Republican party throughout 
the state. "We must organize ourselves," he declared, "and 
become so strong as to be able to control affairs in the
82,i.ee to Pettigrew, February 19, 1897, Lee Papers. 
®^ankton Press and Dakotan. February 20, 1897.
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future. At least we will be able to dictate to-the other
84political parties." To Governor Lee he wrote emphatically, 
"Now I see no other course but to thoroughly organize the 
Silver Republicans." But Pettigrew and Lee were unable to 
accelerate the momentum of the free silver bandwagon. Although 
his fight for railroad rate regulation made Lee personally 
popular, support for the fusionist forces in general disinte­
grated. Lee was re-elected in 1898, but he faced a 
legislature dominated overwhelmingly by orthodox Republicans.
As the months passed, most of his support among leading state 
politicians fell away.
Furthermore, people were now beginning to experience 
the return of prosperity.®^ The price of wheat, for example, 
showed a general incline during the last four years of the
decade, and farmers were left with little of the financial
87issue in their ears save an empty echo. Also the war with 
Spain broke out in 1898, and almost the entire population of 
the country was caught up in the emotional frenzy which 
accompanied it. Richard Pettigrew, for his part, turned
84Pettigrew to H.W. Sawyer, Miller, South Dakota,
March 2, 1897, Pettigrew Papers.
^^Pettigrev to Lee, March 2, 1897, in ibid.
®^Schell, South Dakota. 239-240.
87U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Statistics. 1936, p. 5.
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to the question of "Republican Imperialism," and spent much 
time in violent attacks upon the Republicans "who seek to
QOsubject unwilling peoples for material gain."°°




Senator Pettigrew’s fight against imperialism was 
his most flamboyant effort in the United States Senate. In 
his mind Pettigrew saw a clear connection between the forces 
of economic privilege in the United States and those who 
favored geographic expansion. To him they were linked in one 
great conspiracy to rob American farmers and working men of 
the fruits of their efforts and to subjugate helpless 
foreigners. He was convinced thpt the plutocrats of Wall 
Street sought overseas frontiers for exploitation, and that 
the vehicle through which they worked was the Republican 
party.^
Pettigrew’s first contact with the forces of imperialism 
was occasioned by the outbreak of the Hawaiian Revolution in 
1892. The revolt was the work of a group of American 
residents in the Islands who overthrew Queen Liliuokalani 
and established a provisional government. American sailors 
and marines aided in the coup with the tacit approval of
^R.F. Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 12-24.
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Minister John K. Stevens, who justified this action on grounds
that American citizens and property were endangered by the
2incompetency and corruption of the Royal Administration.
The motives of the revolutionaries themselves have been 
variously interpreted, but it appears that they were driven 
primarily by a desire for annexation to the United States. 
Those islanders who opposed the revolution claimed that it 
was the work of the sugar planters who wanted annexation in 
order to take advantage of the sugar bounty provided by the 
McKinley Tariff. Later research shows, however, that most 
of the planters actually opposed the revolution in the fear 
that they would be cut off from their cheap supply of Oriental
3
labor by the iiaiigration laws of the United States. Never­
theless, with the provisional government in power, a 
commission was appointed to negotiate with the Harrison 
Administration for the extension of American sovereignty to 
the Islands. '
The commission consisted of five members, of whom four 
were Americans and one English by birth. All were wealthy
5
and quite prominent in Hawaiian political affairs. They were
Stevens to President Harrison, January 18, 1893, 
Benjamin Harrison Papers, Vol. 155.
"W.A. Russ, "The Role of Sugar in the Hawaiian Revolu­
tion." Pacific Historical Review. XII (December. 1939), 339.
4
Donald Rowland, "The Establishment of the Republic of 
Hawaii," Pacific Historical Review. IV (September 1935), 201.
5
Stevens to Charles A. Foster, January 19, 1893, 
Benjamin Harrison Papers, Vol. 155. The members of the 
commission were: Lorrin A. Thurston, a former member of the
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led by the able Lorrin A. Thurston who had come to this 
country previously to stir up public opinion in favor of 
annexation. He was so successful in this mission that he 
anticipated little difficulty for the commission in 
accomplishing this task.^ None was encountered in fact and 
a treaty was signed on February 14, 1893. It was then given 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which reported 
it favorably to the upper house on February 15. Here 
opposition developed. The fight was led by a group of anti­
expansionist Democratic Senators assisted by the Republican 
Pettigrew.^ The objective of this group was to delay rati­
fication of the treaty until after the inauguration of Grover
Q
Cleveland, who opposed it.
The imperialist New York Tribune of Whitelaw Reid 
cited Senator Pettigrew as one of the leading members of 
the opposition. His major objections, said the paper, were 
that a heavy debt would have to be assumed, and that
Hawaiian Cabinet; William C. Wilder, President of the Inter- 
Island Steamship Company ; William H. Castle, an attorney; 
Charles P. Carter, son of a former United States Minister to 
Hawaii; and Joseph Marsden, a prominent business man. Marsden 
was the Englishman.
6S.K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii 
(Harrisburg, Pa.: Archives Publishing Co., 1945), 232-233.
•7
Ibid.. 235. They were: Gray, Brice, Blackburn,
White of Kentucky, White of Louisiana, Coffey, Pugh, Vilas, 
Daniel, Berry and Palmer.
Q
George H. Knowles, "Grover Cleveland on Imperialism," 
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review, XXXVI (September 1950), 
303.
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annexation would actually endanger the security of the nation 
by causing jealousy among other powers. To these he added his 
belief that the American Sugar Refining Trust was behind the 
drive for annexation.^ The Tribune demanded that the treaty 
be ratified before the inauguration of Cleveland. "Why is 
the ratification being delayed until after March 4?" asked 
the editor. “The people of the country are favorable and 
the advantages of annexation are understood by all." The 
paper sav great merit in a treaty which purportedly would 
secure the heavy capital investments of Americans in the 
Islands, bring the Hawaiiens "orderly, honest government," 
and strengthen the prestige of the United States abroad.
The Hawaiian Commission lost hope of immediate 
annexation in the months following the inauguration of 
Cleveland, and all except Thurston left the United States 
for home,"^ Meanwhile, the provisional government was faced 
with the problem of maintaining order while the policy of 
annexation was pursued. The Hawaiian leaders were convinced 
that it would be unwise to create a fully representative 
government immediately. Thus the constitution which they
^New York Tribune. February 27, 1893.
^^Ibid.. February 25, 1893.
L.A. Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution 
(Honolulu, 1936), 295-296.
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12promulgated provided certain property qualifications. The
legislature vas to be composed of two houses with fifteen
members in each. To be eligible for membership in the lower
house, the office seeker was to be required to show ownership
of property worth $1000, or show an annual income of at least
$600. Senators were required to show property holdings of
at least $3000, or an annual income of $1200. The franchise
carried even heavier restrictions. Those who desired to
vote for senators were required to show ownership of $1500
in real property, $3000 in personal property, or an annual
income of $600. In addition, there were literacy qualifi-
13cations which virtually denied the vote to most Asiatics.
These qualifications proved to Senator Pettigrew’s satisfaction 
that Hawaii *»ras controlled by the "monied interests." Thus, 
he reviled the constitution. "They established an oligarchy," 
he wrote. "No one but the planters and their fellow business­
men could vote."^^ To a certain extent these charges were 
true. Americans were in control of the business and economic 
activities of the Islands, and while some of the natives were 
allowed to take part in the activities of government, their
12Rowland, "The Establishment of the Republic of 
Hawaii," 213.
13 ̂ Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 272.
14Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 317-318.
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15influence was small.
Meanwhile, Cleveland was determined to investigate the 
part which had been played in the Hawaiian coup by Americans 
holding official diplomatic positions. The President was 
especially interested in the activities of Minister John H. 
Stevens, who, according to rumor, had cooperated actively 
with the revolutionaries. To arrive at an official decision, 
Cleveland appointed James H. Blount to investigate, and gave 
him "paramount” authority regarding all matters pertaining 
to the Hawaiian affair.Congressional opponents of the 
Administration later called the legality of the appointment 
into question, and in a resolution passed December 11, 1893,
they inquired whether the investigator had not been
1 Vcommissioned without senatorial consent. ' Soon after, in 
a resolution supported warmly by Pettigrew, the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate was directed to report on the
18constitutionality of the appointment. Nothing, however, had 
been done at the time of the appointment in early 1893 and
15
“ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Territories,
Report on House Bill 2972 to Provide Government for Hawaii.
56 Cong., 1 Sess., House Report No. 305, February 12, 1900, 
pp. 4-5.
^^Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 247.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Resolution of Senator George F. 
Hoar Inquiring Whether Mr. Blount had been Commissioned and 
Sent to Hawaii Without the Consent of the Senate. 53 Cong.,
1 Sess., Senate Document No. 13, December 11, 1893, pp. 1-3.
18U.S. Congress, Senate, Judiciary Committee,
Resolution Directing the Committee to Report as to the 
Constitutionality of the Appointment of J.H. Blount. 53 Cong.,
2 Sess., January 8, 1894, Senate Document No. 28, p. 1.
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Blount proceeded to the islands where he arrived on March 25.
His investigations lasted slightly more than four months, 
and his report, submitted shortly after his return in August, 
shoved that he was in favor of the restoration of the
I gmonarchy.* Cleveland agreed, but was embarrassed by the
fact that restoration would require military operations
against a government controlled by Americans. For this
reason he contented himself with delegating the entire matter
20to Congress; and there, for a time, it rested.
The next step in the controversy as far as Senator 
Pettigrew was concerned came when the Senate began consideration 
of H.R. 4864, which came to be known as the Wilson-Gorman
Revenue Bill. The measure, as presented to the Upper House,
provided for the continuation of Hawaiian reciprocity which 
Pettigrew heartily opposed. The reciprocity treaty had 
originated in 1875. It provided that all raw sugar grown in 
the Islands could enter the United States duty free in 
exchange for American port privileges at Pearl Harbor. Petti­
grew objected to reciprocity because he thought it was simply 
a device to lower the operating costs of the American Sugar 
T r u s t . H e  introduced an amendment to the revenue bill 
which was designed to nullify the treaty. It provided that
19Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 248.
"^̂ New York Tribune. December 19, 1893.
21Congressional Record. 53 Cong., 1 Sess, July 2, 1894, 
XXT̂ I, 7060.
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the reciprocity agreement of 1875, and the convention of
1884 vhich renewed it, should be repealed effective one year
22from the date of the passage of the revenue bill. This
amendment was defeated, whereupon the Senator offered
another of a similar nature which was also defeated. Thus,
when the bill was finally passed, Hawaiian reciprocity was
23continued. Pettigrew declared;
I did not think the treaty would be abrogated. I did 
not suppose the Senate would abrogate it because if they 
did they would have made an insidious exception; they 
would have struck a blow at one trust, which would have 
been unfair, for all others are thoroughly taken care of 
in this bill /l:he tariff_7 . Without fear of hesitation 
the Senate seemed determined to protect every trust 
vhich has been organized in the past and . . .  to vote 
the money of the people into the hands of the 
corporations.
Pettigrew’s attitude toward the Wilson-Gorman Tariff 
Bill represented the remarkable metamorphosis which his 
thinking had undergone in a relatively short time. Four 
years before, he took little part in the debates on the 
McKinley Tariff after his failure to force through the duty 
on tin. In fact, he did not even bother to vote on the
24measure. Now, however, in 1894, his objections were loud:
I believe in protection, but the present bill is 
excessive and will promote the formation of trusts 
and combinations. , . , The principles of protection
22Ibid.. 7069.
^^Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 275,
^^Congressional Record. 53 Cong,, 1 Sess,, May 29, 
1894, XXVI, 5441,
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are that a nation should do its own work, and that 
the building of new factories augments world 
production, increases competition and reduces prices.
But trusts . . . defeat these principles by preventing 
competition. The Wilson bill is a swindle in every 
respect.
The Senator’s sudden development of an almost psychotic 
hatred of business combinations is difficult to explain. 
Reference to the subject appears seldom in his correspondence. 
But the fact that his changing philosophy came quickly on 
the heels of great financial losses and his estrangement from 
the Republican party might explain his growing antipathy 
toward "eastern financiers" and their representatives in 
Congress. Furthermore, Pettigrew sincerely believed that the 
bill would be injurious to the interests of his home state, 
and this accounts for his rigid opposition to the bounty on
O Rsugar. Said the Senator:
If this bill passes, the market for the South Dakota 
farmer in his own country will be reduced. In 
addition duties have been placed on goods our people 
must buy. The 1.25 cent bounty on sugar amounts to 
an annual tax of 87.5 cents per capita because each 
person uses about seventy pounds per year.
In some ways the fact that Pettigrew believed in the 
"principle of protection" is difficult to understand. Yet 
many people believed as he did that the tariff, if wisely 
constituted and administered, was good for the economy. 
Nevertheless, from the time when he began to suspect that it 
was really a part of the great conspiracy to swindle the
^^Ibid.. 5446.
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prDÔaciag classes out of their just returns, Pettigrew’s 
fa^tical opposition to it was unceasing. And it must also 
be zamembered that Pettigrew viewed domestic exploitation and 
expansion as one and the same conspiracy, thinking that 
iiKÆrialism was merely a sham to increase the need for 
military spending, maintaining a large standing army and
na'/y, and increasing government purchases of armor plate from
- . .26 %ne s'ssi trust.
During 1895, annexationist sentiment continued in 
the Senate. On March 2, an amendment was proposed to the 
diplo3i£tic and consular appropriations bill providing that 
S50D,0(OQ be set aside for the construction of a communications 
cable between San Francisco and Honolulu. Senator Joseph C. 
Blackburn of Kentucky, Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Apprcpriations, asked that the amendment be defeated, 
petricrew agreed. He believed that the sugar trust was 
respc'saible for the proposal and that its purpose was to 
advance the cause of annexation. "The cable is entirely 
unnecessary," he declared.
The annexationists favored construction of the cable 
and tried to show that it would pay for itself. Pettigrew 
replied that the revenue from its use would probably not 
even be sufficient to pay for upkeep. "Their immediate aim 
is tc connect Claus Spreckles* plantations with his refineries
26Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 326, 347.
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27on the mainland," concluded the Senator, Ultimately, the 
project failed, as neither the House nor the Senate could 
muster enough votes to get it attached to the appropriations 
bill.
Also in 1895, an abortive revolt against the
government of the Republic of Hawaii again brought the subject
of American intervention to the attention of Congress,
Senator William V, Allen, a Populist from Nebraska, introduced
a resolution providing that steps be taken by the United States
28to annex the Islands, There was great opposition to this
measure and as matters developed the key vote was cast by
Pettigrew, He voted with the administration supporters and
thus helped to defeat intervention. For this reason he was
reprimanded by his own state legislature, which only a few
days before had re-elected him United States Senator on the
29Republican ticket. This event excited some comment from 
the leading newspapers in Pettigrew*s home town. His 
apologist, the Sioux Falls Press, which only a few days before 
had lauded his re-election, continued its praise saying it 
agreed wholeheartedly with Pettigrew’s objections to
27Congressional Record. 53 Cong,, 3 Sess,, March 2, 
1895, XXVII, 3077-3090,
28 . - U,S, Congress, Senate, Resolution of Senator
William Allen Favoring the Annexation of Hawaii, 53 Cong,,
3 Sess,, Senate Miscellaneous Document No, 71, January 24,
1895, p. 1.
29New York Tribune. January 27, 1895,
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30expansion. The Argus-Leader, on the other hand, noted with
soae interest that Pettigrew*s relationship with the state
legislature was not as congenial as it had been at the time
of his first election.
Throughout the succeeding months of thé election year
of 1896, interest in the Islands was rekindled. Speculation
mounted as to the status of Hawaii if William McKinley should
be elected President. Silver, however, was the primary issue
in the campaign and expansion was forced to occupy a back-
seat position. Nevertheless, shortly after his inauguration
in 1897, McKinley signed an annexation treaty with repre-
32sentatives of the Hawaiian government. Immediate ratifi­
cation, however, was again blocked by the Democrats and it
appeared that they would be successful until the sudden rise
33of "war fever" and the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, 
Pettigrew, who opposed the treaty, favored war 
against Spain, and the independence for Cuba. He went further, 
declaring that the administration should have recognized the 
belligerency of Cuba from the outset of the revolution. Had
on
Sioux Falls Press. January 27, 1895.
31Sioux Falls Argus Leader. January 28, 1895.
^^New York Tribune. June 27, 1897.
^^T.A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii During 
the Spanish American War," American Historical Review. XXXVI 
(April, 1931), 552-560.
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this been done, he claimed, Americans could have furnished
supplies to the rebels without being declared outlaws, the
■Cuban Question" would have been settled, and the "Maine"
would not have been destroyed. ", . .If Spain wants war we
will fight to the finish," he continued. "We will strip her
of every colony in the world," Pettigrew opposed, however,
any thought of annexing the Spanish colonies. He would fight
34that as bitterly as he had fought the annexation of Hawaii.
War was declared against Spain on April,25, 1898.
In the course of the conflict Pettigrew's prophecy became a 
reality. The colonies of Spain fell before the military 
power of the United States, Most important to the Hawaiian 
question, however, was the destruction of the Spanish fleet 
in Manila Bay on May 1. This exploit gave renewed hope to 
the proponents of annexation because with the possibility of 
new possessions in the Pacific, the United States would need 
adequate bases from which to operate. This view, coupled 
with the fear of Japanese encroachments in the Islands, 
resulted in the passage on July 6 of a joint resolution for 
the annexation of the Island Republic, The measure was 
introduced in March when war seemed imminent, but it was not 
until summer when victory was certain that it came to a 
successful vote, Pettigrew, of course, voted against the
34Pettigrew to Louis McLouth, New York, March 18,
1898, Pettigrew Papers-,
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35resolution. McKinley signed it on July 7, 1898.
In the interim Pettigrew did everything in his power 
to prevent annexation. He was still convinced that the sugar 
trust was attempting to turn the situation to its own profit.
He argued that the addition of tropical peoples to the nation 
was foolhardy and unworkable under the Constitution. Such 
people did not understand the American system and would 
constitute a danger to its existence.
More significantly, the Senator feared further 
extension of the power of the federal government. The wealth 
and political power of the nation, he repeated, were now in 
the hands of plutocrats who also manipulated affairs in 
Washington. They wanted to acquire colonies and enlarge 
the army and navy, but even more insidious was their desire 
to divert the attention of the masses from internal grievances. 
The attention of the people, Pettigrew argued, should not be 
diverted from the great economic, political and social issues 
of the time by launching them upon a career of conquest. The 
energies of the people should instead be directed toward the 
solution of the problems created by the concentration of 
power in the hands of trusts and corporations. "Manifest 
Destiny is the murderer of men," said Pettigrew. "It has 
committed more crimes and done more to oppress and wrong the
^^New York Tribune. July 7, 1898. In the Senate the 
vote was 42-21.
36U.S. Congress, Senate, Lecture by Fred T. DuBois 
Against the Annexation of Hawaii. 55 Cong., 2 Sess., Senate 
Document No. 82, January 24, 1898, p. 1.
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inhabitants of the world than any other attribute to which
man has fallen heir."^^
Pettigrew offered two amendments to the joint
resolution. The first was introduced on June 25 but not
considered until July 6, the same day the annexation resolution
was passed. It provided for the abolition of contract labor
in the Islands and was designed to defeat the "evil purposes"
of the sugar trust. This amendment was defeated by the vote
of 41t22. The Senator immediately proposed another providing
for unlimited manhood suffrage. This one was also defeated
38by a vote of 48-16. Later however, Pettigrew’s ideas were
accepted as both Asiatic immigration and restricted suffrage 
39were abolished.
Before the vote on the resolution Pettigrew-made one 
final plea to the proponents of annexation. He declared 
that the sugar beet industry would be destroyed where it 
already existed and stifled in other areas, like South 
Dakota, where hopes were entertained for its development.
"Those who vote for annexation will be voting against the 
sugar beet industry," he continued. "I favor the growth of
37Congressional Record. 55 Cong., 2 Sess., June 22, 
1898, XXXI, 6229-6632.
38Ibid., 55 Cong., 2 Sess., June 26, 1898, XXXI,
6341; July 6, 1898, 6709-6711.
39U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, 
Report on the Extension of Immigration Laws to Hawaii.
55 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Report No. 1654, February 13, 1899,
p. 1.
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that industry. I want it to flourish in my state and other
40states. This cannot be if Hawaii is annexed."
Unfortunately, the administration had anticipated his 
final pleas. On January 17, the Secretary of Agriculture 
declared that Hawaiian sugar would not offer serious 
competition to domestic producers. His report showed that 
since 1893 Hawaiian sugar had equaled about 9 per cent of 
the total imported while domestic consumption of beet sugar 
had increased from 18 per cent to 37 per cent during the 
same p e r i o d . T h u s  Pettigrew's argument was repudiated, 
and he was finally forced to acknowledge that his position 
was hopeless. "When the Spanish War fever swept the country
I knew the fight on the Hawaiian Treaty was lost," he later
* 42wrote.
Meanwhile the war with Spain led to its swift and 
inevitable conclusion. An armistice was declared on 
August 13, and McKinley immediately appointed a commission to 
negotiate with the enemy. The members of the commission were; 
William R. Day, Secretary of State; Whitelaw Reid, publisher 
of the New York Tribune ; and Senators Cushman K. Davis of
"̂ Ĉongressional Record. 55 Cong., 2 Sess., July 2, 
1898, XXXI, 6607-6625.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Opinion of the Secretary of 
Agriculture on the Effect Which tne Importation ot Hawaiian 
Sugar Would Have on the Sugar Beet Industry in the United 
States. 55 Cong., 2 Sess., Senate Document No. 63,
February 17, 1898,pp. 1-4.
^^ettigrew, Imperial Washington. 344.
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Minnesota, William Frye of Maine and George Gray of Delaware.
They were instructed to demand that Spain relinquish Cuba,
cede Puerto Rico, certain other West Indian Islands and Guam
to the United States, and immediately evacuate all of these
areas. In addition Spain was to cede the island of Luzon
in the Philippine group to the United States. The door was
left open, however, for the commissioners "to take as much
as they could get." Reid, Davis, and Frye were in favor of
annexing the entire group, Day favored annexing Luzon alone,
while Gray opposed all expansion into the Far Pacific. Both
Day and Gray were shortly convinced of the efficacy of
expansion, however, and the commission presented its
unanimous demands to the Spanish representatives. These
demands included annexation of the entire Philippine
Archipelago in return for which a payment of $20,000,000
would be made. Spain accepted most of the important demands
made by the United States and the treaty was signed
December 10, 1898. Secretary Day was immensely proud of the
accomplishments of the commission. He wrote to the President 
43hat:
We have an excellent treaty although we did not get 
an island in the Carolines or a renewal of the stipu­
lation protecting American missionaries there. We 
do obtain the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam 
and Cuba in trust— a goodly estate indeed! It will 
bring responsibilities and burdens but the United 
States is equal to the task.
4?Day to McKinley, December 12, 1898, William McKinley 
Papers, Vol. 22, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
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While the commissioners were in session. Senator
Pettigrew became the object of a great deal of criticism from
his colleague James H. Kyle. Kyle, who was already drifting
back toward Republicanism, claimed in an interview to be
"deeply grieved" by the "unpatriotic stand" Pettigrew had
taken concerning the war. In his opposition to expansion,
Kyle declared, Pettigrew had branded McKinley as a coward,
and by his accusations against the administration, materially
aided the Spanish in delaying negotiations. The Spaniards,
he went on, hoped that McKinley's policies would not be
sustained in the election. The timing of this publication,
of course, was designed to hurt Pettigrew and his Populist
44allies in the off-year elections of 1898.
When their business was concluded, the commissioners 
returned home and presented the treaty to the President. He
45signed it and it was laid before the Senate in January 1899.
At this point opposition developed. The Senate became divided 
over the efficacy of American overseas expansion, the question 
turning primarily on the status of the Philippines.
Those who opposed the treaty pointed out that 
annexation was contrary to the Constitution and the Declaration
44Sioux Falls Argus Leader. November 4, 1898.
45U.S. Congress, Senate, Papers Relating to the 
Treaty with Spain. 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Document 
No. 148, February 5, 1901, p. 1.
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of Independence, that Asiatics would flood the country and
debase American standards, and that no great advantage would
46accrue from active intervention in the Far East. Senator
George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, who had favored the
annexation of Hawaii, was most vociferous in his denunciation
of the treaty. Hoar took as the basis of his argument the
position that the subjugation of an unwilling people was
unconstitutional. He spoke at length on this point and his
47position was wholeheartedly endorsed by Pettigrew.
The proponents of the treaty, led by Senators Lodge
and Platt, pointed out that the Constitution sets no limit on
American expansion, that great commercial opportunities
awaited the nation in Asia, and that "honor, duty, and
48conscience," demanded that annexation be carried out.
While the fight raged in the Senate, the popular 
journals of the day took up the question. Journalistic 
opponents of expansion became concerned with the legality of 
the cession. Did Spain have good title to the islands during: 
the period of negotiations, or was the government of the
Julius W, Pratt. Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore; 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 345-350. Leading Senatorial 
opponents were: Pettigrew, Hoar, Hale, Tillman, Gorman and
McLaurin; yet Hoar, Gorman, Hale and McLaurin had favored 
the annexation of Hawaii.




49■Philippine Republic" in control? The writers argued that 
the imposition of American dominion over a people who with­
held their consent was unconstitutional,^^ and that to stretch
the Constitution would be to set a dangerous precedent for 
51the future. Others claimed that imperialism was actually
the antithesis of true expansion and that while expansion
was the story of the historical development of the United
States, imperialism amounted to nothing more than a means
of economic exploitation and was a dangerous departure from
"the Republican principles of the c o u n t r y . F o l l o w i n g  this
line of reasoning it was claimed that there was no need to
go beyond the borders of the continent for additional land.
Americans were advised to concentrate on the development of
53the contiguous territory of the nation. Furthermore, it 
was shown that territorial expansion would necessitate 
strengthening the armed forces at the expense of other and
49Perry Belmont, "Congress, the President and the 
Philippines," North American Review. LXIX (December, 1899),
900.
^^Samuel C. Parks, "Imperialism," The Arena. XXV 
(January, 1901), 579.
^^William C. McDonald, "imperialism v. the Constitution," 
The Nation. LXVIII (January 12, 1899), 25-26.
^%.V. Long, "The Menace of Imperialism," The Arena.
XXIII (March, 1900), 321-326.
53J.M. Scanlon, "Expansion - Past and Prospective,"
The Arena. XXIII (April, 1900), 337-352.
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more vital domestic expenditures,^^ Finally, this country
vas compared with the Roman Empire in an effort to show that
55expansion would destroy America as it had destroyed Rome.
Senator Pettigrew was a voracious reader and he quite
obviously incorporated many of these arguments into his own
speeches. He considered The.Arena the ablest magazine of the
day exclaiming
Every issue gives me renewed hope and inspiration to 
continue the battle we are waging in the interest of 
free government in this country. The greatest problem 
in America today is, shall this be a government by and 
for the people, or shall it continue as it has already 
become, a plutocracy of artificial persons?
The proponents of administration policy both in and
out of Congress were quick to counter these attacks, Whitelaw
Reid pointed out that Article IV, Section 3, of the
Constitution gave Congress the power to "make all rules, , , ,
needed respecting the territories and other property
belonging to the nation," This clause, he asserted, gave the
highest legal sanction to expansion,Senator William A,
Peffer of Kansas argued that a government need not consult
^^Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism v. Imperialism,"
North American Review. CLXIX (January, 1899), 1-13,
55H, Bonis, "A Contrast and a Parallel," The Arena. 
XXIII (March, 1900), 321-326,
^^Pettigrew to J,C, Rippath, Boston, March 11, 1898, 
Pettigrew Papers,
57Quoted in Bradley Martin, "American Imperialism," 
Nineteenth Century. XLIII (September, 1900), 393-406,
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the will of the majority of those governed in matters of 
policy; that our system was admittedly unrepresentative of 
large segments of the population and that . imperialism
is actually a natural growth of our historical development. 
McKinley is doing just what Jackson and others did . . 
he wrote, "To call American imperialism exploitation is only 
to creat a mirage in the heated air of politics.
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, leader of the 
administration forces, scoffed at the charge that American 
policy was depriving liberty to the people of the Philippines. 
Said he:^9
Their insurrection against Spain, confined to one 
island, had been utterly abortive and could never have 
revived or been successful while Spain controlled the 
sea. We have given them all the liberty they ever had.
We could not have robbed them of it for they had none 
to lose.
Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana went further, claiming that 
the Philippines were ours forever by right of conquest. 
Furthermore, he said, the United States was under compulsion 
to institute a government in the Islands since the Filipinos 
were utterly incapable of governing themselves.
^^William A. Peffer, "Imperialism; America's 
Historic Policy," North American Review. CLXXI (August, 1900), 
246-258.
59Henry Cabot Lodge, "Philippine Retention and Rule," 
Men and Issues of 1900 (James P. Boyd, ed., 1900), 190-209.
^^Albert J. Beveridge, "Policy Regarding the 
Philippines," Men and Issues of 1900. pp. 256-276.
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Despite the capable arguments of men such as these, 
the ratification of the treaty remained in doubt until, to 
the surprise and disgust of Pettigrew, William Jennings Bryan 
appeared in Washington to advocate that it be accepted. 
Bryan’s move was calculated to end the controversy and work 
to the advantage of the Democrats. By accepting the treaty, 
this country would end all its difficulties with Spain and 
would make the most of the opportunity to free the Filipinos. 
Furthermore, imperialism could be made an.issue in the 
campaign of 1900.^^
Senator Pettigrew was incensed when Bryan broached 
this proposal to him. If Bryan were willing to abandon his 
principles so lightly for mere political advantage, Pettigrew 
declared: " . . .  his stand reflected on his character and 
reputation as a man, and indicated a lack of knowledge of 
human affairs which must make his friends feel that he was 
not a suitable person to be President of the United States. 
The treaty was ratified 57 - 27 on February 6, 1899, two 
days after the outbreak of the Philippine Insurrection. 
Fifteep Democrats, Populists and Independents voted with the 
Republican majority. Naturally, Senator Pettigrew was not
^^New York Tribune. January 19, 1899; Pettigrew, 
Imperial Washington. 270.
^^Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 270-271. Pettigrew 




among them. As for an explanation for the changed votes 
on the last ballot; if Bryan was not effective, patronage 
certainly was. On the day after the ratification of the 
treaty Mark Hanna wrote to McKinley; "In securing the votes 
of McEnerney and McLaurin yesterday, I made myself your 
representative so if either of them should call at the White 
House today don’t fail to express your appreciation of their 
acts."̂ ^
Meanwhile, the administration had not been idle. At
the suggestion of Commodore Dewey, the President decided to
send a fact finding commission to the Philippines to study
social and political conditions and to recommend the form of
government most suitable to the existing situation. The
commission was also to study the legislative needs of the
inhabitants and recommend those measures which would best
65implement the maintenance of order and public welfare.
^^New York Tribune. February 7, 1899: Hale (R,, Me.),
and Hoar (R.. Mass.) voted against the treaty. Allen 
(Pop., Nebr.j, Butler (Pop., N.C.), Clay (Dem., Ga.],
Faulkner (Dem.. W.Va.), Gray (Dem.. Dela.), Harris (Pop., 
Kan.), Penney (Dem., Dela.), Kyle (ind., S.D.), Linsay (Dem., 
Ky.), McEnerney (Dem., La.), McLaurin (Dem., S.C.), Morgan 
(Dem., Ala.), Pettus (Dem., Ala.), Sullivan (Dem., Miss.), 
and Teller (s.R., Colo.), voted aye.
64Hanna to McKinley, February 7, 1899, McKinley 
Papers, Vol. 25.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Communications from the • 
Executive Department to Aquinaldo and Papers Dealing with 
Other Matters. 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Document No. 208, 
March 5, 1900, pp. 002-04.
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Mc3Cialsy called upon Jacob Gould Schurman, President of 
Corse11 University, to head the commission. Schurman accepted 
vitis some reservations which were accentuated by the fact 
list his arrival in the Philippines coincided approximately 
with the outbreak of the Aguinaldo insurrection,^^ 
Nevertheless, the investigation proceeded and after several 
mosths Schurman was able to report that in his opinion most 
responsible Filipinos were opposed to immediate independence. 
The insurrection, he continued, was being fanned by innate 
disrrust on the part of the natives for white men, by the 
"personal and selfish ambition of the Tagalog leaders," and 
by misrepresentation of American p u r p o s e s . I n  addition 
Schurman made more specific suggestions concerning the
legislative needs of the Filipinos which were later followed
68very closely by William Howard Taft.
At the same time, Senator Pettigrew had been trying 
to discredit the administration by his incessant attacks 
on its Philippine policy, on the specific activities of the 
military occupation, and on the Schurman Commission. The 
Senator charged that the American naval forces under Dewey
^^G.A. Grunder and W.E. Livezey, The Philippines 
and the United States (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press,
1^1), 54.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Final Report of the 
S%ilisoine Commission. 1899-1900, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate 
Do-csanant No. 138, January 31, 1900, pp. 82-84.
^%enry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William 
Howard Taft (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, 1939), I, 177.
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had been aided by the forces of the navy of the "Republic
of the Philippines." He further charged that Dewey had
recognized the flag of the "Republic" making that government
an ally of the United States. Later, Pettigrew charged that
General William Otis, commander of American ground forces in
the Philippines, had used the army of the "Republic" to help
reduce Manila and then had refused to allow it to occupy a
portion of the city. In addition the Senator claimed that
Otis had sought to deceive the Filipinos into thinking they
were to be granted independence,^^
Whether or not there had been intentional deception,
it is true that apathy and delay marred American relations
with the Filipinos. Months of needless uncertainty passed
from Dewey's victory until McKinley's final decision as to
our relationship with the insurgents.^0 In January, 1899,
71the President wrote to General Otis;
I desire that conflict be avoided. The insurgents will 
come to see that our purposes are benevolent. Tact 
and kindness are essential. I am sure you can be 
trusted to accomplish the purposes of this government 
without discord. We accepted the Philippine Islands 
with high duty to their people.
^^R.F. Pettigrew, The Course of Empire (Chicago: 
Boniwright, 1920), 255-256.
70Grunder and Livezey, The United States and the 
Philippines. 23.
^McKinley to Otis, January 8, . 1899, McKinley Papers,
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But even more time elapsed before McKinley announced
72
officially the American intention to annex the Philippines,
and Pettigrew charged that Otis deliberately altered the
wording of interim messages sent him by the President so as
73to deceive the Filipinos.
Furthermore, there was some question as to which side
had fired the shots which began the insurrection. Pettigrew
charged that American troops were responsible and demanded
an investigation. He submitted a resolution on this question
which was tabled. Senator Hoar then introduced a resolution
asking the President to submit all communications concerning
the insurrection to the Senate for examination. This
74resolution passed.
McKinley complied with the Hoar Resolution on March 5, 
1900. The documents showed that the charges made by 
Pettigrew were based,on fact, but that there was no basis 
for an accusation of malfeasance. It was true that American 
military and naval forces had received cooperation from the 
Filipinos, but the American commanders never granted tacit 
recognition to the government of the erstwhile "Republic 
of the Philippines." General Otis specifically informed
72Grunder and Livezey, The United States and the 
Philippines. 207-208.
73Pettigrew, The Course of Empire. 296.
74Congressional Record. January 16, 1900, XXXIII,
56 Cong., 1 Sess., 853.
241
Aguinaldo that he had no power to recognize the government of 
the "Republic" in the absence of orders from Washington.
During the entire course of the insurrection, moreover,
Otis refused to treat as official any diplomatic repre­
sentatives of the "Republic" and informed Aguinaldo that he 
could only negotiate with the Filipino commissioners as 
personal representatives. Further, the General admitted his 
alteration of the Presidential Proclamations, but explained 
that this was done to avoid confusion. "The Filipino leaders," 
he said, "have little idea of the meaning of constitutional 
government and their people have none. They cry for 
independence and protection not knowing the meaning of the 
terms," Commodore Dewey, for his part, denied categorically 
that he had recognized the Philippine flag, and declared
that had he been left to his own devices, he would have
75given Aguinaldo no naval protection at all.
Senator Pettigrew next tried to get a pamphlet 
purportedly written by Aguinaldo printed in the Congressional 
Record. This document attempted to explain the position of 
the insurgents and to justify their actions. It contained 
a declaration that the Filipinos had not started the war 
and had repeatedly asked for a truce which was refused,
Henry Cabot Lodge successfully objected to the printing of
75U.S. Congress, Senate, Communications from the 
Executive Department to Aguinaldo and Papers Dealing with 
Other Matters. 56 Cong,, 1 Sess,, Senate Document No, 208, 
March 5, 1900, pp. 28-50,
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the document on the basis of a letter he had received from 
Devey referring to the pamphlet as a "tissue of falsehoods."
Pettigrew next assailed the Schurman Commission for 
attempting to bribe the insurgents to surrender. According 
to Pettigrew, the attempted bribe was made by Schurman 
himself who offered a bounty to all Filipinos who would lay 
down their arms. Said Schurman: " . . .  had such a /■
preposterous statement been made anywhere else, I would h^e 
ignored it, but as it was made on the floor of the United 
States Senate I desire to say that it is absolutely false.
There is no evidence available to the contrary.
Meanwhile, the task of providing operative civil 
government for the new island possessions proceeded. Two 
matters of vital importance were involved here. First was 
the question of the status of trade between the United States 
end the Islands and second was the problem"of providing 
adequate revenues for local government. The Senate Committee 
on Puerto Rico and the Pacific islands first considered 
these matters in December 1899. Pettigrew, who was a member 
of this committee, opposed free trade and the "medieval economic 
system" which he thought existed on the Islands, especially 
Puerto Rico.^^
Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 261-263. Pettigrew 
cuotes Schurman to demonstrate that the Commissioner was
"a liar."
77Everett Walters, Joseph Benson Foraker: An 
i^napromisinq Republican (Columbus: The Ohio University
Press, 1951), 311. '
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In the hearings before the committee, representatives 
of Puerto Rican agricultural interests appeared to plead for - 
free trade. Shortly after, the representatives of competing 
interests on the mainland appeared to demand protection. 
Herbert Myrick, President of the League of Domestic Producers 
declared that his organization opposed any attempt by congress 
to pass legislation beneficial to growers in the tropics 
who might compete with domestic growers or agricultural 
laborers on the mainland. Henry T. Oxnard and H.J. Frye, 
representing the sugar beet growers of California and the 
New England Tobacco Growers’ Association respectively 
concurred. When this testimony had been heard, the committee 
again questioned the representatives from Puerto Rico. 
Pettigrew asked Lucas Amadeo of the Agricultural Society of 
Puerto Rico whether American Army officers had promised the 
Puerto Ricans free trade at the time of the conquest. Amadeo 
replied that they had been promised only "moral and material 
progress," " . . .  but it was understood," he continued,
"that the island would have that /free trad^ from the 
moment the Constitution of the United States covered the 
island."78
During the course of the hearings. Chairman Joseph B. 
Foraker of Ohio prepared a bill which came to be known as the
78U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Pacific 
Islands and Puerto Rico, Hearings on Senate Bill 2264 to 
Provide Government for the Island of Puerto Rico. 56 Cong.,
1 Sess., Senate Document No. 147, February 5, 1900, pp. 129- 
134, 142-143, 161.
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Organic Bill for Puerto Rico. It provided for the 
establishment of civil government, for the reduction of duty 
rates 85 per cent on all goods entering the United States, and
79for the inauguration of free trade on or before March 1, 1902.
The testimony he heard before the committee, plus his 
cvn position as an uncompromising opponent of the 
administration, compelled Senator Pettigrew to oppose the 
Foraker Bill. The measure, he said, was a "sop* thrown to 
-he public for the support of the Republican party due to 
demands that the party carry out its pledges. "We pledged free 
trade to the Puerto Ricans," he charged, "and now we try to 
break that pledge due to the clamor of the cigar makers
and the tobacco growers. The present bill is to allay that
, «80 excitement."
After surmounting great difficulties, the Foraker
81Fill passed on April 3, 1900. Almost immediately its
constitutionality was challenged in the case of Downes v.
Sidvell. and it was referred to the highest court in the land.
82On May 27, 1901, the Court declared:
^^Walters, Joseph B. Foraker. 161-170.
^^Congressional Record. 56 Cong., 1 Sess., March 15, 
1900, XXXIII, 2927.
^^Walters, Joseph B. Foraker. 169; Congressional 
Record. 56 Cong., 1 Sess., April 3, 1900, XXXIII, 3667-3698. 
Senator Pettigrew did not vote.
^^Downes v. Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244.
245
. . . the Constitution "is applicable to the 
territories acquired by purchase or conquest only 
when and so far as Congress shall direct. . . .  We 
are therefore of the opinion that the Island of 
Puerto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging 
to the United States, but not a part of the United 
States within the revenue clause of the Constitution; 
that the Foraker Act is Constitutional, so far as it 
imposes duties upon imports from such island.
Eut by that time annexation was an accomplished fact, and its
opponents had been repudiated.
During his battle against the expansionists,
Pettigrew was given a great deal of moral support by the
Washington City Anti-Imperialist League. This small group
was founded during the war by William Augustus Croffut, a
Washington journalist, and its meetings were held in his
home. Pettigrew and Croffut became close friends during this
period and the Senator occasionally wrote to Croffut
expressing his sentiments toward the Republicans, The most
vituperative of these pronouncements offers a very good
summary of Pettigrew’s feelings toward the administration,
expansion, and all those who supported them; "These fawning
sycophants without brains who act as McKinley’s advisers are
disgusting in the extreme. They want to carry out the idea
that their President is a sort of emperor and that loyalty
to him is the only way of expressing loyalty to flag and 
83country." The League also acted as a clearing house for 
83Pettigrew to Croffut, October 28, 1899, William 
Augustus Croffut Papers, Box 2, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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the distribution of Pettigrew*s speeches to various sympathetic
84groups around the country. The object of this was to keep 
the issue of imperialism alive throughout the coming 
presidential campaign of 1900. Although they worked diligently, 
little was accomplished, for by the time the Foraker Bill 
was passed the cause of anti-imperialism, like free-silver, 
was dead. The protagonists of these great causes, however, 
did not yet realize their loss. Therefore, they continued 
to level savage attacks at the "barbarian imperialists" of 
the Republican party in a vain effort to sway the emotions of 
the fickle American people. But there was no hope. All the 
old shibboleths of reform had lost their magic before the 
onslaught of prosperity. Anti-imperialism, free-silver, the 
Populist party; once rallying posts for the champions of 
the down-trodden agrarian masses, were now the tarnished, 
laughable icons of wild-eyed radicals and stubborn politicians, 
like Richard Pettigrew and William Jennings Bryan. Still they 
could not admit defeat. They would battle for the right as 
long as breath availed. But the battle tide turned 
implacibly against them and nothing they might do could hold 
it back.®^
To go against the tenets of the all-victorious 
Republicans in 1900 was to commit political suicide, and there
B4pettigrew to Croffut, October 13, 1900, in ibid.
85T.A. Bailey, "The Election of 1900--Mandate for 
Imperialism?" Mississippi Valiev Historical- Review. XXXIV 
(March, 1937), 43-52.
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vas plenty of coroborating evidence for the observant man to 
see and heed. But Senator Pettigrew was blind to such 
evidence. He was guided only by his belief in the panacea of 
free silver and his hatred of exploitive policies of the 
party in power. It must be defeated. He felt that the very 
survival of America depended upon it. For him there could 
be no turning back.
CHAPTER IX 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END: AND THE END
The candidacy of William Jennings Bryan in 1896 on 
both the Populist and Democratic tickets caused a severe 
split in the ranks of Populism, and heralded its end. Those 
*«fho opposed the fusion of the two parties, calling themselves 
"midroad Populists,” demanded immediately after the election 
that the combination be terminated. The mid-roaders, acting 
through a committee which met at Girard, Kansas in April,
1897, issued an address to all Populists which contained a 
call for a national party conference to assemble at Nashville, 
Tennessee on the Fourth of July.
Most of those who attended the Nashville Conference 
were from the southern states and it became clear at once 
that they were predominantly opposed to fusion. Moreover, 
they also appeared to have lost their enthusiasm for free 
silver and it was suggested that the silver plank be removed 
from the party platform. No action was taken on this 
suggestion, however, as the most important consideration 
remained that of fusion. A committee was formed consisting 
of three delegates from each state represented at the 
conference. The task of this body was to prevent fusion in
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all subsequent elections and it amounted, in fact, to the 
creation of a separate mid-road Populist organization.
By 1898 the orthodox Populists were forced to 
recognize the threat posed by the mid-road group which styled 
itself the National Organization Committee, Marion Butler, 
chairman of the regular Populist National Committee, called 
his group together in Omaha on June 15, 1898, to consider what 
should be done. It was a very stormy meeting because the 
National Committee contained within its own membership many 
who were sympathetic to the position of the mid-road element. 
After a good deal of wrangling a sub-committee consisting of 
three fusionists and three mid-roaders was appointed to agree 
upon a compromise. The deliberations of this body resulted 
in the so-called "Omaha Contract" which provided that the 
National Chairman should decline to give aid in any future 
election where fusion should occur.
Unfortunately, the "Omaha Contract" did not completely 
satisfy the National Organization Committee, The call went 
out from this group for a convention to be held in September 
to restate the Populist creed and name candidates for the 
election of 1900. The convention gathered in Cincinnati on 
September 4, 1898. Even though the delegates were few in 
number and represented the extreme left wing of Populism, 
they could not agree among themselves on the question of 
Presidential nominations. About half of them named Wharton 
Barker of Philadelphia for President and Ignatius Donnelly
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of Minnesota for Vice President. The rest of the delegates 
deserted the convention hall and condemned the nominations 
on grounds that it was much too early to name candidates.^
Senator Pettigrew followed these events with great 
interest. He sympathized with the fusionist element of the 
party and he had written to Barker early in the year pleading 
for unity. Pettigrew declared that under existing political 
conditions fusion was the only practical course to be 
followed by the Populists. Pettigrew, who still claimed to 
be a Silver Republican, wrote Barker that he believed whole­
heartedly in the principles of Populism, but would advocate 
fusion in all subsequent elections as a political necessity. 
This position, added to his close cooperation with Populists 
in South Dakota, made Pettigrew for all practical purposes 
one of their number.
The mid-term elections of 1898 were a crucial test 
for Populism and the failure of the party to meet this test 
was catastrophic. In the South, where the race issue added 
to their difficulties, the Populists were overwhelmingly 
defeated by the Democrats. In the West, however, the 
Populists struggled valiantly to maintain fusion with the
^John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis:
The University of Minnesota Press, 1931), 380-386.
2Pettigrew to Wharton Barker, Philadelphia,
January 21, 1898, Pettigrew Papers.
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Democrats, knowing it was their only chance to remain in 
3oixice.
The situation in South. Dakota was in many ways typical 
of the problems faced by western Populists. In that state 
the position of the fusionists had been severely weakened 
by the defection of Senator Kyle to the Republicans and it 
was felt that only by a determined effort could control of 
the state be maintained. The Populist Central Committee met 
in Huron on March 17, 1898, to set a date for the state 
convention. With Pettigrew and Governor Lee in control of 
the proceedings, a resolution was introduced favoring the 
continuance of fusion with the Democrats. Despite an emotional 
speech of opposition by Henry L. Loucks who represented the 
mid-roaders of the state, the resolution was passed over-
4vhelmingly.
The Democrats and Silver Republicans met in Mitchell 
s(xae weeks later and voted to stand by the resolution of 
the Populist Committee. Each group asserted its belief that 
it was most important to the welfare of the state that they 
remain united throughout the campaign. Later, when the 
Fusionist State Convention assembled, it appeared that
3
Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 393-395.
4Lee to Arthur Linn, March 18, 1898, Lee Papers.
^Lee to Linn, Aprilyl8, 1898, in ibid.
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complete unity had been attained. Governor Lee reported 
to Pettigrew that the mid-roaders were given every opportunity 
to express themselves, but made no concerted attempt to 
disrupt the proceedings. Lee predicted that the success 
of fusion in South Dakota meant victory in the election. But 
he could not have been more greatly mistaken, for Lee 
himself was the only fusionist candidate elected to a major 
office. He won his second term as governor by the paper- 
thin margin of twenty-five votes over his Republican opponent, 
Kirk Phillips.^
Senator Pettigrew offered several explanations for the 
defeat. First, he accused the railroads of lavish spending 
in support of Republican candidates. He also accused them 
of importing voters. No doubt the first accusation is true. 
The companies were in the midst of a vigorous fight against 
the Lee Administration due to the Governor's advocacy of 
rate controls. They would have gladly spent a great deal of 
money to insure his defeat. However, Pettigrew's second 
assertion was probably an exaggeration. Although some 
ineligible voters no doubt participated in the election, their 
numbers could not have been significant. Moreover, the 
Republicans themselves threatened to contest the gubernatorial
^South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 331, 649.
7Pettigrew to August Peterson, November 26, 1898,
Pettigrew Papers.
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vote on the very same grounds, but their threats were never 
carried out, A canvassing board disclaimed accusations of
fraud on both sides and issued Lee his certificate of
1 . . 3election.
To Senator Pettigrew, the most important single cause 
of the defeat was the failure of the -Populists and Democrats 
to achieve complete fusion at the county level, Pettigrew 
reported to Senator Fred J, Cannon of Utah that in some 
counties Democrats"combined with Republicans rather than
Q
Populists. In at least eight counties, declared the Senator, 
there was no fusion at all, again resulting in the defeat of 
Populist candidates, Pettigrew was greatly discouraged by 
the outcome of the election: "We have no chance to win in
1900 unless we have complete fusion," he wrote. "If we don't 
get it I shall not campaign hard for the Senate because I 
won't win, but will fight hard for the issues.
The "issues," Pettigrew thought, had been an important 
factor in the election. He felt that South Dakota Populists 
had erred in not making their stand on national issues such 
as government ownership of railroads and free silver. He
^Hendrickson, "The Populist Movement in South Dakota,"
62,
9Pettigrew to Cannon, Ogden, Utah, November 26, 1898, 
Pettigrew Papers,
10Pettigrew to A.J, Troth, Bijou Hills, South Dakota,
January 27, 1899, in ibid.
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vas convinced that if free silver alone had received more 
attention, the outcome might have been different,
Senator Pettigrew’s analysis of the situation was only 
partially correct. Certainly the failure of complete 
cooperation between Populists and Democrats had injured 
fusionist hopes in certain areas of the state, but it is 
questionable whether greater emphasis on free silver 
would have altered the results of the campaign in any 
aeasureable degree. Unfortunately for the Populists, 1898 was 
a year which saw the people of South Dakota and the nation 
turn their attention away from domestic troubles to concentrate, 
at least momentarily on the war with Spain, This worked to 
the advantage of the Republicans at the very time when the 
Populist party was desperately in need of a victory to 
salvage its sagging prestige. Then.too, farm prices climbed 
ever higher making it easier for agriculturalists to forget 
the emotional demands for equity which they had made in the 
recent past.
During the year 1899 Pettigrew devoted most of his 
time to the preparation of scathing attacks upon the 
McKinley Administration and its foreign policy. By the 
opening of the new year 1900 the Senator was completely 
disgusted with the manner in which the representatives of 
both major parties had handled the issue of imperialism. But
llpettigraw to C,T, Jeffers, Ft, Leavenworth, Kansas, 
November 30, 1898, in ibid, ,
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even more important, he was fearful of his own defeat at the
hands of the South Dakota Legislature in the following year.
For these reasons he began to take even more active interest
in the non-partisan New England Anti-Imperialist League,
This organization, founded late in 1898, boasted such members
as Grover Cleveland, John Sherman, Carl Scurz, Samuel
12Gompers, Andrew Carnegie and Charles Francis Adams. Their
association with the group seems to have been of a nominal
13nature, however, as it was primarily a literary movement.
Pettigrew was attracted by rumors that a third party 
might spring from the League to oppose both the Democrats and 
the Republicans in the campaign of 1900. Whether these rumors 
were true is difficult to say, but Senator Pettigrew 
accepted them at face value. He attended a conference of 
the League held on January 6, 1900. At this conference, 
claimed Pettigrew, the decision was made to found a third 
party. Unfortunately, there is no way to substantiate this 
claim because Pettigrew is the only man known to have left a 
written account of the m e e t i n g . H e  declared that Andrew 
Carnegie pledged $25,000 to its support. The others in
12Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion. 253-255.
13F.H. Harrington, "The Literary Aspects of the New 
England Anti-Imperialist League," New England Quarterly. X 
(June, 1937), 650-657.
14F.H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in 
the United States," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review.
XXII (September, 1935), 211.
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attendance promised to match that amount and the conference
broke up in general accord. Shortly, however, Carnegie
changed his mind and informed Pettigrew that he wanted nothing
more to do with the third party movement. Eventually, he
threw his support to McKinley,
The Senator was enraged when he discovered the
perfidy of Carnegie, He accused the steel magnate of selling
out his convictions for great personal profit. He charged
that a "committee" representing the steel industry had come
to Carnegie and insisted that he drop the scheme; that unless
1 5he did, the proposed steel trust would not be consummated.
This accusation, however, cannot be proved from available 
sources. Carnegie does not mention the episode in his 
Autobiography. nor does anyone else mention it who was 
concerned with the Anti-Imperialist Movement,
After the failure of the Anti-Imperialist Party 
Movement in early 1900, Senator Pettigrew once again turned 
his full attention to Populist politics, hoping for success 
through a spirited fight on that ticket. By this time he 
found himself in a rather difficult situation. Although he 
favored fusion between Populists and Democrats in South 
Dakota, and the candidacy of William Jennings Bryan for 
President, he believed that the Populist party should retain 
its identity in the national campaign by nominating its own
15Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 324,
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candidate for Vice President,Here, he worked at cross 
purposes with Bryan who was determined to let the Democratic 
National Convention name his running mate.
The Populist forces were further weakened; by the 
fact that the breach with the mid-roaders had not healed. 
Still voicing determined opposition to any degree of fusion, 
the "left-wing” element held its convention in Cincinnati 
where Wharton Barker and Ignatius Donnelly were once more 
named to the national ticket. On the other hand, the 
fusionist element of the party set its convention for Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota in May. The nomination of Bryan for 
President was, of course, a foregone conclusion, but there 
was much disagreement over the choice for second place.
Some weeks before the opening of the Fusionist
Convention, Bryan wrote Pettigrew setting forth his desire .
that the party leave the naming of a Vice-Presidential
candidate to the Democrats, Pettigrew replied immediately;^”̂
I have read your letter with care, but fear the 
convention will not follow your advice. It will 
want to nominate a full ticket and adopt a platform.
I favor Towne, If the Kansas City convention does 
not adopt our ticket serious consequences might follow. 
The best way to avoid this would be to form a joint 
committee with power to act with the Silver 
Republicans and Democrats at Kansas City
^^Pettigrew to C.F. Taylor, Philadelphia, January 12, 
1900, Pettigrew Papers.
^^Pettigrew to Bryan, April 19, 1900, in ibid.
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Pettigrew referred to Charles A, Towne, leader of the Silver
Republican party of Minnesota. Towne*s candidacy also had
the approval of Marion Butler, Chairman of the Populist
National Committee. Together, Pettigrew and Butler hoped
to force his nomination through the Sioux Falls Convention.
On the other hand, the extreme fusionists, led by Senator
William V. Allen of Nebraska, were preparing to fight the
18nomination of Towne on the floor.
Meanwhile, the people of Sioux Falls prepared for 
the convention which would open on May 9. The townspeople 
were ready for What they thought would be the largest 
gathering ever to assemble in the state. A huge tent 300 by 
106 feet was procured, capable of accomodating 12,000 persons. 
The tent required the services of an expert and a large crew 
of roustabouts to erect. The progress of its assembly was 
the main topic of conversation for several days. Other 
specialists were summoned to decorate the streets and public 
buildings of the city. All the hotels were held in readiness 
to accomodate the mighty throng, and rooms in private homes 
were promised to handle the expected overflow. New sidewalks 
were laid all over town; merchants redecorated their stores 
and hired extra help. Restaurants stocked up on food so as 
to be able to serve adequately the hosts of delegates and 
visitors. As a sidelight, citizens were warned to bank their
18Allen to Bryan, April 28, 1900, William Jennings 
Bryan Papers, Box 24, Manuscripts Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
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extra money and hide their valuables since the convention 
was certain to attract a large number of thieves.
The large crowds, however, failed to materialize.
Only some 1,500 visitors appeared and of this number about 
400 were delegates. Fifty more were newsmen and the remainder 
were curiosity seekers from nearby. Only a handful of 
persons came from more than one-hundred miles away as 
spectators. There were delegates on hand from twenty-eight 
states and Alaska, but the disappointingly small turnout was 
a stern reminder to all that the Populist party was dying.
Governor Lee of South Dakota gave the opening address
in the big tent. Speaking before a tiny, but enthusiastic
audience, Lee reviewed the principles of the party and
declared that it stood for the rights of the people and should
continue to exist along with the other major parties. As
though inspired by “Pettigrewism," the Governor denounced
the policies of the Republican Administration with a
particularly devastating attack on imperialism. He declared
that ”thinking people” could not allow another four years
of "McKinleyism,” because it would "destroy the country." His
words were received with an ovation so mighty as to bely
19the size of the assemblage.
As had been expected, William Jennings Bryan received 
the Presidential nomination by acclamation. The anticipated
19Files of the Sioux Falls Argus Leader. May 2-10, 1900.
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battle fox second place also developed. When Town*s name 
was placed in nomination, a verbal encounter ensued led by 
Senator Allen for the extremists and Pettigrew and Butler 
for the moderates. After five hours of skirmishing a compromise 
was reached, Towne received the nomination subject to the
condition that he withdraw if his candidacy proved unacceptable
00to the Democratic convention in Kansas City,
The platform favored free coinage of silver, 
denounced the Administration's monetary policy, opposed 
expansion, and favored the initiative and referendum, the direct
election of United States Senators, and more stringent
21immigration laws, Pettigrew was pleased with the
outcome, "We have Bryan and Towne and a good platform," he
wrote, "I feel that the preservation of American institutions
92as we know them depends upon our success," . Furthermore, 
the Senator remarked publicly that all the factions of the 
Populist party except the mid-roaders were now in accord and 
that Bryan was "delighted" with the nomination of Towne, 
Unfortunately, neither Towne nor Bryan shared his views.
The Minnesotan, as a matter of fact, was embarrassed by the 
position in which he found himse-lf. He wrote to the Commoner
^^Willis J, Abbott, Press Manager of the Democratic 
National Committee, to Bryan, May 12, 1900, Bryan Papers,
Box 24,
21Sioux Falls Argus Leader. May 11, 1900.
^^ettigreWgto Walter Price, Milford, South Dakota,




The convention should have appointed a committee. I 
said so to everyone in advance. But the vast majority 
wanted a nomination and there was no stopping them. The 
chief reason was that if they adjourned without doing 
anything, they would be open to jibes from the 
Cincinnati Crowd and there would be serious losses in 
states where the Populist vote is crucial. I am in an 
awkward position, but will make the best of it. I 
deeply regret any embarrassment to you, but your 
nomination at Kansas City is certain and few Democrats 
will vote against you because of me.
Far from being embarrassed, Bryan was furious with the 
outcome of the convention. He wrote to Pettigrew demanding 
that his name not be associated with that of Towne in South 
Dakota
. . . Please do not use my name in connection with the 
endorsement of Towne by Democrats in your state as I 
have no way of knowing whether it would be wise to 
endorse him. This will depend upon the way Democrats 
feel about it and so far I have heard from few. . . .
I have been working four years to keep the reform forces 
together. The Sioux Falls Convention has made my work 
much harder than it would have been. I hope you will 
not further handicap me by attempting to state my 
wishes. Let the Democrats do what they think best.
They can confer with the Populists and Silver Republicans, 
in Kansas City and decide whether it will be Towne or 
someone else. . . .
It was to be "someone else." Although Andrew Lee of South
Dakota and several other prominent Populists made personal
appeals to the Democrats, they repudiated Towne and instead
25named Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois. True to his earlier
^^owne to Bryan, May 15, 1900, Bryan Papers, Box 24.
94Bryan to Pettigrew, May 29, 1900, Pettigrew Papers.
25Lee to William H. Kidd, July 2, 1900, Lee Papers.
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agreement, Towne withdrew and the Populists accepted the
26Democratic nominee as gracefully as possible. Even Senator
Pettigrew was forced to accept the inevitable, Bryan sent 
him a letter of conciliation at the conclusion of the 
Democratic convention, declaring his delight that Stevenson 
was "acceptable" in South Dakota, "Towne has increased the 
devotion of his friends by the manner in which he has taken 
his defeat," wrote the Commoner, Then he concluded: "I am
as much interested in your being elected to the Senate as I 
am in carrying South Dakota, You must leave no stone unturned
to secure your election and I will urge the National Committee
97to give you all possible aid,"
The matter of Populist nominations for the campaign 
of 1900 cannot be dropped without one further comment on 
the mid-road elements of the party. Their convention in 
Cincinnati was also rather dismal, and the impact which they 
made upon the campaign was negligible. In fact, it might well 
be forgotten except for a remarkable and pathetic letter which 
Wharton Barker addressed to President McKinley on August 11, 
1900, What Senator Pettigrew's reaction might have been 
had he seen the letter is only a matter of conjecture, but to 
stimulate the imagination of the reader it is here reproduced
^^icks. The Populist Revolt. 400,




You and your associates can no more force 16 to 1 as the 
paramount issue than can Mr. Bryan force imperialism. 
Conditions make issues. If the campaign was between 
you and Bryan I would say your chances of defeat were 
good, but there are three candidates in the field. I 
hope to wage an aggressive campaign and capture the 
electoral votes of Georgia and possibly Texas and 
Alabama. I can also receive 10,000 votes in West 
Virginia, 50,000 in Kentucky, 60,000 in Indiana, 50,000 
in Missouri, 5,000 in South Dakota and some in many 
other states. Many votes cast for me will be by men 
who voted for Bryan in 1896. I cannot wage an aggressive 
campaign without money and it cannot be obtained from 
Populists. It must come from your friends and your 
campaign fund as we agreed when I saw you at the White 
House in April.
I met Hanna in New York last week and he said he did not 
yet have a fund for me nor did he know What he would do 
along the lines I suggested. He said he thought I could 
not carry any southern states but that the vote I might 
get in West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, Nebraska and 
South Dakota might be important. You have the power to 
instruct Hanna to furnish the money. I shall fight both 
you and Bryan with spirit but would much prefer to see 
you re-elected than Bryan elected. But I do not ask you 
to act along the lines I suggest in any spirit of 
blackmail.
This remarkable document asserts with vigor the moral 
and financial bankruptcy of Populism, at least the mid-road 
variety. Whether the alledged "April Agreement" ever in fact 
was consummated cannot be shown with available sources;
however, the "aggressive campaign" which Barker hoped to wage
‘ 29netted not a quarter-million, but only 50,000 votes. On
28Barker to McKinley, August 11, 1900, William 
McKinley Papers, Vol. 58, Manuscripts Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
29Dictionary of American Biography. I, "Wharton Barker,"
607.
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the other hand, it is well to point out that Barker was
correct in his pronouncement that "conditions make issues."
Fusionists of the ilk of Bryan and Pettigrew could not be
convinced that the fighting issues of the past— free silver
and imperialism— no longer appealed to the people.
Prosperity was returning without drastic changes in the
monetary system; and the acquisition of the Spanish colonies
was an accomplished fact. Yet the fusionist leaders refused
to budge from their position, Bryan asserted himself
emphatically in a letter to national chairman James K, Jones:
"I believe that a reaffirmation of the Chicago platform, no
matter how explicit, would be regarded as evasive of the
money question if we reiterated other things in the platform
30and fail to reiterate the silver plank."
And Pettigrew, in a campaign letter distributed in
qiSouth Dakota declared:
I am not a candidate for re-election as a Republican 
because this is a battle between Man and the Dollar;, 
between wealth concentrated in the hands of a few and 
the masses who produce wealth but who are unable to 
enjoy what they produce.
The Republican party has been captured by evil elements, 
by the great transportation companies and money trusts; 
thus it seeks to perpetuate that legislation which has 
produced the present situation in regard to the 
distribution of wealth.
O f )
Paul W, Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, I960), 59-60.
31Pettigrew to X, July 24, 1900, Pettigrew Papers.
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Thus in spite of the fact they rode a sinking warship, the 
leaders of Populism and the Democracy steeled themselves for 
battle with the Republican Leviathan. And none was more 
vigorous, more feared and hated in this struggle than 
Richard F, Pettigrew of South Dakota.
Since 1896, when he left the party, Pettigrew had
devoted most of his time and energy in the Senate to spirited
criticisms of leading Republicans. Indeed, no man who
advocated Republican policy or voted Republican on the floor
was safe from Pettigrewian tongue lashings. There was. one,
however, for whom Pettigrew reserved a special and personal
hatred, for whom no insult was too mean, no epithet too
cruel. This man was "Mr. Republican" himself; Marcus Alonzo
Hanna. Senator Pettigrew held Hanna personally responsible.
for the failure of the Great Crusade in 1896. From that
time onward, his personal malice toward the Ohioan grew until
some declared it had driven him mad. He would believe any
charge made against Hanna no matter how absurd. To discredit
32the man's public image became an obsession.
The climax of the Pettigrew-Hanna "vendetta" came on 
June 5, 1900, shortly after Pettigrew's return to Washington 
from South Dakota. On that day. he delivered a speech in 
which he accused the Republican party of fraud in obtaining 
campaign funds in 1892. Suddenly, and for no apparent reason
^^Thomas Beer, Hanna. 223.
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he turned upon Hanna and charged him with bribery in connection 
with his election to the Senate in 1898. The incident began 
when Senator Augustus 0. Bacon of Georgia referred to a 
statement Pettigrew had made a few days before to the effect 
that a shipbuilder named Crawp gave $400,000 to the 
Republicans in 1892 with the understanding that the money 
would be returned in the form of government contracts. Bacon 
wanted to know why no one had replied to the charge. Senator 
Hanna rose, and directing his remarks to Pettigrew, declared 
that he considered such a ridiculous assertion unworthy to 
be dignified with an answer. Pettigrew immediately regained 
the floor, his usually palid fact now livid with rage. He 
screamed that Crawp had told him the story because the money 
was not spent as Hanna had promised it would be. Then, 
suddenly dropping the subject of the election, he produced 
a document purported to be a report from the State Senate 
of Ohio concerning charges of bribery in connection with 
Hanna’s election. It was the report of a minority in the 
Senate’s Committee on Privileges and Elections, asking an 
investigation of the story that one of the assemblymen had 
been influenced to vote for Hanna by unfair means. The 
evidence contained in the report was scattered and 
inconclusive, in fact there was no real evidence of bribery 
in it. Nevertheless, Pettigrew used it as the basis of a 
ten-minute verbal attack upon Hanna which was remarkable only 
for its savagery and lack of content. When he had finished
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and sat down, the Senators expected no reply. However,
Hanna did reply, and men who had left the chamber during 
Pettigrew's tirade hurried back to listen. They saw a man 
visibly shaken and heard him level an indictment against 
Richard Pettigrew that left nothing to the imagination. While 
the Dakotan sat huddled in his chair, Hanna never taking 
his eyes from the back of Pettigrew's head, denounced the 
report as so much humbug, questioned his assailant's sanity, 
and concluded by challenging Pettigrew to prove the vicious 
insinuations he had made. Physically exhausted from this 
emotional outburst, Hanna leaned upon his desk, close enough 
to Pettigrew to reach out and strike him if he wished, ''Let 
the Senator speak," he rasped, "Let him tell what he knows. 
And then;" the words were clipped and measured and murderous 
in their intonations, "and - then - I - will - tell - what - 
I - know - about - him,"
From this time onward Hanna was determined to end the 
political career of Richard Pettigrew. Immediately following 
the altercation in the Senate, Hanna went to McKinley to 
inform the President that he would not allow such insults as 
had been heaped upon him to go unnoticed. Secondary evidence
^^C,W, Thompson, Party Leaders of the Time, 91-92; 
Beer, Hanna, 222; Congressional Record. 56 Cong,, 1 Sess,,
June 5, 1900, XXXIII, 6582-6588,
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indicates that Hanna told President McKinley that Pettigrew
had to be eliminated from public o f f i c e . T h e  time came in
October, Despite the pleas of his colleagues that he drop
the issue, Hanna went on a whirlwind speaking tour of the
West, the brunt of which was aimed at Pettigrew. C.H.
Grosvenor, prominent Ohio Republican, reported to McKinley
35on efforts to dissuade Hanna from his objective;
I laid your views carefully before Hanna, but he is 
unwilling to forego his trip to South Dakota and on 
reflection you will agree there is wisdom in his view.
He says so much as already been said about it that 
if he should fail it would be called a back down.
And so, accompanied by Senator William P. Frye of
Maine, Vice-Presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt and
several others, Hanna set forth in search of vengeance. The
tour began in Chicago on October 15, 1900. After two short
stops in Wisconsin and five in Minnesota, the party fulfilled
forty-four speaking engagements in South Dakota.During
this extended visit the name “Pettigrew” was never mentioned.
37Hanna later explained:
Some of my friends here thought I was gunning for pretty 
small game ^ettigrew/f but I wanted that hide— and I 
got it. What makes Pettigrew most angry, probably, is
^^Beer, Hanna. 223.
35Hanna to McKinley, October 14, 1900, McKinley Papers,
Vol. 67.
36Grosvenor to McKinley, October 8, 1900, McKinley 
Papers, Vol. 66.
37New York Evening Sun. November 8, 1900. (Clipping,
Pettigrew Papers.)
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that when Senator Frye and I went into his state we 
never mentioned his name. We had an agreement and we 
kept it. That hurt him worse than anything we could 
have said about him.
Pettigrew had his own version of the tour. He
claimed that Hanna set aside over $500,000 of the Republican
campaign fund to buy votes in South Dakota. With this money
special trains were chartered for the tour, and farmers were
taken to local banks, given ten dollars and promised ten
more if Pettigrew were defeated. Moreover, claimed the
Senator, Hanna called his political secretary by phone from
Cleveland at 10 p.m. on election night when he learned that
the Republicans had carried South Dakota. "I wanted to
accomplish two things in this election," Hanna was supposed
to have said, "to elect McKinley and to beat Pettigrew, and
I did not know which I wanted worse." For the rest of his
life Richard Pettigrew declared this to be the most striking
38compliment ever paid him.
Meanwhile, the campaign against Pettigrew by South 
Dakota Republicans was carried on with equal vigor. On 
November 3, 1900, the Sioux Falls Argus Leader carried a 
front page article entitled "The Case Against Pettigrew."
This article summed up for South Dakota voters the 
reasons why Pettigrew should not be returned to the Senate. 
Most of the material used against him concerned his role as 
an opponent of Philippine annexation. The article declared




His statement that he is ashamed of his country and 
wishes he could blot out the history of the last two 
years; his reference to the "Puny President" when speaking 
of McKinley; his statement that the Stars and Stripes are 
"only a rag, a piece of cloth," his statement that the 
McKinley Administration is the most corrupt in history, 
his support of Aguinaldo, his charges against Otis 
and Dewey; are some of the most reckless and 
irresponsible utterances by a public figure in many 
years.
In addition to this indictment, however, the paper went on to
point out some Pettigrewian character defects which were all
too true to be amusing. It argued that Pettigrew's continued
use of personal abuse against his political enemies had so
reduced his prestige in Washington that he was no longer
capable of securing beneficial legislation for his state.
"During the last three years," declared the paper, "Pettigrew
has made himself conspicuous, but the voting record shows
3Qthat his speeches have carried little weight."-
Four days later was election day, and by evening it 
had already become clear that the Republicans would carry 
South Dakota. The headline of the Argus Leader read:
"McKINLEY WAS,RIGHT— PETTIGREW WAS WRONG" and a front-page 
story on the election gave a good deal of space to the 
defeat of the Senator. Included was a copy of a telegram 
purportedly sent to South Dakota Republicans by H.C. Payne 
of the Republican National Committee. It was reminiscent of 
the sentiments expressed by Mark Hanna: "To Pettigrew a long
39Sioux Falls Argus Leader. November 13, 1900.
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farewell. There were three important things in this campaign: 
to beat Pettigrew, to elect McKinley and to carry Nebraska,
We have done all three,"
. In the same issue of the paper there was a long 
editorial entitled, "The Passing of Pettigrew," which rivalled 
anything Pettigrew had ever said for its vicious invective,
"As a factor of importance in the politics of South Dakota," 
it began, "R,F, Pettigrew has finally and completely passed 
from view. Never again will his name excite even a passing 
riffle of interest." The editorial went on to accuse 
Pettigrew of every imaginable form of malfeasance, misfeasance 
and nonfeasance in connection with his public career. Finally, 
it concluded, "Pettigrew had great ability and a chance for 
fame and success, but from the very beginning of his career 
he has demonstrated duplicity and treachery such as have 
seldom been equalled in American politics.
Of course the Pettigrew-Hanna vendetta and the 
"crusade" of the Republican party against Pettigrew were only 
minor factors in the crushing defeat suffered by the forces 
of agrarian reform in the election of 1900, William 
Jennings Bryan and most of his allies were defeated primarily 
because they were pulling against the tide. As Thomas A,
Bailey has asserted; ""The issue which beat Bryan was 
’Bryanism*; the fear that he would overthrow the gold
^^Ibid.. November 7, 1900,
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standard and thus destroy p r o s p e r i t y . I n  South Dakota, 
where the issue of free silver had never enjoyed an electric 
appeal, the rural voters swarmed back to the "party of 
stability" leaving men like Pettigrew and Andrew Lee alone 
and virtually without support. The statistics are mute but 
eloquent evidence of the trend. While the Populists in 
South Dakota made no gains over their return in 1898, the
Republicans increased their vote by more than fifty-five
40per cent. Yet Pettigrew, like Bryan himself, never
comprehended the reasons for his defeat, even after the
results had been announced. Late in November, 1900, he wrote 
43Bryan;
I cannot understand the labor vote of this country, 
neither can I understand how the farmers of this country 
are willing to submit to the taxation which must come 
from a large standing army, to the rule of trusts, 
which heretofore have fixed the price of everything 
they have to sell. It seems to me that the laborers 
and the farmers are being ground out of existence by 
pressures from both directions and therefore I cannot 
understand their vote.
It was the same with the issue of imperialism. Both 
Pettigrew and Bryan had expected to make something of it in 
the campaign but when the time came they found themselves 
confronted by an obvious lack of interest on the part of the
^^T,A, Bailey, "Was the Election of, 1900 a Mandate 
for Imperialism?" Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XXII 
(1937), 43,
^^South Dakota Legislative Manual (1911), 341-352,
^^Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth. 211,
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public. This lack of interest has often been interpreted
as the result of the facts that the islands taken from Spain
had already been annexed, and that the nation was too busy,
prosperous and complacent to take up the missionary zeal
of the reformers. In short, Bryan and those who followed him
had miscalculated.But Pettigrew did not understand. Years
later he wrote; ". . . I did all that a man could do to
prevent the American people from taking this fatal step
/expansionJJ As a reward for my efforts I was denounced,
45vilified and condemned.”
The repudiation of Pettigrew by the legislature of
South Dakota came as something of an anti-climax to the
campaign and election, since his defeat was by then a foregone
conclusion. The balloting occurred on January 22, 1901.
Pettigrew was renominated by one of the few Populists left
in the legislature. His opponent was R.J. Gamble of Yankton,
and ex-friend and follower. The issue was decided quickly,
for on the first ballot Gamble received 113 votes while
Pettigrew polled thirteen.: Newspapers gave the election only
46cursory attention. Two days later, however, the Argus 
Leader published a large front page cartoon depicting
44Bailey, "Was the Election of 1900 a Mandate for 
Imperialism?" 48.
45Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 344.
46Sioux Falls Argus Leader. January 22, 1901.
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Pettigrew as a mongrel hound baying at a moon whose face 
looked like William McKinley. Tied to the hound*s tail was 
a tin can labeled, “South Dakota Republican Majority." The 
public career of Richard Franklin Pettigrew had come to an 
end.'*''
47Ibid.. January 24, 1901.
CHAPTER X 
THE "HAS BEEN" POLITICO
After the loss of his Senate seat Pettigrew maintained 
his legal residence in South Dakota. However, he actually 
spent most of his time living in New York City. During this 
period Pettigrew maintained an active interest in politics, 
now identifying himself with the Democratic party. He also 
engaged in the practice of law and invested large sums of 
money in mining ventures. Luck was with him and he recouped 
the fortune which had been lost while he served in the Senate. 
Little is known of his professional activities, but there is 
some evidence extant of his rather colorful business 
enterprises, which led him to invest in several copper mines 
and engage in a scheme to collect on $240,000 worth of 
repudiated bonds issued by the state of North Carolina.
Shortly after he settled in New York, Pettigrew 
entered into an agreement with several others to collect on 
the repudiated North Carolina bonds through court action.
His associates in the scheme were interesting. They 
included R.W. Stewart, head of the Republican machine in 
South Dakota, Daniel Lindsay Russell, former governor of
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North Carolina, Charles H. Herreid, Republican Governor of 
South Dakota, and Marion Butler, former United States 
Senator from North Carolina and ex-chairman of the Populist 
National Committee.^ The "plot" was pending for several years.
but, unfortunately, the "conspirators" fell out due to a
2misunderstanding, and no recovery was made. Disappointed, 
Pettigrew and Russell accused each other of incompetency and 
stupidity in handling the deal, and threatened each other 
with law suits. However, nothing ever came of these threats, 
and after letting off considerable steam, the would-be
3promoters dropped the scheme. The odd part of the entire 
transaction was the willingness of the extremely radical 
Pettigrew to associate himself with men like Stewart and 
Herreid, leaders of the hated Republican party. Perhaps the 
incident is a good example of the fact that Pettigrew, like 
many radicals of his day, had a dual standard of conduct.
In politics, his malevolence toward the Republicans went 
unchecked, while in personal and business transactions he was 
quite willing to deal with the same men he criticized on 
another plane.
Pettigrew*s mining interests flourished in the years
^Pettigrew to Russell, July 28, 1905, Daniel Lindsay 
Russell Papers, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina.
2Pettigrew to Russell, February 7, 1901, in ibid.
^Russell to Pettigrew, July 16, 1905, in ibid.
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after he left the Senate. He became owner or part owner of
4copper mines in California and Arizona, The Arizona mine 
was located near Yuma and was known as the "Del Monte." 
Pettigrew seems to have had a controlling interest, in the 
corporation which owned this mine. Stock sold for three 
dollars and about 100,000 shares were offered for sale. Of 
these, Pettigrew had personal control of a bloc of 12,000,
5some of which he sold for his own profit. The other mine
was known as the "California King" and was also located near
Yuma, Arizona. Its lode was somewhat inferior to "Del Monte,"
but by the summer of 1903, was yielding 300 tons of ore per
day to treatment. Although he encountered temporary financial
setbacks from time to time, Pettigrew made large profits,
and estimated that in the long run he cleared $500,000 from
6his investments.
Pettigrew's successful business activities did not 
alter his political views as failure in business had done ten 
years before. He continued to advocate the tenets of 
Populism, though he sought to achieve these principles through 
the Democratic party. He also maintained his political 
connections in South Dakota, despite the fact that he resided
■^Pettigrew to James H. Drake, Morgan Park, Illinois, 
March 14, 1902, Pettigrew Papers.
5
Pettigrew to W.A. Means and Company, New York,
March 14, 1902, in ibid.
^Pettigrew to D.H. Henry, Chamberlain, South
Dakota, August 17, 1903, in ibid.
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in New York, and was able to secure a seat on the state
7delegation to the Democratic National Convention in 1904.
He preferred William Randolph Hearst for the nomination in 
1904, considering him vastly more acceptable than Judge 
Alton B. Parker of New York. The Democratic party, he 
found, was divided into two factions as the campaign 
approached; those, like Parker, who were willing to abandon 
the silver plank in the party platform; and those, like 
Hearst, who were not. In December 1903, Hearst called on 
Pettigrew in New York City, asking for support from the South
QDakota delegates at the forthcoming convention. After due
consideration the Senator decided to lend Hearst his personal
support, and began inquiring as to the popularity of the
publisher throughout the party. By the middle of January
1904, Pettigrew was convinced that Hearst could easily win
the nomination and defeat Theodore Roosevelt in the election.^
He had discovered that Tammany Hall was at best lukewarm in
its support of Parker and that Hearst had a devoted following 
10in the West. On January 20, Pettigrew issued a statement
"^Pettigrew to ¥,H. Sawyer, Sioux Falls, February 3, 
1904, in ibid.
O
Pettigrew to E.S. Johnson, December 28, 1903, in
ibid.
9Pettigrew to H.F. Miller, Fargo, North Dakota, 
January 4, 1904; Pettigrew to Frank Parsons, Philadelphia, 
January 14, 1904, in ibid.
10Pettigrew to H.W. Sawyer, Sioux Falls, January 18,
1904, in ibid.
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to South Dakota Democrats explaining his position
I support Hearst. He is rich, but has made his money 
selling newspapers and by inheritance from his father 
who was in mining. He and his mother own one-third 
of the Homestake Mine but their sympathies are with 
the working man. He opposes trusts and favors govern­
ment ownership of railroads. He will be an aggressive 
candidate.
The year 1904 was one of unrest in South Dakota 
politics and the wily Richard Pettigrew sought to take full 
advantage of the situation. Coé I. Crawford moved against 
the Kittridge machine and nearly succeeded in gaining control 
of the Republican convention. On the other hand, Pettigrew 
appealed to state Democrats for support on grounds that the 
only chance for the Progressive Movement lay within that 
party. It was on this basis that he hoped to line up the 
state for William Randolph Hearst.
The State Democratic Convention met in Sioux Falls on 
March 30. The seven-hundred delegates attending were divided 
almost exclusively into two factions; the "old guard," and 
the "raw recruits," or those members who had entered the 
party after 1896. It appeared from the outset that the "raw 
recruits" were in the majority and that they were under the 
personal control of Richard Pettigrew. This impression was 
confirmed the night before the official proceedings began
^^Pettigrew to Harry Wentxy, Chairman, South Dakota 
State Democratic Committee, undated, Pettigrew Papers.
^^Schell, South Dakota. 259-260.
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vhen the state central committee met to elect temporary
officers. The “raw recruits" nominated Pettigrewite
S.A. Ramsey of Woonsocket for the chair, while the "old
guard" named John Martin of Codington County. Ramsey won
13easily by a vote of 28 to 19.
On the floor of the convention the "raw recruits" had 
it all their own way. Hearst banners and pictures of the 
great man bedecked the hall. Pettigrew and seven other 
Hearst men were named delegates to the national convention, 
and the climax of the whole affair was an address by Pettigrew 
himself who had arrived from New York to experience the full 
measure of his triumph. The Senator began by declaring 
himself to be a Democrat and expressing his happiness over 
this fact. He was greeted with a wild ovation. He then 
lauded William Randolph Hearst in true Pettigrewian style.
The Publisher, he declared, had made his money honestly by 
selling newspapers at one cent per copy. The fact that the 
New York Journal had the largest circulation in the world, 
Pettigrew went on, proved that Hearst had ability. He would 
be nominated and would make a great President. Again there 
was an extended ovation. Pettigrew’s speech was liberally 
sprinkled with what the newspapers called "socialist doctrine." 
He advocated municipal and government ownership of public 
utilities and promised to introduce a truly progressive
13Sioux Falls Arous Leader. March 30, 1904.
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platform to the resolutions committee at St. Louis. At the 
conclusion of his address Pettigrew was given a standing 
ovation and shortly after, the proceedings of the convention 
were concluded by electing him chairman of the state 
delegation.^*
The Hearst-for-President boom was actually a home 
made affair. It gained most of its impetus from Hearst*s own 
employees and newspapers working through his National 
Association of Democratic Clubs and through political leaders 
like Pettigrew anxious to gain the favor of his newspapers. 
Nevertheless, his candidacy struck a responsive chord among 
people who knew his interest in reform and over two-hundred 
newspapers around the nation commended the ambitions of 
the "great advocate of popular welfare." Despite the great 
personal wealth of Hearst himself, his campaign fund was 
small and in some cases nonexistent. However, when delegates 
began to arrive in St. Louis it was discovered that Hearst 
had carried the state conventions of South Dakota, California, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode Island, 
Washington, and Wyoming. Counting other stragglers, the 
Publisher had 104 instructed delegates on opening day.
l*Tbid.. March 31, 1904.
^^John K. Winkler, William Randolph Hearst (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1928), 189-191.
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Even though his partisans were vocal, Hearst never 
had much chance to win the nomination from Alton B. Parker. 
Enemy newspapers derided his candidacy, and even those which 
might have been friendly could not muster very much enthusiasm 
once the convention got under way.^^ Hearst was further 
injured by the announcement on July 5 that Tammany Hall was 
withdrawing opposition to Parker. Later that same night when 
key states such as Pennsylvania caucused and the tide moved
inexorably in favor of Parker, the Hearst Headquarters at the
17Hotel Jefferson became enveloped in gloom.
Meanwhile, Richard Pettigrew was more concerned with 
the treatment of his suggested platform by the resolutions 
committee. The only plank in his platform to receive serious 
consideration by the committee, however, was the one calling 
for government ownership of public utilities. It was the
most radical of his proposals and also the one closest to his
18heart. Nevertheless, after a short discussion, the committee
^^New York Times. July 6, 1904; Sioux Falls Arous 
Leader. July 2, 1904.
^^Sioux Falls Arous Leader. July 5, 1904.
^®R.F. Pettigrew, "Platform Submitted to the 
Democratic National Convention, St. Louis, 1904." The planks 
were as follows; 1. Equal taxation. 2. Government owner­
ship of all public utilities. 3. All money to be issued 
directly by the government rather than through banks.
4. Postal Savings Banks. 5. No bank to be allowed to deposit 
in another bank and call it "reserve." 6. Prohibition of 
speculation in stock and bonds, and farm products» and the 
closing of such "gambling houses as the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade." 7. Initiative, 
referendum and recall. 8. Graduated income and inheritance
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rejected the Pettigrew Plank a$ impracticable. In the end,
the only victory scored by the anti-Parker forces on the
resolutions committee was achieved by William Jennings Bryan
who succeeded in having the gold plank in the platform stricken
out,19 This was also the high point of the entire convention
for the Hearst forces because when news of Bryan's victory
was relayed to Parker, he wired the convention threatening
to withdraw as a candidate. The receipt of this message
forced a showdown vote on the floor of the convention on the
question; gold or no gold. Pettigrew and his colleagues
from South Dakota joined with 182 others in voting no on the
demands of Parker, but the Judge did not withdraw and was
20nominated on the first ballot. With both his candidate and 
platform repudiated, Pettigrew returned to New York in 
disgust.
In the years which followed, Pettigrew maintained his 
affiliation with the Democrats even though his views were 
those of an extremely radical socialist. In 1908 he once 
more served on the South Dakota delegation to the Democratic
taxes. 9. Repeal of tariff on all articles manufactured or 
sold by trusts. 10. Exclusion of trust controlled items 
from interstate commerce. 11. Reorganization of the federal 
courts— short terms for judges. 12. Life and fire insurance
to be controlled by the states. 13. Exemption of land
improvement from taxation. 14. Old age pensions. 15. With­
drawal of regaining government lands from sale.
19Sioix Falls Arous Leader. July 8, 1904.
^^Winkler, W.R. Hearst. *193: New York Times. July 10,
1904; Sioux Falls Arous Leader. July 9, 1904.
284
Convention at Denver, and lent his support to Bryan, Before 
the convention met, Bryan contacted Pettigrew asking him to 
see Charles F. Murphy of Tammany Hall, and Roger B. Sullivan 
of the Chicago machine. Pettigrew's mission was to elicit 
support from these organizations for the Commoner in exchange 
for a promise of "fair treatment” from him if he were
elected. Pettigrew was successful in Chicago, but was unable
01to crack the solid opposition of Tammany to Bryan.
Nevertheless, Bryan was in complete control of the Denver
22convention, and dictated his own nomination. Later,
Pettigrew did a little campaigning for the Democrats, and after
their defeat Bryan addressed him a letter of thanks:^^
Thank you for your help and service during the 
campaign. We are naturally disappointed at defeat 
but cannot lay down our arms merely because we have 
lost a battle. The things we advocate are worth 
fighting for and I shall continue to fight. With 
the cooperation of men like you we shall succeed.
As- time wore on, Pettigrew became more and more
interested in socialism, but he never joined the Socialist
party. He also began to address himself to the problems of
American workers. In a letter to Samuel Gompers dated
August 8, 1911, Pettigrew declared that the land and all
21Bryan to Pettigrew, 1908 (The exact date is 
obliterated), Pettigrew Papers.
22
M.R. Werner, Brvan (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1929), 158.
23Bryan to Pettigrew, December 18, 1908, Pettigrew
Papers.
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instruments of production should be cooperatively or publicly 
ovned, and that laboring men would never receive what they 
deserved until this came about.24 The letter was meant to 
be a criticism of Gompers for whom Pettigrew had very little 
regard. In an unpublished manuscript written at about the 
same time Pettigrew declared that Gompers was the tool of
capitalists and had been a party to their methods of
95exploitation since the beginning of his career.
By this time, the Senator was known as one of four 
self-styled "chief radicals" in the Democratic party, and in 
this role he attempted a comeback to public life which came 
within an ace of success. In January, 1912 he went home to 
South Dakota to assume the leadership of the "Champ Clark 
for President Movement
On January 31, 1912, a convention of Democrats met 
in Pierre to select delegates to the national convention and 
to issue instructions to these delegates. Pettigrew attended, 
was named a delegate, and declared himself for Speaker Clark. 
Pettigrew*s group filed for the preferential primary to be 
held later, under the heading, "Champ Clark for President."
One month later, on March 1, 1912, E.S. Johnson, a candidate
24Pettigrew tq Gompers, August 8, 1911, in ibid.
25R.F. Pettigrew, "Capital and Labor," unpublished 
mamuscript, in ibid.
26Arthur S. Link, Wilson; The Road to the White 
House (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1917), 380.
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for Governor of South Dakota, made up another ticket of ten
delegates to the national convention under the motto, "The
Vilson-Bryan Progressive Democracy." He filed this ticket
vith the South Dakota Secretary of State for participation in
the primary. These groups represented the two dominant
factions in South Dakota. Later, however, a third ticket was
placed in the field which also purported to be a Clark
faction. The purpose of this ticket was to split the Clark
vote in the hope that Wilson would receive a plurality. The
trick was successful and the primary in May gave a small
27preference to Wilson.
Meanwhile, Pettigrew was busily engaged in his 
campaign fof Clark. On March 13, 1912, he wrote to the 
Speaker outlining his position: "As a Progressive I wish
you would come out in favor of Government ownership of rail­
roads, abolition of the federal courts, and withdrawing all 
public lands in Alaska from sale. . . . Announce your position
in these matters soon so that Roosevelt will not steal all
28our Progressive matter." Pettigrew then went on a speaking 
tour for his candidate which took him to all parts of the 
state. He meant to do all that he could for Clark in the 
hope that ^e would be amply rewarded. By June he completed
27Legal Déposition of R.F. Pettigrew, July 3, 1912, 
in ibid.; Sioux Falls Arous Leader. June 27, 1912.
28Pettigrew to Clark, March 13, 1912, in ibid.
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local preparations and journeyed to Baltimore for the
national convention. At about the same time an article on
him appeared in the Saturday Evening. Post, and a portion of
it vas later reprinted in the Sioux Falls Arous Leader. "The
lean, cadaverous, saturnine R.F. Pettigrew of South Dakota
is one of the leaders of the Champ Clark Movement," declared
writer S.G. Blyth, He went on to describe Pettigrew's
career, his "disappearance" from politics in 1901, and his
attempted comeback in 1912. "If Clark is successful,"
declared the author, "much of the credit will be due
R.F. Pettigrew. He is one of the guiding lights of the
29Clark surge at Baltimore."
Unfortunately, "the Clark Surge at Baltimore" 
firzled. The first act in the fiasco was called by the 
newspapers, "The South Dakota Steal." Two reports were 
submitted to the floor by the credentials committee. The 
majority report favored Pettigrew's Clark delegation while 
the minority report was for Wilson. Even though the 
Democratic National Committee had already approved the Wilson 
delegation, the credentials committee unseated them on 
grounds that the two Clark tickets combined had polled more 
votes in the preferential primary. However, when the matter 
was submitted to the floor of the convention for debate, it was 
found that the rank and file delegates were sympathetic to
29Sioux Falls Arous Leader. June 27, 1912.
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Wilson. Even though charges of fraud were levelled by 
Pettigrew and others, the convention voted to accept the 
minority report by a vote of 633 1/2 to 437.^®
"The South Dakota Steal,” however, was really only 
a minor scene in the over-all picture which developed. It 
began to take shape during the night and early morning of
31June 27 and 28 when the nominations for President were made. 
There were several favorite sons, but the significant 
candidates were Clark, Wilson, Oscar W. Undgrwood, and 
Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio. The first ballot was 
taken on the morning of June 28. Clark led with 440 1/2 
votes; followed by Wilson with 324; Harmon, 148; and Underwood, 
117 1/2. The stage was now set for a momentous struggle, and 
the convention adjourned.
The convention went through nine ballots the following 
day with little change until on the tenth, Charles F. Murphy 
of Tammany Hall shifted his state's votes from Harmon to 
Clark. This gave Clark 556 votes and a majority. The 
Speaker, in his Washington office, prepared a telegram of 
acceptance which he would send as soon as the requisite 
two-thirds majority was reached. But Clark never received the
30Ibid.. June 29, 1912.
31Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House. 445.
^^Ibid.. 447-448.
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necessary votes. During the demonstration which followed
the Tammany switch, Wilson's managers pleaded with the Underwood
men not to go over to Clark. On the eleventh ballot the
Underwood votes held firm, the expected Clark landslide
33failed to materialize, and the convention adjourned.
The climax had now been reached and passed. By 
convincing the supporters of Underwood to stay with their man, 
Wilson's managers successfully defeated Clark's bid for the 
nomination. From this point onward the outcome was only a 
matter of time. On the ballots which followed the next day, 
there was little change in the voting. Then on the 
fourteenth ballot the next important step in the drama 
unfolded. William Jennings Bryan gained the floor and 
declared to the astonished delegates that Nebraska would never 
vote for Clark so long as he had the support of Tammany Hall.- 
This declaration by Bryan nearly caused a riot, but in the 
long run had little to do with the outcome of the convention. 
After the confusion had subsided, the voting continued once 
again, ballot after ballot, with little noticeable change 
until the forty-third round when Illinois swung to Wilson.
This gave him a majority for the first time and precipitated 
his nomination. However, his managers were still fearful 
that unless he gained the support of the Underwood delegates, 
he could not win. They now pleaded with Underwood's managers
S^Ibid.. 448-450.
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to release his votes, and finally, on the forty-sixth ballot, 
an agreement was reached. Shortly after, the Clark and 
Harmon votes were released and on the afternoon of July 2, 
1912, Woodrow Wilson became the Democratic nominee for 
President of the United States.^^
Although Bryan*s dramatic gesture had little to do 
with Clark's defeat, Pettigrew and the Speaker both thought 
it was the key. Pettigrew was said by many to be nearly 
irrational with rage, but he finally calmed down enough to 
issue a statement to the press in which he indicted Bryan 
for rank hypocricy and treachery. In his statement, Pettigrew 
made public the story of how he had acted as liaison man 
between the Commoner and the Democratic machines of New York 
and Illinois in 1908. "Bryan doesn't want any Democrat 
elected now," the Senator raged, "because it would cost him 
the party leadership and with that would go the advertizing 
which makes his lectures and writing so profitable. In this 
role he is the best asset the Republicans have."^^ Later, 
Champ Clark wrote Pettigrew thanking him for services 
rendered
I am obliged for your unselfish support. It did me 
much good in receiving the large vote I got at 
Baltimore. . . .  I know how you feel about the
3*Ibid.. 460-̂ 462.
35R.F. Pettigrew, "The Campaign of 1912," Pettigrew
Papers.
36Clark to Pettigrew, August 17, 1912, in ibid.
291
Baltimore outrage, but after all Wilson vas nominated 
according to the rules. The two-thirds rule should have 
been abolished long ago. I have always been a 
progressive and will continue so to the end.
The "Baltimore outrage" marked the end of Pettigrew's 
twelve-year affiliation with the Democratic party. On 
July 10, 1912, he journeyed to Oyster Bay, New York, for a 
conference with the one whom he called "that strenuous little 
man who always wants to kill something." At this conference 
Pettigrew cast his lot with Theodore Roosevelt.The Senator 
explained to Roosevelt that he had left the Democratic party 
because of the continual perfidy of Bryan, but more than that, 
because the party had nominated Wilson whom Pettigrew con­
sidered innately conservative. "I refused to support Parker 
in 1904," he wrote, "because he was a conservative of the 
Cleveland school. And I will not support Wilson because he 
is even more conservative than Parker. Wilson's platform is 
not a progressive document. They declare against the Aldrich 
bill as the only plank on money and they back down from 
their former position on the Philippine Islands."^®
Pettigrew tried to induce the "strenuous little man" 
to adopt an extremely radical platform studded with some
37Telegram from New York World to Pettigrew, April 28, 
1915; Telegram from Pettigrew to New York World. April 20, 
1915, in ibid.
38Pettigrew, "The Campaign of 1912," in ibid.
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of the old line Populist demands, and a few new ones. He 
wanted Roosevelt to come out in favor of government ownership 
of railroads and all other means of communication. But 
Pettigrew also asked Roosevelt to declare that he favored the 
abolition of the Federal District and Circuit Courts, and a 
radical reduction in the power of the United States Supreme 
Court, all of which Pettigrew believed to be controlled by 
the "trusts." "I am not interested in reform," wrote the 
Senator, "but in revolution which will change the entire 
social and economic system and establish equal opportunity
for all."39
Roosevelt, however, was not so willing as Pettigrew
to burn all his political bridges behind him. Although he
now headed the "Progressive Movement," he was certainly no 
40Socialist. At Columbus, Ohio, where he "threw his hat intr 
the ring" on February 21, 1912, Roosevelt made one of the 
most radical pronouncements of his career, which was said 
by many observers to be designed specifically to publicize his 
political aspirations.In this speech he declared in 
favor of the initiative and referendum, and the recall of 
judicial decisions, but he said nothing about the abolition
39Pettigrew to Roosevelt, July 19, 1912, in ibid.
40Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradition 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1960J, 234-235.
*^Ibid.. 233.
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of the court system. At the same time, he repeated his oft-
stated views on trusts and corporations, which were much
less radical than those of Pettigrew. Existing anti-trust
legislation, Roosevelt declared, was inadequate because it
did not distinguish between honest, efficient businesses and
those guilty of unfair, monopolistic practices. Roosevelt
said the real progressive was one who endeavored to shape
the policy of the government so as to encourage legitimate
and honest business while at the same time moving against
crookedness and injustice. All businesses, he concluded,
into which the element of monopoly might enter, should be
carefully regulated by the administrative branch of the
government. However, honest efficiency should not be 
42penalized. Concerning the suggestions of Pettigrew,
Roosevelt commented:^^
I shall run square on the Columbus program but you 
must not ask me to go far beyond it. I have had 
enough trouble educating people to the position I 
took there. We can ask for government ownership of 
railroad and telegraph lines in Alaska, however. It 
is a good place to experiment .i
It seems incredible that Pettigrew could have been
sincere in his hatred of big business and yet have chosen to
support the New Nationalism over the New Freedom, but such
*^New York Times. February 22, 1912.
43Roosevelt to Pettigrew, July 25, 1912, Theodore 
Roosevelt Papers, Letters Sent, Vol. 67, Manuscripts Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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is the case. The only plausible explanation for his stand 
is that his hatred of Wilson and Bryan for having defeated 
his bid for a serious political comeback overshadowed his 
devotion to principle. As will be seen, however, within a 
very short time the situation was altered as his devotion to 
radical reform became an obsession with him which governed 
his every move.
The Senator now made his permanent home in Sioux Falls, 
and here on Labor Day, 1912, he made a campaign speech before 
the workers of the city. "Laboring men should go into 
politics," he declared, "and insist on just legislation to 
insure a just relationship between labor and capital. 
Furthermore, the stock markets should be abolished and the 
thieves who run them thrown into jail." He went on to repeat 
his usual demands for government ownership of railroads and 
communications, abolition of federal courts and the establish­
ment of postal savings b a n k s . I t  was speech of a much 
more radical nature than Theodore Roosevelt would have 
approved.
Despite his feelings, Pettigrew accepted the platform 
of the Progressive party. In October, Roosevelt wrote the 
Senator expressing his gratitude, "I am glad you like the 
platform," he said, "It does not go as far as I myself am
44R.F. Pettigrew, "Manuscript of Speech to Workers
of Sioux Falls," Pettigrew Papers.
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willing to go or as far as all of us will go four or eight 
years hence. But it is better that these movements proceed 
step by step."45
The platform firmly reiterated Roosevelt*s Columbus 
speech of several months before. Thus at the time Pettigrew 
was forced to accept the idea that the Progressives must 
proceed "step by step* and that the Columbus program was as 
far as the Colonel could go.4& in any event, Pettigrew 
continued the campaign and considered himself in large measure 
responsible for the fact that Roosevelt carried South Dakota 
in the election. "We carried the state," he wrote, "but it 
was not easy as the influence of the two great railroads was 
behind Wilson, in addition to the influence of the Homestake 
Mine people."4?
The campaign of 1912 marked the last serious 
engagement of Richard Pettigrew in politics. From this 
point to the end of his life he isolated himself from both 
major parties as well as from the mainstream of American 
radicalism, and proclaimed loudly that no existing protest 
movement was radical enough to do what was needed for the 
American people. An excellent example of his attitude was
45Roosevelt to Pettigrew, October 29, 1912, in ibid.
4^New York Times. August 8, 1912.
47Pettigrew to Roosevelt, November 8, 1912, Pettigrew
Papers.
296
his brief association with the Non-Partisan League. In 
December, 1916, Pettigrew attended a meeting in Aberdeen which 
was called by A.C. Towniey, founder and leader of the League 
in North Dakota. Later, he wrote of this meeting: "I
found that I had not been called to a conference, but had 
been called there for the purpose of endorsing what Mr.
Towniey had already decided to do." It developed that 
Townley had decided to organize the League in South Dakota 
and was testing the sentiments of men who had formerly been 
prominent in the farm movement. However, Pettigrew concluded 
that Townley was little more than a profiteer who was 
determined to swindle the people of his state. "I found 
that $8.20 of every $16.00 received by Townley went into his 
own pocket," wrote the Senator. He suggested that Townley 
be ignored and that a South Dakota League be organized 
independently by himself, Andrew Lee, Henry L. Loucks and 
several others.^9 Nevertheless, although the Non-Partisan 
League was later active in South Dakota politics, Pettigrew 
apparently had nothing to do with it. On May 5, 1917, he 
wrote to socialist author Charles Edward Russell that he 
had no further interest in such an organization.^®
48Pettigrew to Charles Edward Russell, July 14, 1923,
in ibid.
49Pettigrew to James E. Kelly, Pierre, January 1,
1917, in ibid.
5nPettigrew to Russell, May 5, 1917, in ibid.
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Meanwhile, contemporary events continued to affect
Pettigrew’s political philosophy. After the outbreak of the
World War in 1914, he expended a good deal of time and
energy denouncing it as a capitalist scheme to create huge
profits for the rich,^^ and urging that the United States
remain strictly neutral. He was an avowed opponent of
preparedness, and he publicly advised all young men to
refuse to enlist in the national guard. "Why should those .
who have no property go to war to protect property owned by
others but which they have not produced," said Pettigrew.
He believed that the national guard was being organized to
suppress revolt among the nation’s laborers. "They will be
sent from state to state," he wrote, "to kill protesting
53workers and innocent women and children."
After the United States entered the war, Pettigrew 
went too far in his denunciations of government policies.
On October 6, 1917, in an interview which appeared in the 
Sioux Falls Argus Leader. Pettigrew repeated his views as 
to the origins of the war and advised young men to do 
everything in their power to avoid the draft. Within 
ten days after the appearance of the interview he was
51Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 382-383.
^^ettigrew, "On Universal Military Training," 
Manuscript found in Pettigrew Papers.
53Pettigrew to Sioux Falls Argus Leader. August 11,
1916, in ibid.
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indicted by a grand jury under the provisions of the
Espionage Act of April'6, 1917, and a warrant was issued for
his arrest. The indictment charged that Pettigrew had
uttered false and malicious statements against the government
of the United States; that he had obstructed the enlistments
and recruitment of military personnel, and that he had
incited insubordination and mutiny among members of the armed 
54forces. The Senator was in Chicago at the time of his 
indictment and a federal marshall was dispatched to bring him 
home. However, he appeared before a federal court in Chicago, 
posted bond of $5000, and was allowed to remain free. 
Meanwhile, he secured attorneys in Sioux Falls, and they began 
to prepare his defense.Pettigrew was to be defended by 
C.O. Bailey and G.E. Williams of Sioux Falls, and by the 
illustrious Clarence Darrow of Chicago. Their plan was to 
delay the case by all possible means and then avoid all 
mention of the war itself iriien the Senator should finally be 
put on trial. " . . .  Our line of defense should be the 
Senator's many years of radical attacks on financial abuses," 
wrote Williams. "If he could show the jury that for many 
years he has fought the great financial interests he could
54Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 371.
55George F. Williams to Joe Kirby, Sioux Falls, 
November 20, 1917, Pettigrew Papers.
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justify most of his statements without prejudicing the jury
or the court."56
Pettigrew became very unpopular during the time he 
was under indictment. On April 5, 1918, a mob gathered in 
downtown Sioux Falls, proceeded to Pettigrew’s office, and 
painted it yellow. The Senator was still in Chicago at the 
time and Williams advised that he had better stay there.
Fortunately, for Pettigrew, the case never came to 
trial. After more than a year of delay, his attorneys filed 
a demurrer which, much to their surprise, was granted. As 
a result, the charges against the Senator were dropped.
The indictment, however, became one of Pettigrew’s most 
treasured possessions; a symbol of his defiance. He 
hung it on the wall of the study in his home between the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and there, 
by order of his will, it hangs today.5*
It was during the same period that the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 occurred. This event had a profound 
influence on the mind of Richard Pettigrew, who wrote:
56Williams to Bailey, September 3, 1918, in ibid.
^^New York Times. April 5, 1918; Williams to Pettigrew, 
May 1, 1918, Pettigrew Papers.
58Bailey to Pettigrew, September 18, 1918, in ibid.
^*R.F. Pettigrew, "Last Will and Testament," in ibid.
60Pettigrew, Imperial Washington. 388.
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The Russian Revolution is the greatest event of our 
times. It marks the beginning of the epoch when the 
working people will assume the task of directing and 
controlling industry. It blazes a path into this 
unknown country where the Workers of the world are 
destined to take from their exploiters the right to 
control and direct the economic affairs of the 
community.
Although Pettigrew claimed to be a serious student of 
Russian affairs, his explanation of the causes of the 
Bolshevik Revolution reveals that he had little or no real 
understanding of the situation. "The war was an affirmation 
of capitalism," he wrote. "The Russian Revolution was the 
answer of the workers. The demands of the Russian people 
were very simple. They asked for work, bread and peace—  
those things that the capitalist system in Russia was unable 
to provide— hence the revolution." The Senator went on to 
say that the Russians had wisely abandoned the precedent of 
copying the American Constitution, "which permits the 
economic masters to carry on their work of exploitation with 
impunity," and had written a constitution based upon the 
proposition that the exploitation of one man.by another must 
cease.
Pettigrew now came to believe that the -only chance 
for civilization was a general movement among the workers of 
the world patterned upon his concept of the Russion 
Revolution. The workers must organize, he thought. Seize 
possession of their jobs, assume direction of all economic
*^Ibid.. 384.
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policy, and take the full value of everything they created 
for themselves. He believed, however, that his dream could 
perchance be accomplished without resort to violence through 
the organization of a political party of workers.
The Senator spent most of his time in the years 
after 1917 preparing the manuscripts of his two books. The 
first one to be published was The Course of Empire, which 
appeared in 1920. It was a compendium of Pettigrew's 
anti-imperialist speeches made while he was in the Senate.
The second volume appeared in 1922 and was given the 
intriguing title, Imperial Washington. It was supposed to be 
a record of Pettigrew's fifty years in politics in which he 
traced the reasons for his hatred of the American system.
He attempted to show how leading politicians had "sold out? 
to Wall Street and how the ideals of the American Revolution 
had been prostituted by the profit motive and the unchecked 
spoliation of the American working class. Pettigrew was 
very proud of this book, and he sent several copies to Lenin 
and Trotsky with the request that his work be translated 
into Russian. He was informed that it would be; however, the 
Library of Congress Catalogue gives no indication that such 
a translation exists.
62Ibid.. 425.
63Pettigrew to Leon Trotsky, May 9, 1923; L. Lotievia
to Pettigrew, August 24, 1923, Pettigrew Papers.
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Meanwhile, the Senator continued to seek answers to
the problems which he thought were facing the American people.
In June 1920, he was in Chicago, and studied as closely as
he could the activities of the Republican National Convention.
Later, in an unpublished manuscript, he described these
proceedings:^*
I was there from June 2 to June 12 and saw the whole 
operation. The representatives of the great interests 
arrived in a body and took charge of the convention from 
the start. It was the first time they have ever done 
this. There was Gary of the steel corporation; Davidson 
and Lamont of Morgan and Company; H.F. Allen of Lee 
Higgins and Company; Atterbury, Vice President of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. . . . They took no chances. They 
came, wrote the platform, and nominated the candidates. 
They would have been willing to take Lowden or Wood, but 
Borah said he would bolt the convention if they did.
They were holding Knox, Hoover and Harding in reserve. . 
They settled on Harding; they needed Ohio to win and 
he was solid on the question of commercial conquest 
of the earth by the United States. Their full 
determination is to envelope all the oil; iron and 
coal of the world and exploit the natural resources of 
North America, South America, Asia and Africa.
Such a pronouncement by the Senator only illustrates in
grandiloquent style the fact that now, at an advanced age,
he had little understanding of contemporary affairs. He
still dwelt in a Hobsonian world of intrigue in which all
political matters were controlled exclusively by the
financiers who were compelled by the capitalistic system to
seek new markets and sources of raw materials, or perish.
Still, Senator Pettigrew continued his search for a
^^R.F. Pettigrew, "The Republican Convention of
1920," Manuscript found in Pettigrew Papers.
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new political body which would meet his desires. In July,
1920, he attended the national convention of the newly
65organized Farmer-Labor party, which also met in Chicago. 
Although he was not a delegate and took no active part in 
the proceedings of the convention, Pettigrew believed this 
group came close to fulfilling his wishes for a third party 
of workers and farmers which could offer substantial opposition 
to the "tools of Wall Street." The convention nominated 
Parley P. Christensen of Utah for President and Pettigrew 
supported him in the campaign. He published a broadside in 
the Sioux Falls Press exorting the voters of South Dakota 
to carry the state for the Farmer-Laborites, ai  ̂then:
". . . take possession of the state government, and establish 
state banks and deposit all the money of the state in them 
where it will be available to help maintain the crops and 
carry prices. . . . "
Pettigrew declared that the basis of the farmers* 
problems was that they were forced to sell their crops for 
less than it cost to produce them to middle-men who in turn 
were controlled by Eastern financiers. Farmers were then 
forced to borrow from the banking community in order to 
operate and thus remained at the mercy of the exploiters. If 
all the money in the state of South Dakota could be controlled 
by the farmers themselves, he thought, the problem would be
ASNew York Times. July 15, 1920.
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solved,
In the Sioux Falls Press of October 17, 1920, Pettigrew
published another double-page broadside condemning the
candidacy of both Harding and Cox. "I suppose one or the
other of these pygmies will be elected," he lamented, "but
I shall vote for neither of them because they are both * tools
67of Wall Street.*" Later, the Senator recorded his
impressions of the election in his book. Imperial Washington.
"The great war is over. Peace has been restored. Sanity
is supposed to have replaced the hysteria of the war
frenzy. Yet Harding is in the White House, while Debs, the
champion of economic emancipation, is in the Atlanta 
68penitentiary." Apparently, Pettigrew took little comfort 
from the fact that Parley Christensen polled 37,000 votes in 
South Dakota, one of his best showings in the nation.
Pettigrew maintained his affiliation with the Farmer- 
Labor party, attending most of its conventions in the years 
which followed. In May, 1922, he attended a gathering in 
Chicago at which seventy delegates representing seventeen
66Sioux Falls Press. No date. Clipping, Pettigrew
Papers.
6?Ibid.. October 17i, 1920.
6flPettigrew, Imperial Washington. 402.
^^Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United 
States (New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1928), 395.
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states laid plans for the off-year elections. That fall 
he saw the party poll about 46,000 Congressional votes in
South Dakota.70 in July, 1923, Pettigrew attended another
71convention of the National Farmer-Labor party in Chicago.'
Here, he saw the party organization infiltrated and captured
72by the Workers* party of William Z. Foster. He was very 
much opposed to this event, however, because he was suspicious 
of the motivations of Foster.
After the July convention of 1923, the Farmer-Labor 
party rapidly disintegrated, and two distinct groups emerged; 
the Federated Farmer-Labor party, and the old National 
Farmer-Labor party. The former organization, however, existed 
only on paper and was controlled by the communists of the 
American Workers* party. The latter, now divested of all 
vitality, soon gave way to the leadership of the Minnesota 
Farmer-Labor party. This group, in an effort to pull all 
the dissident factions together, called a national convention 
to meet in St. Paul on June 17, 1 9 2 4 . Pettigrew attended 
the convention and once again saw the communists gain 
control. The sight did not please him, however, because of
7°Ibid.. 429.
71Pettigrew to Cherup Spic Dovick, June 25, 1923, 
Pettigrew Papers.
^Sjew York Times. July 6, 1923.
73Fine, Farmer and Labor Parties in the U.S.. 433.
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his dislike for Foster. "The . . . party has a few sincere 
communists," he wrote, "but they are controlled by a man 
named Foster and a man named Kennedy, who are self-seeking 
scoundrels, and may be purchased for cash or other personal 
advantage."
Disgusted with the leadership of the Worker's party, 
Pettigrew corresponded with leaders of other left wing 
organizations in an effort to find more "sincere communists."
He found them all lacking, however, and was especially critical 
of the National Peoples' Progressive party and its 
presidential candidate, R.P. Painter. "His platform is the 
usual dodge," wrote the Senator. " T h e 5iĉ 7 declare" for as 
little as possible in order to get all the radicals on 
something. There is no principle involved.
Pettigrew became devoted to the idea that "every man 
is entitled to all he produces," and his devotion was not 
subject to compromise. No longer was he interested in 
politics as an art. Only his principles were important, and 
thus he denounced the candidacy of William Z. Foster in 1924 
and spent the remainder of his time leveling bitter attacks 
not only at the American system, but at its radical opponents 
as well. He died on October 5, 1926, at the age of 78, with 
his dreams for reform as yet unrealized.
In the final analysis it must be concluded that
^^Pettigrew to Henry L. Loucks, April 17, 1924,
Pettigrew Papers.
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Richard Pettigrew had lost contact with realityDuring the 
last fifteen years of his life, he demonstrated a complete 
inability to adjust to the great changes which were occurring 
in American society. Early in his career he showed a. keen 
sensitivity to public needs, especially irtien they coincided 
with his own ambitions. Later, however, he adopted a rigid 
set of principles from which he would not depart. He refused 
to admit that others were concerned with the economic 
inequities of American life. He was blind to the positive 
work of reform accomplished by men like Woodrow Wilson. He 
even repudiated most American radicals, claiming to doubt 
their sincerity and integrity. Furthermore, his personal 
vindictiveness became even worse as he grew older, and he came 
to view all men who disagreed with him as scoundrels. Thus 
his final years were something of a tragedy, for had his 
energies been channeled into more useful endeavors, he might 
have accomplished much.
On the day of Pettigrew’s death, the Sioux Falls 
Arous Leader, so long his bitter critic, published an 
extremely sympathetic front-page obituary outlining the 
Senator’s political philosophy. "He was a communist of a 
peculiar variety," declared the paper. "He compromised with 
no one, and in recent years had devoted all his time to 
attacks upon economic i n e q u i t y . B u t  it was also recounted
75Sioux Falls Arous Leader. October 5, 1926.
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that in his youth he was a pioneer, and he helped to build 
the very system which in his age he could not find the 
weapon to destroy.
EPILOGUE
The life of Richard Pettigrew is an intriguing one. 
Like most men he was certainly affected by the time and place 
in which he lived. However, in surveying his political 
career, it becomes clear that he reacted to his environment 
in two distinct ways during two separate periods of his 
life.
As a young man in Dakota Territory, Pettigrew*s 
ambition and ability soon carried him to a position of 
leadership within the Republican party. When he entered the 
United States Senate in 1889, he was undeniably the most 
powerful man in South Dakota. From this point onward, 
however, his political career began to decline. Pettigrew's
fblase attitude toward the federal government and his clash 
with the Harrison Administration over patronage and the 
tariff raised questions concerning his loyalty in the minds 
of Republican leaders. His position on the Hawaiian question 
likewise caused doubts as he joined with the Democrats to 
block ratification of the first annexation treaty. Finally, 
his position on the silver question completely alienated him 
from the party and caused him to leave it in 1856.




it is necessary to inquire whether he was actuated by 
political motivations or sincere belief in the efficacy of 
free coinage. The answer is, both. Pettigrew sincerely 
believed by 1894 that the Populist Movement in South Dakota 
was powerful enough to take political control of the state 
and sustain it for an indefinite period. He believed this 
because he thought the Populists had struck a responsive 
chord among the people, and hit upon the correct answef to 
the problems of the agrarian elements of the state. On the 
other hand, Pettigrew was a professional politician, and 
was determined to stay in office. Thus it was only natural 
for him to switch parties at the proper juncture.
Pettigrew’s change-over was not a betrayal of principle 
because he was committed to the idea that free and unlimited 
coinage of silver was a panacea which would mitigate all the 
economic ills of the country. This can only be explained 
by saying that Pettigrew read the literature of free silver, 
and believed it. This belief, combined with his desire 
to remain in office, made his desertion of the Republican 
party virtually inevitable.
From 1896 onward, Pettigrew the shrewd politico 
rapidly gave way to Pettigrew the emotional zealot. During 
his anti-imperialist crusade he burned his bridges behind 
him and made return to the G.O.P. impossible. When he left 
the Senate, however, he maintained an interest in politics 
and for several years contemplated a return to public office.
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In his thinking, however, he rapidly drifted away from the 
practical and into the realm of idealism, from which he 
never returned. This drift was complete by 1912, after which 
Pettigrew was little more than a political curiosity. His 
love for the Russian Revolution, his connection with the 
Farmer-Labor party, and his final conversion to communism 
mark the path of a "wild-eyed" radical, not a serious 
politician.
His radicalism was all too sincere, however. There 
is little doubt that Pettigrew believed every word he spoke 
and wrote about economic inequity. Oddly, much of what he 
said was true. Other thinkers recognized the problems 
which confronted American society, and endeavored to correct 
them. But the fact that Pettigrew thought all men who 
disagreed with him were evil, insincere and incompetent 
marked him as an outcast from the mainstream of American 
reform.
Nevertheless, Richard Pettigrew was one of those 
fortunate individuals destined by fate to leave his foot­
print on the sands of time. His contributions to the 
material development of Dakota were significant. Had he 
not been stymied by the depression, they would have been 
incalculably greater, for his dream of making Sioux Falls 
the hub of a trans-continental railway system came within 
an ace of success.
Oh the national scene, Pettigrew*s most important
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contribution vas his backhanded support of forest reservation 
and administration. The law of March 3, 1891, which he 
helped to formulate became the basis for the national forest 
system of the United States. Furthermore, his r  amendment to 
the Sundry Civil Bill of 1897 provided for the administration 
of the forests at a most crucial juncture. Had he not 
altered the measure as.he did and secured the support of 
needed western votes, the bill might have failed of passage 
indefinitely.
Senator Pettigrew*s greatest shortcoming was his 
habitual use of biting sarcasm, invective, and slander in 
criticizing his political foes. This habit hastened the 
end of his own career as a public servant while he was still 
in the prime of life. Of course, it is impossible to say 
what the outcome would have been had he ever been elected 
to Congress again, but in any event, it cannot be denied 
that Pettigrew was a colorful figure, and a delightful 
example of political Americana. When he died, most people 
agreed that an irreplacable facet had passed from the scene.
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